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This thesis considers the problem of user authentication and supervision in networked 
systems. The issue of user authentication is one of on-going concern in modem IT systems 
with the increased use of computer systems to store and provide access to sensitive 
information resources. While the traditional usemame/password login combination can be 
used to protect access to resources (when used appropriately), users often compromise the 
security that these methods can provide. While alternative (and often more secure) 
systems are available, these alternatives usually require expensive hardware to be 
purchased and integrated into IT systems. Even i f alternatives are available (and 
financially viable), they frequently require users to authenticate in an intrusive manner (e.g. 
forcing a user to use a biometric technique relying on fingerprint recognition). Assuming 
an acceptable form of authentication is available, this still does not address the problem of 
on-going confidence in the users* identity - i.e. once the user has logged in at the 
beginning of a session, there is usually no ftirther confirmation of the users' identity until 
they logout or lock the session in which they are operating. Hence there is a significant 
requirement to not only improve login authentication but to also introduce the concept of 
continuous user supervision. 
Before attempting to implement a solution to the problems outlined above, a range of 
currently available user authentication methods are identified and evaluated. This is 
followed by a survey conducted to evaluate user attitudes and opinions relating to login 
and continuous authentication. The results reinforce perceptions regarding the weaknesses 
of the traditional usemame/password combination, and suggest that alternative techniques 
can be acceptable. This provides justification for the work described in the latter part o f 
the thesis. 
A number of small-scale trials are conducted to investigate altemative authentication 
techniques, using ImagePIN's and associative/cognitive questions. While these techniques 
are of an intrusive nature, they offer potential improvements as either initial login 
authentication methods or, as a challenge during a session to confirm the identity of the 
logged-in user. 
A potential solution to the problem of continuous user authentication is presented through 
the design and implementation of a system to monitor user activity throughout a logged-in 
session. The effectiveness o f this system is evaluated through a series o f trials 
investigating the use of keystroke analysis using digraph, trigraph and keyword-based 
metrics (with the latter two methods representing novel approaches to the analysis of 
keystroke data). The initial trials demonstrate the viability of these techniques, whereas 
later trials are used to demonstrate the potential for a composite approach. The final trial 
described in this thesis was conducted over a three-month period with 35 trial participants 
and resulted in over five million samples. Due to the scope, duration, and the volume of 
data collected, this trial provides a significant contribution to the domain, with the use of a 
composite analysis method representing entirely new work. The results of these trials 
show that the technique of keystroke analysis is one that can be effective for the majority 
of users. Finally, a prototype composite authentication and response system is presented, 
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1.1 Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed the use of computer technologies in a wide range of 
business and domestic scenarios. As such, there are few people in Western society whose 
lives are not affected by the use of Information Technology (IT). More recently, the 
explosive growth of both the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) has meant that IT 
has had yet ftjrther impacts upon our everyday lives. However, with society's widespread 
use of and, in some cases, reliance upon technology, significant opportunities now exist for 
both mischievous and malicious abuse via IT systems. While it is difficult, i f not 
impossible, to prevent all forms of IT misuse, there are a number of methods of addressing 
the variety of risks that modem computer systems face. One of the key problems in IT 
misuse is authenticating the identity of end-users in order to both prove the identity of a 
valid user as well as identifying impostor activity and illicit use of computer resources. 
In typical IT systems, protection against unauthorised user activities is usually provided via 
login authentication. Unfortunately, the majority of authentication schemes are based upon 
traditional password methods. The weaknesses of passwords are well-known (Jobusch and 
Oldehoeft, 1989), but their simplicity (from both user and developer perspectives) serves to 
ensure their continued use. A significant issue with passwords is that they typically 
provide a one-off authentication judgement at the beginning of a user session. Basing 
security measures on the identification of the user at the start of the session may prove 
unsatisfactory, as a user with lower user privileges or an outsider may gain access to the 
session and masquerade as the original, authenticated and, hence, authorised, user. The 
normal means of monitoring and identifying this is via audit trails, which maintain a record 
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of nominated security-relevant activities within the system and can be inspected at a later 
time in order to identify anomalies. The problem with this approach is that any detection 
of unauthorised activity will be retrospective, when significant damage may already have 
been done. I f audit trails are not monitored, security breaches may potentially remain 
unnoticed for some time. What is, therefore, required is an automated, proactive means of 
detecting and responding to unauthorised access/activity. The research described in this 
thesis attempts to address a number of these issues. 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
The objectives of this research programme can be categorised into two parts. Firstly, the 
range of methods for user authentication were identified and evaluated in order to 
determine currently available techniques and consider alternatives. This informed the 
second objective; namely the design of new methods and the development of associated 
practical experiments conducted to evaluate the alternative techniques, as well as 
considering user attitudes and opinions following exposure to the methods under trial. 
The thesis begins by analysing the current methods of user authentication as well as 
considering the concept of user supervision. The user preference for secret-based 
authentication techniques is considered, together with the inherent weaknesses that these 
approaches present. User behaviour is considered by looking at the use (and misuse) of 
current authentication techniques, before a survey was conducted to determine the attitudes 
and perceptions of computer users to existing authentication techniques as well as 
introducing alternative methods. 
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The research continued by considering the practical implementation of a number of 
alternative user authentication mechanisms. In implementing these alternative approaches 
a key aim was to improve the level of security without causing the user to perform explicit 
actions (e.g. to provide authentication details) or to have to modify software (or their own 
behaviour). While the earlier trials considered improvements in the initial login 
authentication utilising secret-based methods, in order to achieve these objectives the later 
trials developed into transparent, continuous, real-time user supervision. The practical 
implementation of these techniques is evaluated via a series of prototype implementations. 
The objectives for the research programme can be summarised as follows: 
1. to investigate the current methods o f user authentication/supervision within 
computer systems; 
2. to assess user attitudes towards current authentication systems, as well as the 
acceptability of alternative authentication approaches and the concept of continuous 
user supervision; 
3. to design new methods for improving user authentication and continuous user 
monitoring; 
4. to evaluate the methods implemented and produce recommendations on necessary 
improvements; 
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5. to examine how the techniques can be applied in a wider, more comprehensive 
security system; 
6. to recommend fiiture development and propose further work relating to the research 
programme. 
The objectives outlined above relate to the sequence of material presented in the following 
chapters in the thesis, the outline structure for which is presented in the next section. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis presents the outcome of research conducted to investigate and evaluate 
alternative user authentication and supervision techniques in a modem PC environment. 
The thesis begins by considering the general area of user authentication before identifying 
potential approaches for further investigation. The chosen techniques are then evaluated in 
detail, and experiments conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the approaches. 
Chapter 2 presents a general overview o f current issues relating to computer security and 
draws upon a number of examples of recent incidents to demonstrate the risks faced by 
computer systems. This is followed by a summary of the classifications of those 
responsible for computer abuse incidents in order to gain a better understanding of the 
different types of offenders. Having considered the background to computer abuse, the 
chapter then focuses upon the limitations of current user authentication techniques, 
considering the classic classifications of what the user knows, has and is. The chapter then 
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proceeds to discuss the problems with the current preferred technique, namely the 
password, before considering the alternatives. A significant section of the chapter is then 
dedicated to the consideration of a range of biometric based techniques, and finally 
sununarising the relative merits. 
Having evaluated a range of alternatives to the simple password, chapter 3 presents the 
results of a survey evaluating user attitudes and perceptions regarding a range of 
authentication techniques. This survey evaluated a range of issues in order to determine 
the acceptability of alternative techniques to the end users. The chapter begins by 
summarising current password practices (from a user perspective), before presenting the 
participants with a range of alternatives. The results of this survey informed the selection 
of techniques for further evaluation. 
Following the selection of a subset of potential approaches, chapter 4 presents the results 
of two trials conducted to evaluate a range of secret-based authentication techniques. As 
these techniques are popular among users, this chapter focuses on methods that utilise 
secret knowledge. The chapter begins by presenting the technical implementation 
followed by the results of two trials aimed at evaluating both user recall of secret 
information and the long-term perceptions of user-friendliness and acceptability o f these 
approaches. 
Chapter 5 progresses beyond the use of secret-based techniques to present an overview of 
the concept of keystroke analysis. This chapter begins with a discussion of the range of 
metrics that can be obtained through keystroke analysis, and the ways in which these can 
be interpreted. Following this, the chapter identifies a range of ways to obtain the 
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identified metrics under the Windows operating system together with discussion of the 
potential integration of keystroke analysis directly into the Windows security model. The 
discussion then moves on to consider the role o f filtering and post processing before 
summarising previous work in the area. Finally, the chapter identifies a series of new 
approaches to keystroke analysis, considering the use of trigraph, keyword and application-
specific profiling. 
Chapter 6 takes the proposed techniques from chapter 5 and describes an experimental 
implementation of keystroke dynamics aimed at evaluating the methods previously 
identified. The chapter begins with a detailed description of the software developed for the 
experiment and the features of the underlying operating system that were utilised. This is 
followed by a discussion of the analysis of the data, before considering the results of the 
trial. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of a novel use of data mining for 
keystroke analysis, before presenting an initial experiment of the use of an application-
specific approach. 
Following the small experiment described in chapter 6, chapter 7 presents the results of a 
long-term experiment evaluating digraph, trigraph and keyword-based keystroke analysis. 
The chapter begins by presenting the technical implementation of the keylogging software 
and utility programs used to filter the raw data, generate the profiles and compare the 
samples. Following this, the chapter presents the results for each of the separate metrics. 
Chapter 8 extends the work presented in chapter 7, and considers alternative approaches 
and concepts. This chapter presents the results of a composite approach that combines the 
three metrics evaluated in the previous chapter, before introducing a composite 
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authentication and response system based upon the software described in chapters 4, 6, 7 
and 8. This is presented as a prototype implementation to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
these techniques in an operational context. 
Finally, chapter 9 presents the conclusions drawn from the research conducted and 
presented in the thesis. The key achievements are emphasised, together with the 
limitations on the research programme. This chapter also suggests a number of potential 
extensions to the research described in the earlier chapters, and identifies a number of 
possible improvements to the experiments conducted. 
The thesis also includes a number of appendices containing additional information to 
support the discussion presented in the main chapters. In addition a CD is provided that 
includes source code from the experiments described in chapters 6, 7 and 8, as well as the 
raw results (too large to include in the body of the thesis). Finally, a number of published 
papers arising from the project are included, as well as a list of papers produced during the 
same period that are less directly related to the PhD research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed the integration of personal computer technologies into 
a wide range of business and domestic scenarios. As such, there are few people in Western 
society whose lives are not affected in some way by the use of IT. More recently, the 
growth of the Internet and the WWW has meant that IT has had yet further impacts upon 
our everyday lives. This is set to increase over the coming years with the increased 
availability of new technologies - especially with an increasingly mobile and technically 
minded public. However, with society's widespread use of, and, in some cases reliance 
upon, technology, significant opportunities now exist for both mischievous and malicious 
abuse of IT systems. 
Over the past 20 years, the UK Audit Commission has conducted a series of surveys to 
assess the scale of crime and abuse within the IT community. The results of these surveys 
show a significant upward trend in overall crime levels during this period (Table 2.1). The 
audit commission surveys are not alone in these findings with surveys conducted by the 
CS! in the USA showing similar rises in computer crime (CSI, 2003). 
It should be noted that the categorisation of various types of computer crime cases has 
varied slightly over the twenty years of the Audit Commission surveys. In particular, the 
category of Viruses' was not included until 1990 and cases of offences involving 
pornographic material were not reported until 2001 (the latest survey results currently 
available). In the 1984-1990 surveys the definition of the category "theft" was quite broad 
and covered the use of unlicensed/illicit software, private work and theft (of equipment or 
10 
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data) while the category "hacking" covered hacking, sabotage and invasion of privacy. For 
the comparisons of later surveys, these categories have been maintained for consistency. 
Fraud Viruses Theft Hacking Pornography Other Total 
1984 60 - 17 - - - 77 
1987 61 - 22 35 - - 118 
1990 73 54 27 26 - - 180 
1994 108 261 121 47 - - 537 
1998 67 247 88 56 - 52 510 
2001 50 200 19 44 193 119 625 
Table 2.1 - Reported incidents of computer crime and abuse 
It is clear that over the last 20 years there has been a significant increase in the number of 
reported incidents. A clear factor influencing this increase is the explosion in virus 
incidents that can be observed from the 1990s and the subsequent increase in cases relating 
to the access or distribution of pornographic materials in the most recent survey. It is 
worth noting that, in the latest results, 'pornography', 'use of unlicensed software' and 
'private use of company IT resources' are the only categories of abuse in which the 
reported incidents have risen (in both real terms and as a percentage of incidents reported) 
when compared to the previous surveys (193 cases relating to pornographic material, 35 
cases relating to unlicensed software and 72 cases relating to private use of company 
resources). 
These findings are echoed in the surveys conducted in the USA by the CSI/FBI through 
their computer crime and security surveys. The most recent report (CSI, 2003) showed 
56% of organisations suffering from unauthorised use of corporate computer systems 
(slightly down on the 60% reported in the previous year). Of the 490 organisations 
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surveyed, 45% reported unauthorised access to computer resources by insiders and 80% 
reporting insider abuse of network access. This shows a high level o f computer misuse 
appearing from inside an organisation - misuse which may be prevented by improved user 
authentication and/or monitoring of user actions. 
Over the last few years there have been numerous incidents that have been reported in the 
media that have reaffirmed the susceptibility of IT systems to abuse. Examples of these 
incidents include the MyDoom virus (and its variants) and the mass defacement challenge 
(a number of recent incidents are outlined in Table 2.2). 
Incident Details 
MyDoom worm January 2004 
Mass mailing and peer-peer file-sharing worm 
• contained an SMTP server to send emails (spam/replication) 
• contained a backdoor to allow IP spoofing or remote code 
execution 
• contained a Denial of Service payload targeting the SCO (and 
Microsoft in the MyDoom.B variant) web sites 
At the peak of the infection it was estimated that 20-30% of all 
worldwide email traffic was generated by MyDoom. 
(F-Secure, 2004) 
Mass defacement July 2003 
Global hacking competition conducted to deface web sites. 
Target of 6,000 web sites hacked in 24 hours 
There is no confirmed count of defacements but the figures are 
estimated to be in the region of a few thousand. 
(ZoneH, 2003) 
Global DDoS June 2003 
Global distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. 
The web sites of Clickbank and Spamcop were victims of a global 
DDoS attack suffering over 1000 hits per second. 
1 (Schultz, 2003a) 
Table 2.2 - Example IT security incidents 
Before we can look at ways of improving IT security, it is first necessary to understand the 
issues that affect computer systems. There are four main issues relating to computer 
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security (ITSEC, 1991) and overall IT system security relies on the preservation of all of 
these factors. 
Confidentiality 
The term confidential is indicative of a level of secrecy and is clearly 
understood. This generally refers to the prevention of unauthorised disclosure 
of information and has a familiar comparison with a "need to know", military-
style, security model. The consequences of a breach of confidentiality are 
usually dependent on the context of the breach. From an organisational 
perspective, i f confidential content is accessible to a third party the 
consequences are probably more significant than i f someone inside the 
organisation accessed the same material. 
Integrity 
Integrity of data can be more difficult to analogise, as it relates to the 
consistency, completeness and correctness of data. An impostor or 
masquerador could potentially make minor changes to data files or programs 
(e.g. to siphon of f small amounts of money lost in account transactions 
through rounding errors) that would not necessarily be identified immediately. 
Not all breaches of data integrity are malicious, however, even accidental 
modification/deletion of data can cause serious problems (e.g. a user 
mistakenly deleting an important file). Viruses represent one of the 
commonest threats to IT system integrity with payloads that can modify/delete 
files. 
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Availability 
With an increased dependence on IT systems, their availability (or uptime), is 
increasingly important. Users expect systems to be available whenever and 
wherever they need them. While this used to concentrate on defence against 
mechanical/logical failure, it is now equally ( i f not more) important to 
consider the threat from malicious activity which can render a system 
inaccessible. Known as a Denial of Service (DoS), this form of malicious 
activity was used to significant effect against several major Internet sites 
(Yahoo, Amazon and eBay to name a few) in the worldwide attacks in early 
February 2000, effectively holding systems hostage (McCullagh and Arent, 
2000). A recent survey (CSI, 2003) identified DoS attacks as the second most 
expensive form of incident affecting respondent organisations and costing 
industry in excess of S65m. 
Accountability 
Whilst not usually considered a part of the C-I-A trio, accountability is vitally 
important to allow actions and intrusions to be tracked. Without some form of 
accountability it is impossible to directly attribute an action to an individual or 
to be able to prove that an individual did not perform a specific action (i.e. 
through authentication we should be able to hold an individual accountable for 
their actions or, alternatively to be able to defend an individual or 
organisation). Accountability is usually achieved through historical logs, 
however this only allows action to be taken after the event, therefore some 
form of interactive monitoring is needed to audit (and respond to) user actions 
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in real-time. Action in response to illegitimate activity needs to be taken 
proactively rather than reactively. 
2.2 Categorising system intrusions and misuse 
Whilst the previous section discussed the four specific issues relating to IT security, it is 
also necessary to understand the sources from which computer abuse is likely to be 
encountered. This is important, as although it is necessary to appreciate the differing forms 
of computer abuse, it is also important to consider the nature of the person undertaking the 
misuse. By examining the perpetrators of computer crimes, it may be possible to evaluate 
the motives and hence to reduce the risks faced by IT systems. Forms of human abuse 
have already been comprehensively categorised by Anderson (1980), and are described in 
Table 2.3. 
Abuser Type Description 
External 
Penetrators 
Outsiders attempting or gaining unauthorised access to the system. 
E.g. a hacker trying to download the password file(s) from a server or a rival 
company trying to access the sales database. 
Internal 
Penetrators 
Authorised users of the system who access data, resources or 
programs to which they are not entitled. Sub-categorised into: 
• Masqueraders Users who operate under the identity of another 
user. 
E.g. someone using another users' PC whilst they are 
absent from their terminal, or, someone using another's 
usemame/password. 
• Clandestine users Users who evade access controls and auditing. 
E.g. someone disabling security features/auditing etc. 
Misfeasors Users who are authorised to use the system and resources accessed, 
but misuse their privileges. 
E.g. someone in the payroll department accessing a colleague's records or 
misappropriating funds. 
Table 2.3 - Categories of system abuser 
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These groupings are considered appropriate for describing the different types of user-
related abuse within an intrusion-monitoring framework and wil l , therefore, be adopted for 
the remainder of the discussion. Whilst it is also possible to develop a deeper profile of 
potential intruders, by considering factors such as the common motivations behind abuse 
(e.g. money, ideology, egotism etc.), these are not explored here as knowledge of them 
would not contribute to the process of detection. However, this subject was discussed in a 
paper published in 1999 (Fumell et al) in which the motivations, ethics and perceptions of 
computer criminals are explored and the role of the media is considered. 
It should be noted that Anderson's categorisations do not take into account any of the types 
of abuse that may result from software activity (e.g. viruses, Trojan Horses etc.). This is 
understandable given that the analysis was made in 1980 before such incidents had become 
commonplace. However, there has been a significant increase in such attacks over the last 
decade and evidence suggests that viruses are one of the major causes of security breaches 
in both networked and standalone PC systems (CSI, 2003). 
2.2.1 Internal Penetrators and Misfeasors 
At the highest level, intrusions or misuse will be the result o f actions by authorised users or 
processes, which operate on one or more targets that may include data (files), system 
devices and other users or processes. It has been shown that the most significant source of 
computer system abuse is from within the organisation (Dinnie, 1999; ISBS, 2000), 
Therefore, i f we can secure systems against internal abusers, we will be targeting the most 
likely perpetrator. Unfortunately, internal abusers are quite likely to be authorised to use 
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the systems they are abusing, hence reliance on the basic usemame/password wil l only 
serve to, retrospectively, attribute blame once the abuse has been detected. In order to 
detect and prevent abuse in real time, it is necessary to introduce an element of user 
supervision. 
The purpose of introducing supervision will be two-fold: 
to ensure that systems are only accessed by authorised users; 
to ensure that systems are only used for authorised purposes. 
By introducing user supervision it is possible to monitor, in real time, the actions of 
individual users at a variety of levels. Monitoring could take place at operating system 
level; monitoring key files, directories or resources (e.g. printers and CD writers) or 
individual applications could be monitored (e.g. a database application could be monitored 
for export of data or deliberate deletion of data). Alternatively, a higher-level approach 
could be taken. A supervision application could be loaded into a system that would 
monitor specific characteristics (akin to a lifeguard watching a swimming pool from a high 
vantage point). When an uncharacteristic pattern is monitored (e.g. a person panicking in 
the deep end of the pool) an appropriate response can be initiated. This could potentially 
identify a user acting in an unusual or unexpected manner (e.g. conducting tasks outside of 
their defined role) or could identify a user account being used by an impostor. 
User actions can be categorised as being either legitimate or illegitimate. However, it is 
useful i f a more detailed breakdown than this can be derived for the different potential 
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classes of illegitimate activity. For example, all of the following scenarios represent types 
of illegitimate activity that should be monitored: 
an illegitimate action that is still within the normal authorisation of a 
valid user (i.e. abuse of privileges); 
• an action by a valid user which is outside the normal limits of 
authorisation; 
any action by an unauthorised user. 
2.2.2 External Penetrators 
Whilst sources of abuse within the organisation are the most likely form of abuse, they are 
usually the least damaging to a company and its reputation. The reason for this is that 
being intemal attacks, they are usually dealt with by the company concerned and rarely 
have any external impact. External penetrators are quite different. Due to the intrusive 
nature of such attacks, they are more likely to have a visible, external impact. Examples of 
this could include company blackmail, attacks against web sites and financial loss from e-
commerce systems. Although most of these attacks can be described as prank or hoax 
attacks, they will often have a significantly negative effect as they undermine the 
company's public image. A particularly apt example of this was the hack of the RSA 
security web site in February 2000 (2600, 2000). (It should be noted that the server on 
which the RSA web site was held was not actually hacked. Instead, the perpetrator, a 
hacker named Coolio, was able to modify the DNS records to redirect traffic destined for 
the RSA web site to a different server.) The consequence of this particular hack was the 
rather unfortunate headlines indicating that a company purporting to provide high security 
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solutions was itself hacked - the media choosing to overlook the nature of the attack that 
was actually outside the control of RSA. 
2.3 Limitations of current technology 
Having identified and categorised the main sources of computer abuse, this section 
considers the current methods of protecting IT systems and identifies their shortcomings. 
There are three main approaches to user authentication, something the user knows, 
something the user has and something the user is (Wood, 1977). Table 2.4 summarises 
these 3 main forms of authentication and provides examples as well as indicating the 
known weaknesses of each method. These methods will all be discussed in more detail in 
the next section(s). 
Something 
the user... 
knows has is 
Example • Password 
• PIN 
• Other secret 
knowledge (e.g. 
personal information) 
• Magnetic card 
• Smart card 
• Proximity device (e.g. RF 
tag) 
• Physiological (e.g. 
fingerprint, retinal scan) 
• Behaviour e.g. keystroke 
analysis 
Weaknesses • Can be guessed 
• Often chosen 
inappropriately 
• Vulnerable to social 
engineering or 
shoulder surfing 
• Can be stolen 
• Potentially replicated 
• Dedicated hardware 
needed (e.g. magnetic 
card reader). 
• Usually requires dedicated 
hardware to profile and 
authenticate 
• If breached, users cannot 
replace their identifying 
characteristic (e.g. cannot 
grow a new fingerprint). 
Strengths • Easy to implement 
• Easy for users 
• Can be combined with 
knowledge (e.g. pin plus 
swipe card) 
• Depending on measure is 
highly unique to the 
individual. 
• Cannot be forgotten by user 
Table 2.4 - Examples of authentication measures 
The most commonly used means of authentication in IT systems is the password. 
Passwords are conceptually simple for designers and users and can provide effective 
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protection i f used correctly. However, their protection is often compromised by users. 
Typical problems include forgetting passwords, writing them down, telling other people 
your password and selecting easily guessed passwords. 
Several studies have been carried out over the last 30 years looking at the ease with which 
passwords can be determined. In 1979, 86% of the 3829 passwords gathered, could be 
guessed by a PC in less than 1 week (Morris & Thompson, 1979). This was repeated in 
1990 by Klein and in 1992 by Spafford (Klein, 1990; Spafford, 1992). Whilst the results 
from these later experiments showed that password selection had improved (only 21% 
could be guessed in 1 week), so have the tools that can be used to guess passwords. In 
1998, LOpht Heavy Industries developed LOphtCrack (Heskett, 1998) - later renamed and 
re-released as LC4 when bought out by @stake (2004). @Stake is a utility that allows 
Windows NT Server Message Block (SMB) password packets to be captured during 
network authentication sessions (although the product is advertised as a password auditing 
and recovery tool). This utility not only allows the encrypted passwords to be captured 
directly o f f the network, it can also perform a dictionary and brute force attack against the 
encrypted passwords. Similar utilities are also available for other operating systems 
(notably CRACK which runs under a number of flavours of UNIX) (Cherry et al, 1992). 
More recently, researchers from the Swiss security organisation Lasec developed 
"Advanced Instant NT Password Cracker" (Schultz, 2003b). This prototype application 
(only available as a demo from the web site) claims to be able to crack Windows user 
account passwords in hours rather than days. 
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There are a number of measures that can be taken to improve password security for 
example: 
Non-Dictionary Words 
Forcing users to select non-dictionary passwords prevents the use of 
dictionary based attacks. A dictionary attack can identify a password in less 
than 20 minutes even on word lists with up to one million words. The only 
way to identify non-dictionary passwords is by using a brute-force approach 
(testing every combination of characters for every length of password). 
Passwords with mixed case/symbols 
Including both upper/lower case and symbols (!£$% etc.) in passwords 
requires any attack to use a brute force method. The use of these extra 
characters exponentially increases the time taken to determine the password 







a-z 456,976 (26'') 208,827,064,576 (26**) 
a-z, A-Z 7,311,616(52") 53,459,728,531,456 (52') 
a-z, A-Z, 0-9 14,776,336(62") 218,340,105,584,896 (62") 
a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and 
special characters e.g. !, 
^ £ , $ , % . ^ @ . # etc. 
[Approx 82 characters] 
45,212,176 (82") 2,044,140,858,654,976 (82**) 
Table 2.5 - Character combinations for passwords 
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Figure 2.1 - Exponential increase in password complexity 
Password Ageing 
Should an intruder obtain a valid usemame/password combination most 
systems will allow the intruder to continue to access the system until the 
intrusion is noticed. If a password ageing policy is in place users can be 
forced to change their passwords regularly, thus forcing the intruder to 
identify the new password. 
Whilst these suggestions will help to make a password-based system more resilient to an 
intruder they are by no means secure. A determined intruder can utilise password-cracking 
utilities to determine even the most random password in a matter of weeks. With the 
advent of more powerful processors, intruders will be able to crack passwords in a more 
realistic time - a matter of days for some PCs. A more worrying issue is the failure by 
some users to protect their own passwords. None of the measures outlined above help to 
address the human-element of the problem. This was demonstrated in a recent survey 
conducted at the InfoSec conference at Olympia (IT Week, 2003). The survey revealed 
22 
Chapter 2 : Evaluation of Current Authentication Measures 
that of the 150 people questioned, more than 100 were prepared to give their passwords to 
a complete stranger - tested most effectively by simply asking people what their password 
was. While not very scientific, the survey did highlight a ftindamental problem with IT 
security - we still rely on users! To counter these problems with password based systems, 
we need to consider alternative approaches to user authentication. Another factor 
suggesting the use of altemafives is that any of the above means of strengthening 
passwords ultimately reduce their simplicity and fi-iendliness for users. 
2.4 Methods of Improving Authentication 
To meet the demand for alternative methods of user identification and authentication, there 
are a growing number of companies offering both hardware and software based products. 
Solutions range from basic (and cheap) keystroke analysis software (BioPassword, 2004) 
to sophisticated iris and retinal scanning devices (Secure Computing, 1995; Sherman, 
1992; Cope, 1990). Many of these devices can be incorporated into desktop PC's and can 
usually be configured into a network-wide security policy. However, most of these 
products utilise proprietary technology in both the hardware and software making it 
impossible (or at the very least difficult) to integrate products purchased from a variety of 
manufacturers. There is also considerable variability in the extent to which the software 
provided can integrate with the operating system's security model. Some products simply 
provide an additional layer of security, requiring the user to authenticate themselves in 
addition to providing a valid usemame/password pair, whilst others provide replacement 
logon interfaces and ftilly integrate into the security model of the OS. However, some 
work has been done by OS vendors to provide a standardised application programming 
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interface (API) to allow product vendors to integrate their identification/authentication and 
monitoring devices/products into the OS security kernel (BioAPI, 2004; Microsoft, 2000). 
As indicated earlier in Table 2.4, the three main methods of user authentication have a 
number of weaknesses. Passwords can be written down, forgotten and shared; tokens or 
cards can be stolen, copied or lost whereas the alternative, biometrics provides a seemingly 
near-perfect solution. I f the problems of cost, user acceptance and integration can be 
overcome (not insignificant problems on their own) the use of biometrics could be a 
solution to the problems of user authentication. Biometric characteristics cannot be 
(easily) lost, stolen or duplicated; are usually stored in a non-reproducible manner and 
offer a high level of authentication confidence (depending on the methods chosen). 
Methods o f biometric-based user authentication fall into two distinct categories, 
specifically physiological and behavioural characteristics. 
• Physiological characteristics represent those traits that describe who we 
are based on physical attributes, for example fingerprints, hand geometry, 
retinal and iris scanning. These characteristics usually require additional 
equipment to be connected externally to the computer to provide the 
necessary data capture. 
Behavioural characteristics cover attributes such as typing style, voice 
pattern and signature recognition. Most behavioural characteristics can be 
acquired without the need for additional equipment (keyboard & mouse) 
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however others do require specialised hardware solutions (signature 
recognition). 
Most biometric devices offer a compromise between high security/low user acceptance and 
low security/high user acceptance. This trade-off can be measured as the False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the devices. Figure 2.2 shows the 
relationship between the FAR and FRR rates and can be seen to be mutually exclusive. 
100 F a l s e Acceptance 
R a l e ( F A R ) 
F a l s e Rejection 
Rate ( F R R ) 
Equal Error Rate 
S lack T o l e r a n c e / T h r e s h o l d 
Set t ing 
Increasing end-user rejection — 
Tight 
Figure 2.2 - F A R / F R R Graph 
FAR represents the proportion of invalid users who will be successfully authenticated by a 
system (i.e. falsely accepting an unauthorised user). FRR represents the proportion of 
valid users who will be identified as illegitimate by the system (i.e. incorrectly rejecting an 
authorised user). The error rates of an authentication system are assessed using a fixed 
population of test users and usually involves cross testing of users against the profiles of all 
other users in the trial. This allows consistent testing of error rates, but results in rates 
based on a subset o f the population - i.e. it does not consider a true intruder (an individual 
unknown to the system). Despite this flaw, the use of FAR/FRR rates is widely used as a 
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metric for authentication techniques and, as such, is used within this thesis to allow 
appropriate comparisons to be made to existing techniques. It has so far proved impossible 
to achieve a system where the FAR and FRR rates have both been reduced to 0. Most 
systems, instead, select an appropriate level at which inconvenience to the legitimate user, 
through denial of access (rejected logins), is acceptable, without allowing too many 
intruders to gain unauthorised access. All systems have an Equal Error Rate (EER), the 
point at which the FAR and FRR rates are equal. Whilst this rate represents the theoretical 
"best-fit" for security measures, it is rarely ideal in a secure environment where a 
preference for either low FAR or FRR exists (Cope, 1990). 
2.4.1 Continuous supervision 
While the techniques outlined in the previous section are usually used to identify an 
individual at the start of a session (in a similar way to passwords) this does not address the 
problem of on-going authentication. In most systems, once a user has identified 
themselves to the operating system/application, it is usually impossible to determine i f the 
active user is authorised. For example, a typical user session commences when they arrive 
in the morning and will end when they leave in the afternoon/evening. Throughout the day, 
the user will leave their terminal (often without any form of locking or password protected 
screen-saver) for breaks, lunch, meetings etc. During this period of absence, the system, 
without additional controls, will continue to assume that the user is still the original 
authenticated user - who could have been replaced at any stage by an impostor or 
masquerador. Whilst this may be adequate for some users, in environments where a higher 
level of security is required, some form of ongoing user authentication may be desirable. 
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To remedy this, authentication can be extended beyond the login stage and effectively 
supervise the user throughout a logged-in session. It should be noted that not all of the 
measures described above (and in the following sections) are suitable for continuous user 
monitoring. For example, signature recognition would be entirely unsuitable, as the user 
would be forced to stop his/her work to sign their name before proceeding. Instead, 
measures such as continuous keystroke analysis, combined with strong one-off 
authentication measures may prove effective. 
2.4.2 Finger scan 
Fingerprint scanning requires a hardware-based device linked to a PC or access control 
system and is one of the most established forms of biometric based user authentication. 
The use of fingerprints as a means of identification has been established over many years 
through their use in criminology. Whilst this measure is a good discriminator of identity, 
there are social issues to consider. It has been suggested (IBG, 1999; Sherman, 1992) that 
the use of fingerprints for identification has criminal overtones and that there may be some 
resistance by users to use such systems. Despite this, there have been successful trials with 
organisations like MasterCard and the US Department of Defence (Identix, 2004) and 
these devices are now available at relatively low cost from a range of suppliers. 
2.4.3 Hand geometry 
Hand geometry is, like fingerprints, a good discriminator of identity and also requires some 
form of dedicated hardware. It is one of the least used of all biometric measures, although 
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there are a number of establishments that have adopted it (Recogsys, 2003). Although 
there is little resistance to this form of user identification, it still requires a specific action 
on the part of the user, i.e. the user must place their hand on the scanner, there are also 
significant cost factors to consider for any deployment. While this seems to be accepted 
for access control for buildings, offices etc., it is unlikely to be acceptable on individual 
PC's or other devices. 
2.4.4 Retina scan 
Retinal scanning projects a laser light onto the user's retina and identification is based on 
the retinal vascular pattern i.e. the vein pattern on the retinal surface. There is only one 
commercially available system (Eyedentify fi-om Access Controls International), their 
device claims to match a users retinal scan fi-om a user base of 300,000 in less than 15 
seconds (ACI, 2004). The accuracy of this device is claimed to be very high, this allows a 
user to simply present their eye to a device without requiring a card, pin or usemame, i.e. 
one to many identity matching. The main drawback to this device is cost and acceptability. 
The cost factor has restricted the use of such identification methods primarily to the 
military sectors, where security is of greater importance than cost. The acceptability factor 
is related to public perception of the safety o f lasers. There are also some technical 
problems when identifying user's wearing glasses (especially i f darkened) (ACI, 2004). 
2.4.5 Iris scan 
Iris scanning is also a hardware-based technique, using high-quality cameras and natural 
light to detect and identify the unique patterns of a users' iris. Iris scanning has several 
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advantages over retinal scanning, notably, cost and acceptability. The entry-cost for iris 
scanning is significantly cheaper than retinal scanning as it relies on simpler cameras e.g. 
Panasonic's Authenticam (Panasonic, 2004). As these cameras become more widespread 
(even potentially built into monitors), the use of iris scanning as an acceptable method of 
user identification may increase. Secondly, because the iris can be identified without the 
use of laser light, it may prove more acceptable from a safety viewpoint. Recent 
improvements have resulted in much more reliable products that are able to cope with 
users who wear contact lenses or glasses (KJiew, 2002) 
2.4.6 Facial geometry 
Facial recognition is another economically viable method currently available. Facial 
recognition can be achieved using standard cameras e.g. a webcam. The video stream is 
then encoded and the face located and identified. The face can be authenticated using a 
range of methods but can be represented by two techniques. Feature extraction and 
recognition identifies the location of key features of the face (e.g. eyes, ear, nose and 
mouth) and calculates a geometrical relationship between the key features. This 
relationship is then stored as a mathematical model of the face. This method has the 
advantage that it relies on relative positioning o f facial features and is therefore more 
tolerant of variations in head position. An alternative is to use a holistic approach where 
the face is evaluated as a whole and use neural networks or statistical techniques to 
evaluate a face-print and form a profile. As with iris recognition, there are some technical 
problems with user's appearance, e.g. wearing glasses, changing hairstyle etc., such 
deviations fi^om the stored images may require the user's profile to be updated (Woodward 
et al, 2003). 
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2.4.7 Key stroke dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics can provide an additional level o f security for the traditional 
usemame/password by analysing the typing style during logon, or, can be used to identify 
the user based on more dynamic freestyle text entry e.g. allowing the user to type a known 
string or phrase. This method is o f particular interest as it is one o f the few totally non-
intrusive authentication mechanisms available as the user does not have to explicitly do 
anything to be authenticated by this method (i.e. the user would perform a normal login, or, 
in a supervised environment, would continue with routine tasks whilst being monitored in 
the background). There is only one available product that utilises this method, namely 
BioPassword (2004). This product is able to supplement login authentication wi th 
keystroke analysis - however, this is only at login and there is no further improvement in 
security beyond the initial authentication. 
2.4.8 Mouse Dynamics 
Mouse dynamics is an extension o f the keystroke analysis concept. The principle o f mouse 
dynamics is that, like our typing, our mouse movements may be a characteristic trait that 
can be monitored and compared against a historic profile. Like the keystroke dynamics 
technique described previously, this method could also be transparent (depending on 
implementation) and could act as a continuous authentication mechanism. There are 
currently no products available using this technique. 
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2.4.9 Speaker verification 
Speaker verification requires nothing more than a basic microphone connected to the PC's 
sound card and the appropriate software. Speaker verification is a distinct area from that o f 
voice interpretation that is commonly found in commercially available dictation software 
often (mistakenly) referred to as voice recognition (voice recognition/interpretation 
software is used to convert spoken language into written text - i.e. a speech-text translator 
and has no recognition o f the individual speaker). Whilst this is a conceptually simple 
form o f user authentication, it may be inappropriate in certain (noisy) environments. 
2.4.10 Dynamic signature 
O f all the biometric measures, signature recognition is probably the most familiar to the 
end-user. The principle o f providing a signature as a means o f authentication is a historical 
part o f western culture - thus potentially avoiding some o f the problems o f acceptability. 
However, it should be note that this would be one o f the most intrusive biometric-based 
authentication techniques i f applied in a continuous context, requiring a user to stop work 
and sign their name. A significant advantage o f signature recognition over keystroke 
analysis or voice recognition is avoiding the dependency on technical ability or language. 
However, there is also the need for a signature capture device - typically provided as a 
graphics tablet. 
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2.4.11 Summary of techniques 
Each o f these methods o f enhancing user authentication has advantages and disadvantages. 
Perhaps the most significant o f these is the user acceptance o f such measures. To 
determine the level o f user acceptance, a survey was carried out, the details o f which are 
listed in chapter 3. There are also other issues to consider, specifically, effectiveness, 
transparency and cost. These were not considered as part o f the survey as the majority o f 
the respondents would not have the adequate knowledge in the area to provide appropriate 
responses. The benefits and disadvantages o f each o f these methods are briefly described 
in Table 2.6. False Acceptance/Rejection Rates are also shown (where available). 
Unfortunately it is often di f f icul t to gather sufficient quantitative data fi-om the biometric 
manufacturers. In particular, mouse dynamics has been omitted fi-om this table, as there 
are no commercially available products to evaluate. 
It is interesting to note that hardware/software vendors seem to ignore the only statistical 
analysis o f the effectiveness o f biometric authentication methods. In fact a number o f 
vendors stated the error rates for their products as " low", an entirely subjective assessment. 
This apparent ignorance o f the appropriate measures may ftirther hinder the acceptance o f 
these methods into both commercial and private sectors. 
There are few standardised methods o f comparison between biometric authenticafion 
measures. However, a method used by the Independent Biometric Group ( IBG) is the 
Zephyr™ chart, which shows the authentication methods around the outside with the 
assessment criteria ranked inside the chart. The evaluation criteria used are listed in Table 
2.7. 
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Method FAR F R R Advantages Disadvantages 
Password Not Applicable No hardware 
requirements. 
Transparent to user. 
Users forget, share and 
write down passwords. 
Selection of passwords is 
usually poor (names, 





Equal Error Rate 
No hardware 
requirements. 
Transparent to user. 
May not be suited to 
certain typists (touch). 




"Low" <0.2% Simple to use. 







[Equal Error Rates] 
May be ideal for 
switchboardA^oIP based 
systems. 
May be effective for 
telesales/phone banking. 
Requires audio hardware. 
May not be suitable in 
office environments 
(intrusive to other users) 






User familiarity with 
concept of signatures for 
ID may help acceptance 





[Equal Error Rate] 
High level of user 
discrimination. 
Requires scanning device. 
Intrusive. 
Acceptability may be 
hindered by confusion 




0.0001% 0.1% High level of user 
discrimination. 
Requires scanning device. 
Intrusive. 
Uses laser light which 








0.001% 0.5% Simple to use. 
Hardware becoming 
cheap (<£100). 





Table 2.6 - Comparison of commercially available authentication methods 
User Cr i te r ia 
Aspects which relate to the user. 
Technology Cr i te r ia 
Aspects which relate to the technology 
1. E f f o r t - How much time and effort 
is required on the part o f the user 
i,e, registration, enrolment, 
authentication. 
1. Cost - Cost o f any necessary \ 
hardware capture device together 
with any software, support and • 
training required. 
2. Intrusiveness - How intrusive the 
user perceives the system to be. 
2. Accuracy - How well the system 
identifies individuals. [FAR/FRR] j 
Source: International Biometric Group (2002) 
Table 2.7 - Table of evaluation criteria used in Zephyr chart 
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A Zephyr chart allows the comparative strengths and weaknesses o f each measure to be 
examined visually. As an example. Figure 2.3 shows a Zephyr chart available f rom the 
International Biometric Group (IBG,2002). The ideal criteria for a successful biometric 
measure is shown at the top o f the chart, (this only occurs when all four criteria are at their 
optimum settings and are, therefore, located at the outer perimeter o f the chart). 
/ c p h y r An^lvitU 
Kc\strokc-ttc<iP • 
Si j j i iAi i i rc - s tMn 
Kctina-sciin / ^ Finger-scMti 
b 
I r i « ( - H i M i i V i M i ' f - H C M i i 
I •Inirutn'cncM *Dwtincih-cnc^s #C(>ii • h f f o r i 
Source: International Biometric Group (2002) 
Figure 2.3 - Zephyr^' C hart for common hiometric-based authentication methods 
I f we consider the use o f keystroke dynamics, the criteria are distributed across the entire 
range (it should be noted that this is based on one-off authentication rather than continuous 
monitoring). O f the four criteria, keystroke analysis satisfies two, namely non-
intrusiveness and cost. Many biometrics fail on the intrusiveness criteria as they require 
the user to perform some explicit action to authenticate themselves. Static keystroke 
analysis offers the ability to analyse keystroke patterns during the entr\' o f the 
usemame/password pair (or some other form of identification string) therefore reducing the 
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impact on the user. Cost is minimised (as far as hardware issues are concerned) as almost 
all PCs w i l l have a keyboard, although there w i l l be some additional expense as a result o f 
additional costs (i.e. training, maintenance etc.). The effort involved to authenticate via 
keystroke analysis is still small in comparison to some other methods as the user is only 
required to type in a small sample o f text. Ideally, this would be enhanced to monitor free-
style text, thus further reducing the effort involved to achieve authentication by this 
method. The final criterion is that o f accuracy. Static keystroke analysis is ranked 
comparatively poorly against the other methods; this is mainly due to the limited amount o f 
data with which user authentication can take place and the variability l ikely with such a 
small sample size. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the increase in levels o f detected computer crime and abuse 
cases over the last twenty years (as reported within the UK.). Although it is not possible to 
attribute the increase in reported crime to any underlying specific cause (i.e. was the rise 
due to increased criminal/malicious activity, increased reporting o f crimes or the increased 
success in detecting and solving such cases) it is clear that there is an increased level o f 
incidents with a respective increase in costs. 
One o f the problems in addressing the increase in crime is that o f attributing blame. The 
surveys presented have indicated a high level o f cases originating from within 
organisations however, in order to identify the person or persons responsible for the 
incident, it is necessary to have absolute authentication o f a user's identity. A misfeasor 
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would be acting under their own account with appropriate permissions and hence would 
not be highlighted by the usual authentication measures, while a masquerador may only be 
detectable through improved authentication techniques. Given that many users leave their 
terminals logged in and unlocked for long periods o f time (usually all day), simple login 
authenfication is not sufficient. 
This chapter has also discussed the limitafions o f current authentication techniques, 
highlighting in particular the shortcomings o f the commonest method - the 
usemame/password combination. To overcome these problems a number o f alternatives 
have been presented together with an overview o f their advantages and disadvantages. 
It is clear that some form o f improved authentication is necessary to ensure accurate 
authentication at login. It is also important for the concept o f monitoring to be considered 
to ensure that the active user is the original user who logged in - i.e. continuous user 
authenfication/monitoring. 
Before investigating potential improvements to user authentication, a survey was 
conducted to determine the need for improved user authentication and supervision, and to 
determine the user acceptability o f such measures (which would help to inform the design 
and implementation o f an improved user authentication and supervision system). This 
survey is described and discussed in the fol lowing chapter. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the weaknesses o f current authentication systems and 
proposed a number o f alternatives to the current secret-based approaches. Before 
attempting to implement and evaluate alternatives to the traditional usemame/password 
approach, it is first necessary to determine the attitudes o f computer system users to the 
current methods o f authentication, as well as their perceptions o f the alternatives presented 
in the previous chapter. This is increasingly important as users frequently find ways to 
bypass security mechanisms that are considered to be inconvenient or intrusive. 
This chapter presents the results o f a survey that aimed to determine awareness, and 
acceptance of, a range o f alternative authentication and supervision methods. The survey 
respondents were asked to comment on current techniques, identifying bad practise (e.g. 
sharing passwords), as well as mitigating circumstances (e.g. large numbers o f passwords 
for different systems), before considering a number o f alternative authentication 
mechanisms. 
3.2 Survey Overview 
In order to determine the acceptability o f user authentication and supervision techniques, a 
survey was conducted to assess the attitudes and awareness o f current IT users. The survey 
aimed to assess the fo l lowing issues: 
attitudes towards different forms o f user authentication; 
• the attitudes towards the concept o f continuous monitoring. 
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The survey questionnaire consisted o f 53 main questions, the majority o f which were 
multiple choice, with the remainder requiring short written responses (a copy o f the paper-
based questionnaire can be found in Appendix A ) . Many o f the questions contained 
multiple sections, resulting in a maximum o f 130 possible answers per respondent. The 
survey was split into a number o f categories, each focussing upon a specific area o f interest. 
Questions 1-7 gathered general details, to determine the gender, age, education, and level 
o f computer use; these provided demographic information on the survey response base. 
Questions 8-14 considered the use o f computers within the respondent's work environment, 
whilst questions 15-19 considered the use o f computers at home. These helped to provide 
information on the spread o f IT into the home and work contexts, as well as the likely IT 
awareness o f the respondents. Questions 20-34 were intended to determine individual 
opinions and knowledge in the area o f computer crime and abuse. The findings relating 
specifically to these questions are presented in Dowland et al (1999) and w i l l not be 
discussed here. The final section (encompassing questions 35-53) looked at the 
respondent's views on user authentication and supervision. 
The survey was distributed to a wide range o f individuals and organisations with the 
intention o f gaining a diverse variety o f opinions. The questionnaire was made available in 
two forms, a printed copy and an online version. Approximately 300 printed surveys were 
distributed with 148 completed responses being received, representing a response rate o f 
49%. A further 27 responses were submitted via the web site resulting in a total o f 175 
responses. It should be noted that, whilst questionnaires were sent to companies, the focus 
o f the questionnaire required respondents to reply from an individual rather than 
organisational perspective (i.e. respondents were asked to consider the questions posed 
from a personal perspective rather than considering an organisational security policy -
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should one exist). As such, these responses were still representative o f a personal rather 
than business viewpoint on the issues. 
3.3 Demographics 
The survey demographics showed a male dominance in all age groups, wi th 80% o f the 
total respondents being male. In terms o f age, 74% o f the respondents were below 35, 
indicating that the vast majority o f the responses were likely to be f rom people who had 
grown up with IT to some extent. The overall breakdown o f respondents by age group is 









Figure 3,1 - Survey respondents by age 
In terms o f employment background, a high number o f responses were received f rom the 
technology fields (with 103 out o f the 175 responses claiming to be fi-om the computing, 
communications or engineering domains). Academically over 70% o f the resjx)ndents 
claimed to hold A-Levels or above, with 44% having a degree level education. This 
represents a generally high level o f academic achievement and reflects the fact that the 
distribution o f a large proportion o f surveys occurred via academic channels. 
The vast majority o f respondents had considerable familiarity wi th IT , wi th over 98% 
having used a computer for over 1 year, 88% using a computer at work and 84% using one 
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at home. In terms o f the level o f use, the results indicated that, in both home and work 
environments; over half o f the respondents used their systems for four hours per week or 
more. The respondents were also asked about the availability o f Internet access. 129 
respondents (88%) claimed to have access at work, while 69 respondents (48%) claimed to 
have access at home. The latter statistic indicated that the respondent group was clearly 
ahead o f the U K average in terms o f Internet adoption, as the penetration into U K homes 
(at the time o f the survey) was considered to be around 14% ( I C M , 1999). It should be 
noted that more recent surveys have estimated U K Internet adoption at around 50% 
(Ofcom, 2003), which would be more in-line with the respondents f rom this survey. 
The general information above shows that the respondents had considerable experience 
using computers in both home and work environments. As such it was considered that the 
respondents had adequate background knowledge in order to comment on a range o f 
authentication techniques and the issues relating to them. 
3.4 Password based authentication 
Given that they represent the most common, and therefore familiar, form o f authentication, 
the survey began by assessing respondent attitudes towards passwords. The results 
indicated that over 9 1 % o f respondents relied on passwords for access control to their 
computers - a figure that is generally compatible with the 1998 K P M G security survey 
which showed 97% o f organisations using them (KPMG, 1998). This situation appears to 
have changed relatively little since the survey was completed, wi th the latest D T I survey 
( D T I , 2002) reporting between 82% and 99% o f organisations still using passwords for 
user authentication (the precise figure varies by organisational size). The high reported use 
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o f passwords among respondents ensured that the subsequent questions about password 
implementations and password limitations would be answered based upon practical 
experience. 
Due to the dominance o f passwords, most users have multiple passwords for different 
systems and applications. When asked how many different systems or applications they 
use which require passwords, 26% o f respondents claimed to have five or more, wi th 18 
people claiming in excess o f ten (Figure 3.2). This is becoming an increasingly 
problematic issue due to the increased usage o f web-based systems. With the spread o f on-
line banking, e-commerce and login details needed for a wide range o f sites, an average 
user may have numerous usemame/password combinations. Added to this, many web sites 
have specific requirements for the format o f usemames/passwords. These requirements 
may include the familiar minimum length requirements, but they arc increasingly requiring 
mixed case, punctuation or numeric characters to occur in login details (especially in the 
on-line banking sector). It is likely that the number o f systems that users w i l l be required 





4 5 6 7 
Number of systems 
10+ 
Figure 3.2 - Number of different systems/applications used requi r ing passwords 
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The requirement to remember such a large number o f passwords can cause a major 
problem for users. It is, therefore, no surprise that users frequently select dictionary words 
or personal names as the basis for their passwords, as these are easier to remember. 
Having said this, only 15% o f respondents felt that their passwords could be easily guessed. 
The phrasing o f the question in this case gave examples o f information that, i f used as a 
basis for selection, could render the password more easily guessed (i.e. "is it part o f your 
address, name, partner's name?"). Although the majority o f users considered themselves 
to be safe on this basis, the question did not provide an exhaustive list o f what might 
constitute obvious choices. As such, many respondents may still have been using insecure 
passwords, such as dictionary words (which the LOphtCrack tool mentioned in the previous 
chapter can determine in less than a minute). It should, however, be noted that even when 
forced to select more complex (and hence less meaningful) passwords, users often 
compromise these by writ ing them down (15%) or sharing them with other users (29%). 
This is not always done without any thought to the consequences, but for some users, the 
benefits o f having a note stuck to the monitor o f their PC with their password in clear sight 
for all to see is better than the problems caused by forgetting the password every four 
weeks due to forced password changes! 
Not only do users often choose insecure passwords, they also frequently select the same 
password for multiple accounts, wi th 40% o f respondents re-using the same password. As 
such, should an intruder gain access to one protected account, it is quite likely that they 
would be able to reuse that same password for other machines and applications. This could 
be extrapolated further when considering the impact upon web site logins - i f users choose 
the same (insecure) login details across multiple sites, it is likely that a successful intruder 
on one site would have unrestricted access to a wide range o f sites. Responses to 
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subsequent questions revealed that 31 (21%) o f the 151 respondents who used computers 
at work claimed to have used another person's password without their consent or 
knowledge. It is surprising that so many people have illegitimately used other users' 
accounts and also to f ind that so many o f the respondents were prepared to admit to doing 
so. It is possible that some o f the respondents lied about such illegitimate activity and, as 
such, the real figure could be somewhat higher. It could be argued that i f respondents had 
taken better care o f their passwords (by fol lowing basic guidelines on selection and use) it 
is likely that there would have been less opportunity for such abuse. 
A further issue is that o f the password's lifetime. Once a password is illegitimately 
acquired then, without time limits, restricted logins or account monitoring, it is possible 
that the intruder would remain unnoticed until he/she committed an act that caused some 
form o f disruption that would consequently be detected. I f we again consider the use o f 
web sites, a compromised account could provide not only unrestricted access ( i f no time 
limits were imposed on accounts) but, more worryingly, could provide unlimited access to 
other accounts sharing the same login details. The respondents were asked how frequently 
they changed their passwords and i f they were forced to change their passwords by the 
system or the system administrators. As indicated in Table 3.1, an alarming 34% claimed 
to never change their passwords. Furthermore, the responses to the subsequent question 
revealed that 5 1 % were not forced to change their password by the system. The former 
represents bad practice on the part o f the users, whereas the latter reflects poor system 
administration. From an administration point o f view, it is more encouraging to observe 
that 70% o f users claimed to use systems in which a minimum password length is enforced. 
Having a minimum length o f seven or more characters helps to ensure that passwords are 
more resilient to brute force attacks. 
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Less frequently 20% 
Never 34% 
Table 3.1 - Frequency of password changes 
These results serve to underiine some o f the known problems wi th passwords and provide 
the justification for the subsequent questions, which asked users about other forms o f 
authentication. 
3.5 Alternative authentication and supervision methods 
One o f the main objectives o f the survey was to evaluate user's opinions regarding 
different authentication methods. In order to achieve this, the respondents were asked to 
rate the acceptability o f a variety o f initial login and continuous supervision techniques on 
a 5-point sliding scale from 'totally acceptable' to 'totally unacceptable'. A total o f nine 
methods were cited, ranging from passwords to a variety o f physiological and behavioural 
biometric methods. Each o f the methods was briefly described on the questionnaire sheet 
to ensure that the respondents understood the context (using the text shown in Table 3.2). 
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Method Description 
Keystroke analysis Research has shown that users have different typing styles 
and that they can be identified by measuring the times 
between keystrokes. 
Face recognition A snapshot of the user, taken by a camera positioned on the 
monitor, is compared with a previously stored 'faceprint'. 
Mouse dynamics Similar to keystroke analysis, users can be identified by the 
way in which they use the mouse. 
Voice verification A user's voice, when speaking a word or phrase into the 
computer's microphone, is compared with a previously 
stored 'voiceprint'. 
Signature analysis A user signs their name using a special pen and pad, the 
signature is digitised and compared with a previously stored 
version. 
Iris scanning A snapshot of the user's iris, taken by a camera, is compared 
with a previously stored image. 
Hand geometry This technique measures the physical dimensions of the hand 
using a small camera and compares these with previously 
stored values. 
Fingerprint analysis An automated version of the fingerprint identification 
system similar to that traditionally used in criminology. 
Table 3.2 - Biometric methods, as presented to survey respondents 
Table 3.3 summarises the ranked results, which are also illustrated graphically in Figure 
3.3. The responses have been normalised to reflect the variable response rate to each 
question, as there was a higher response rate to questions on initial login authentication 
(probably reflecting a lack of understanding of the concept of continuous supervision 
amongst some respondents). The positive responses ('totally acceptable' and 'acceptable') 
were summed and then the total number of negative responses ('unacceptable' and 'totally 
unacceptable') were subtracted, thus producing a rank of user preference. 
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Method Initial login authentication Continuous supervision 
Password 95.7% -10.2% 
Keystroke analysis 29.8% 25.5% 
Face recognition 49.1% 3.2% 
Mouse dynamics 21.3% 21.8% 
Voice verification 53.4% -0.6% 
Signature analysis 40.1% -35.9% 
Iris scanning 47.2% -16.8% 
Hand geometry 44.4% -19.9% 
Fingerprint analysis 48.8% -16.0% 
Table 3.3 - Ranked user preference of security methods 








Figure 3.3 - User preference of authentication methods 
As expected, the most popular form of initial login authentication was the password, with 
90% of respondents rating it as 'totally acceptable' (scoring more than twice as many votes 
in this category than most other methods). However, it should be noted that i f all 
respondents were forced to adopt correct password selection and use procedures, it is 
considered unlikely that the level of acceptance would be quite so high. This high level of 
acceptance for passwords did not mean the outright rejection of alternative methods and 
many also achieved respectable scores. 
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It is clear that there is a reasonably significant level of user acceptance for ail the initial 
login authentication techniques suggested. Methods such as face recognition, voice 
verification, signature analysis, iris scanning, hand geometry and fingerprint analysis were 
all considered favourably. It is interesting to note that all of these techniques (with the 
exception of signature analysis) have had significant media coverage, especially through 
film and television. It is possible that familiarity with these techniques influenced the 
respondents' choices. The acceptance of signature analysis cannot be readily explained by 
the familiarity with the technology through the media; however the concept of a signature 
as a means of identity verification is well established in our society. 
After passwords, the most acceptable forms of login authentication were considered to be 
voice verification and fingerprint recognition, scoring raw overall acceptability ratings of 
68% and 67% respectively (f i j l l table of results in Appendix A). The latter result is 
somewhat surprising, in that conventional wisdom suggests that the association of 
fingerprints with criminal identification may represent a potential barrier to user 
acceptance (Observer, 2002). However, it is clear fi-om these results that the majority of 
respondents are comfortable with the concept. It can, however, be noted that, in the 
normalised results (Table 3.3), face recognition scored higher than fingerprints once 
negative responses had been taken into account (un-normalised results can be found in 
Appendix A). It should be considered that while these results show a positive response to 
the use of such techniques, the respondent base was predominantly represented by IT-
literate, well-educated individuals working regularly with PC's. As such, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a high level of acceptance was achieved. I f a wider (more inclusive) 
survey were conducted, it is possible that certain techniques (e.g. fingerprint scanning or 
retinal scanning) may have achieved lower acceptance for login authentication due to 
public distaste for such mechanisms; while others (e.g. keystroke analysis and mouse 
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dynamics) may have had a lower acceptance due to lack of exposure or knowledge of the 
techniques. 
One of the significant questions posed in the survey was whether respondents would be 
comfortable with the concept of continuous supervision. This would provide a means for 
authentication to become an ongoing process within a logged in session, rather than being 
merely a one-time judgement at the beginning. This, in turn, would guard against 
situations such as an impostor replacing a legitimate user at the terminal, or an impostor 
who may have been able to fool the initial login authentication system. In general, the 
respondents were positive towards the idea of monitoring, with 43% considering it 
acceptable, though 29% were unsure. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that there was some 
reluctance - i f continuous monitoring were deployed in an organisational context, 
employees may be concerned about the use of data gathered by such techniques. For 
example, i f keystroke analysis were used to monitor a users' typing, the statistics could be 
used to profile a users' productivity or to confirm when the user was at his/her desk. It is 
also possible that an employer (or administrator) could use keystroke analysis software to 
actually record the typing of an employee and then obtain potentially sensitive/private 
information (e.g. on-line banking details). Safeguards and other concerns are discussed 
later in this section. 
It is recognised that the concept of continuous supervision also introduces ethical 
considerations. Indeed, 70 respondents (40%) stated that they would consider monitoring 
as an invasion of their privacy (interestingly, 18 of these had stated that they considered 
this to be acceptable), with a ftarther 18% being unsure. It is clear that i f continuous 
supervision of users is to be implemented, then certain safeguards should be considered. In 
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particular, users should be aware of the intended uses of the informafion collected. 45% of 
respondents felt that they could not trust their organisation to use the supervision data for 
security-related purposes only, and were concerned that it could be utilised for an ulterior 
motive, such as monitoring work productivity. 85% stated that users should be aware of 
any monitoring being used, potentially demonstrating an inherent distrust o f the concept o f 
a big-brother scenario. The simplest way to ensure these requirements are met is to 
involve the users in the planning and implementation of these systems and provide clear 
policies on the uses for the gathered information. With the introduction of data protection 
laws covering personal information stored electronically there will also have to be 
provision for securing the profiles and session data obtained in any continuous monitoring 
system as well as ensuring access (upon request) to all personal data stored in the system 
(in the same way that an employee may ask for his/her personnel records). 
The respondents considered only three techniques to be acceptable for continuous 
monitoring; namely keystroke analysis, mouse dynamics and face recognition (the latter 
being with a very low preference). Whilst the overall ranked results reflected sensible 
views, some of the individual responses in the underiying data did provide a few surprises. 
In particular, 34 respondents rated the use of signature analysis for continuous monitoring 
to be 'acceptable'. This is most likely to be a misunderstanding, as few computer users 
would be prepared to stop work and sign their name intermittently (a view borne out by the 
fact that 90 respondents rated this as 'unacceptable'). 
Respondents were also asked to consider how long they would be prepared to spend 
creating a behaviour profile that the monitoring system would then use to authenticate 
them. The responses are shown in Table 3.4. It is clear that the majority of users would 
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not be tolerant of explicit profiling activity for any long periods. Equally, the time that 
most of them would consider acceptable is 15 minutes or less - which would be unlikely to 
be adequate for some measures (e.g. whilst face and fingerprint recognition systems would 
allow adequate registration within this time, accurate measures relating to typing and more 
general system usage would require longer periods - potentially in the order of days rather 
than minutes). As such, elements of profiling would need to occur as a transparent 
background task in order to ensure user acceptance. 
User-profile set-up time Respondents 
No time 11% 
Up to 5 mins 36% 
Up to 15 mins 24% 
Up to 30 mins 13% 
Up to Ihr 12% 
> Ihr 5% 
Table 3.4 Acceptable duration of proflling activity 
Once a profile has been created, there is still the possibility that a monitoring system may 
falsely reject a legitimate user, believing them to be an impostor. The questionnaire made 
the respondents aware of this and asked them how fi-equently they would be willing to 
tolerate such errors. The results are presented in Table 3.5 and illustrate that any deployed 
system would need to have a very low error rate in order to avoid alienating the user 
population. 





Table 3.5 Perceived tolerable frequency of false rejection by monitoring system 
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Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate which fields/sectors would benefit most 
ft-om supervision of users by computer, rating the benefit from 'great benefit' to 'no benefit 
at air . As with the results in Table 3.3, the responses have been normalised to provide a 
ranked overall benefit. The positive responses ('great benefit' and 'some benefit*) were 
summed and then the total number of negative responses ("little benefit' and "no benefit at 
air) was subtracted, thus producing a rank of overall perceived benefit. These results are 













Figure 3.4 - Benefit from monitoring by sector 
As expected, the majority of respondents considered the areas of government, defence, 
health and banking to benefit most from user supervision (these being the areas with the 
most obviously sensitive systems and data to protect). However, the respondents felt that 
all areas could benefit from improved supervision, showing that there is still considerable 
concern over the perceived level of computer security across all sectors. 
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3.6 Discussion of results 
The results reaffirm the accepted shortcomings of password-based authentication (poor 
selection, sharing and forgetting passwords etc), as well as the fact that, in spite of these, it 
remains the dominant form of user authentication. However, the fact that the respondents 
have shown a willingness to use alternative authentication techniques can be considered to 
be encouraging. It should be noted, however, that in the majority of cases, it is unlikely 
that the respondents had actually used the techniques that they were being asked to 
comment upon. As such, it is possible that their views may change i f presented with the 
practical experience. 
Given that a strong preference was expressed for passwords, consideration should be given 
to retaining them as the means of login authentication, whilst identifying means to 
compensate for their weaknesses. Suitable strategies in this respect could include (with 
numerous other combinations): 
- Utilising password login in conjunction with transparent keystroke 
analysis of the information entered. In this way, the user would be 
authenticated not only by what they type, but also how they type it. This 
should not have any significant influence on user acceptance, as the 
primary authentication mechanism will still appear to be the password. 
This would, however, not overcome a fundamental problem of password-
based system; that once logged in, there is typically no further 
authentication required throughout a users' session. A user may login at 
the beginning of the working day, providing a valid match is made 
between the typed password and the users' historical typing profile but 
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then be able to continue throughout the rest of the day without any form of 
challenge. While this approach enhances the initial login authentication, it 
provides no ftirther session protection. Given that many users leave their 
workstations logged in all day (with some not even logging out when they 
leave in the evening), this would only be able to potentially catch another 
user misusing a colleague's details at login. While this offers no 
protection during the logged-in session, it does represent a significant 
improvement over login authentication. 
Retaining password-only authentication at login, but supplementing it with 
on-going supervision during the user session. (NB the term continuous is 
used to distinguish between static monitoring; e.g. monitoring key presses 
during login, and dynamic monitoring which has the ability to monitor a 
users* behaviour throughout a session - the time interval for which could 
be truly continuous or intermittent.) The survey results suggest that 
techniques such as keystroke analysis and mouse dynamics would be 
conceptually acceptable to users in this regard. This approach could still 
retain the user-accepted login mechanism (i.e. usemame and password), 
but would switch to a supervision/monitoring role once the user had been 
authenticated; to monitor the users' typing behaviour, application usage or 
mouse dynamics (or some other metric) throughout the logged-in session. 
This would effectively remove the ability for a third party to hijack the 
users' session providing the resolution of the monitoring was sufficient to 
identify an impostor within an acceptable time frame. 
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The respondents preference for passwords is in agreement with the previously published 
results from the Australian TRUST project, which (based on an experiment with 76 
participants) found users' principal preference to be for passwords, followed by 
physiological biometrics and, finally, behavioural measures (Deane et al, 1995). The latter 
finding is, however, in contrast to the results fi-om this study in that (for continuous 
monitoring) the behavioural techniques of keystroke and mouse dynamics were chosen in 
preference to the physiological technique of face recognition. Indeed, in the TRUST study, 
keystroke analysis and pointing device based verification scored the lowest of the seven 
biometrics assessed. 
Although many considered the concept of continuous supervision to be acceptable for 
security purposes, the respondents showed concern over the potential wider use of such 
data. As such, it is important for organisations to establish agreed working practices to 
employees before proceeding with such methods (this may assist in reassuring those such 
as the 29% of respondents who were undecided over the acceptability of the monitoring 
concept). I f such pracfices are not naturally adopted by organisations, it is possible (maybe 
even preferable in some cases) to legislate on acceptable supervision practices. This could 
be implemented in a similar way to that which restricts the rights of an employer to 
intercept and/or read an employee's email correspondence (HMSO, 2000). 
Overall, a significant factor in the acceptance of alternatives to the password will be that of 
education. I f people can be shown that newer authentication techniques are safe, reliable 
and secure, then their acceptance is likely to be improved. This will be best demonstrated 
in the UK over the next ten years where a trial is being undertaken to determine public 
acceptance of biometric identification. This scheme (Home Office, 2003), announced by 
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the government in November 2003, is due to begin in early 2004, with the aim of 
introducing a national identity card scheme comprising driving license, passport details and 
incorporating a biometric ID (iris or fingerprint scan). This scheme, more than any other 
in recent years, wil l depend on public acceptance to determine the widespread used of 
biometrics. I f the public reaction to biometric identification is negative, it will be 
increasingly difficult to implement such systems - even when forced through employment 
contracts or government legislation. 
Of course, the UK. is by no means alone in considering the use of widespread biometric 
systems. The US has been trialling biometric systems at border points for some time now 
(ZDNet, 2002) and has recently announced plans to use fingerprint scanning for overseas 
workers entering the country (USDoS, 2003). 
3.7 Conclusions 
The survey has shown that, although demonstrably weak, the password remains the most 
popular form of authentication in the minds of users. However, a number of other methods 
emerged as possible contenders, and it is possible that practical experience of using them, 
combined with improved awareness of the vulnerabilities of passwords, would increase 
their perceived acceptability as alternatives. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the survey results is that the use of continuous 
supervision is, in general, acceptable. However, the viability of such a scheme would be 
dictated by the methods chosen, and subject to suitable assurances being given to the 
monitored population regarding the planned uses of the collected data. This is an 
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important issue as user acceptance of such a radical approach as continuous user 
authentication will probably be just as important as overcoming the technical issues of 
implementation. There are also potential problems with the level of user support needed to 
make these systems work. There may still be reluctance on the part of users to undertake 
the necessary profiling to make the systems used sufficiently reliable for day to day use, as 
well as resentment should the system reject valid users too frequently. The survey has also 
indicated a lack of understanding over authentication in general and the specific issues of 
continuous user supervision. It is unlikely that re-educating users will avoid the problems 
with passwords, however, it is possible that increased awareness and understanding could 
improve acceptance of alternatives. 
Given the acceptance of some form of supervision during a logged-in session and the 
preference for a keystroke-analysis based method, the latter parts of this thesis wil l discuss 
the application of transparent keystroke analysis in a modem operating system. Chapter 5 
will introduce in more technical detail the concepts of keystroke analysis and identify the 
range of metrics that can be assessed, while chapters 6 and 7 evaluate the results of two 
trials conducted to ascertain the feasibility of a keystroke analysis based supervision 
system. 
Before committing to keystroke analysis, the next chapter presents the results of some 
further investigations that were conducted in order to determine whether the weak, 
password-based approach could be more easily replaced by an alternative secret-based 
knowledge approach to user authentication. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The survey described in the previous chapter identified the need for improved user 
authentication, with the respondents indicating a continued preference for secret-based 
authenticafion (e.g. the use of passwords). Unfortunately, although users may still have a 
preference for passwords, the weaknesses of this method are well known. In order to 
provide improved security, while still maintaining the users' preference for a secret-based 
approach, this chapter considers the results of two trials conducted to investigate 
alternative forms of user authentication using software-based methods (which do not incur 
any additional expenditure on hardware technologies, and as such are likely to be 
considered favourably by system administrators). 
Previous research into altemative software-based methods has identified a number of 
potential approaches: 
• Cognitive and associative questions - a question and answer based approach 
using easily memorable (but nonetheless secret) information (Haga and Zviran, 
1991). This approach has a distinct disadvantage as it can require a lengthy 
exchange between the user and the system in order to be authenticated. 
• Graphical authentication - this uses graphical images that the user must 
memorise and identify on screen. There are a number of implementations, 
ranging from a picture with a number of pre-defined regions (Blonder, 1996 
and Jermyn et al., 1999) to the D6ja Vu system that used randomly generated 
electronic art images (Dhamija and Perrig 2000). 
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These methods share the common advantage of easy implementation - i.e. they are 
software based methods that have no hardware dependencies (unlike most biometric-based 
authentication methods that require dedicated hardware). 
While previous trials have shown the individual techniques to be viable authentication 
measures, there have been no comparative experiments to evaluate user acceptance of 
these measures side by side. As such, two trials were conducted in order to evaluate the 
techniques. The first, described in the next section aimed to test users' recall of personal 
(but secret) information. The second trial, described in section 4.3, took a longer-term 
approach to evaluate user finendliness and acceptability. These trials allowed a comparison 
to be made between these techniques with users having similar levels of exposure to each 
method. 
4.2 An Experimental Study Of Alternative Methods 
The first trial was devised to evaluate five secret-knowledge based techniques. The 
methods selected were PINs and passwords (familiar methods, included to provide a 
baseline for reference), alongside two question and answer methods (using cognitive and 
associative questions respectively), and a graphical technique using an image-based PIN 
(hereafter referred to as an ImagePIN). The study sought to assess the practical 
effectiveness of the techniques, as well as the fiiendliness and perceived level of security 
ft-om the user's perspective. 
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The effectiveness was gauged by means of a practical trial, using specially designed 
profiling and authentication software to present the various techniques to a series o f 
participants. Opinions relating to the friendliness and security of the methods were then 
obtained using a written questionnaire - completed by participants after they had 
participated in an authentication phase. The design of the experimental tools and the 
follow-up questionnaire are described in the subsections that follow. 
4.2,1 The Profiler 
The Profiler required participants to identify themselves and then provide appropriate 
responses for each of the methods under test. The profiling procedure for each of the 
methods is summarised below. 
• Passwords and PINs. The implementation of these methods was fairly 
standard, with each participant being asked to supply a 4 digit PIN and a 
password of at least 8 characters. Participants were requested not to select a 
password or PIN that they already used on other systems, as the aim of the 
exercise was to assess their ability to recall new details, and thereby put these 
more familiar methods on an equal footing with the other techniques when it 
came to assessing ease of information recall. Nonetheless, as later results wil l 
indicate, some participants did not follow this guideline. 
• Cognitive questions. Participants were asked to provide answers to a series of 
twenty questions, each requiring factual or opinion-based answers. The 
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questions requested information that was personal to the participant, and 
would therefore be difficult for a potential masquerader to guess in an 
operational scenario. The questions used are listed in Table 4.1. 
What is your mother's maiden name? 
Where were you bom? 
What is your favourite colour? 
What was the name of your best friend at school? 
What is your favourite music? 
What is your favourite food? 
What was the name of your first pet? 
Which primary school did you go to? 
What is your favourite sport? 
Where was your first house? 
What make was your family's first car? 
How old were you when you had your first kiss? 
What is your favourite film? 
Where was the first place you remember going on holiday? 
What was your favourite subject at school? 
What is the most important part of your body? 
What is your favourite type of animal? 
What is the name of your favourite relation? 
How many cousins do you have? 
What is your favourite shape? 
Table 4.1 - Cognitive questions 
Even in cases where the participants might not have had a genuine answer (e.g. 
they may never have had a pet), it was expected that they would still be able 
to provide a response that could later be reproduced i f prompted to answer 
that question. 
Associative questions. Participants were then asked to provide word 
association based responses to a set of twenty keywords. The keywords are 
listed in Table 4.2, and were carefully chosen to ensure that a number of 
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different responses were theoretically possible in each case. For example, for 
the associative word "seven", responses might include "wonders", "dwarves", 
"sins" or "days". 
Blue House Table Computer Friend 
Peace Glass Marriage Sea Love 
Cat Music Fire Seven Video 
Father Food Remote Fast Door 
in 
Table 4.2 - Associative key>vords 
• ImagePIN. The user had to select five images from a number of icons, by 
clicking on them with the mouse. Later authentication would work by the 
user reselecting the same images in the correct sequence (images are shown in 
Figure 4.1). Limiting the selection to five images meant that the resulting 
ImagePIN would not be considered as resilient to brute force attack as the 6-8 
character passwords that are typically recommended. However, when viewed 
as an alternative to a traditional 4-digit PIN, as used with A T M cards and such 
like, the concept was considered to offer some useful potential. 
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Figure 4.1 - Profiler system (showing associative questions and ImagePIlV screens) 
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After the profile had been created, a short training exercise was performed using the 
second program, the Authenticator, in order to familiarise the users with how the later 
authentication test would work. After this, it was up to the participants to attempt to 
remember the details they had provided in order to perform the later authentication tests. 
4.2.2 The Authenticator 
The authentication tests took place one month after the initial profiling, with the aim of 
assessing whether the participants were able to adequately recall the information that they 
had previously provided during profiling and thereby authenticate themselves successfully. 
The interface of this system was very similar to that of the Profiler, and two aspects are 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Pronio : test 
' I 
t Authenticator 
Welcome to ihe AuihemlcAior. 
You will mw be «sked to provide responses for the different 
forms of u/theruictiion prevtously prafiled. 
Do rwt worry If you have forgotten an Item of 
Information - Just provide some response to enable the 
test 10 continue. 
The sywem will no* Indicate "hether you h*/e responded 
correaly. 
A summary of your results will be preseraed at the end. 
'fti:..T:T.' 
Tie Hcto 
Profile : lest 
Cognitive questions 
Figure 4.2 - Authenticator system (showing welcome and cognitive question screens) 
In the case of the PIN, Password and ImagePIN methods, the participant was directly asked 
to provide the same information as originally profiled. For the cognitive and associative 
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methods, however, they were asked to answer five randomly selected questions out of the 
twenty that had been profiled in each case. This was considered to represent a good 
simulation of how such question and answer authentication techniques would be 
implemented in practice. 
4.2.3 Participant questionnaire 
Following the authentication test, all the participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire, in order to determine their regular exposure to user authentication 
methods in other contexts and to assess their views about the different methods under 
trial. The key information collected fi-om the participants was the ranking of the 
trialed methods according to the perceived user ftiendliness, level of security, and 
overall preference (although several other questions were also asked). 
A total of 27 participants were involved in the profiling and subsequent authentication 
testing, and the results of the study are described in the next section. While the number of 
participants was small, this did allow for baseline comparisons to be made between the 
different authentication techniques. 
4.2.4 Experimental Results 
The results presented here consider the effectiveness of the techniques that were observed 
in the practical trial, as well as the participant's subsequent opinions in relation to the 
methods. It should be noted that, in the discussions and graphs that follow, the percentage 
figures have been rounded to whole numbers. 
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The practical evaluation began by examining the participant's perfomiance in relation to 
the password and PFN methods. The results indicated that 70% of the participants had 
succeeded in authenticating themselves using passwords, and a similar proportion (67%) 
were successful using the PIN based method. Although these results initially appear very 
encouraging from the perspective of the participants being able to accurately recall the 
details after an absence of a month, the results of the accompanying survey revealed that a 
significant number of people had not followed the request to use different passwords and 
PINs than the ones normally used in other applications. In fact, only 56% used different 
passwords and 41% used different PINs. Within these subgroups, the authentication 
success was markedly lower - 53% of them succeeded in the password test and only 36% 
in the PIN version. By contrast, within the subgroups that used the same details as in other 
systems, 92% of them succeeded with passwords and 87% succeeded with PfNs, so these 
figures can be considered to have artificially inflated the overall results. 
In the cognitive and associative question tests, the participants were presented with a 
random selection of five questions out of the twenty that they were profiled for. 
Authentication was judged to be successful i f all five questions were answered correctly. 
With the cognitive questions, a success rate of 59% was observed, whilst a number of 
further participants did succeed in answering a proportion of the questions presented to 
them. The distribution of correct answers in the cognitive test is shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 43 - Distribution of correct answers in cognitive questions 
With the associative questions, the success rate was significantly lower. Only 4% 
(equivalent to one person) managed to correctly answer all five questions and the 
distribution of correct answers across five random questions is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 - Distribution of correct answers in associative questions 
These results suggest that the associative question method is extremely problematic in 
relation to the correct recall of the information, and that participants are inconsistent in the 
words that they most readily associate with the keyword prompts. A further problem 
observed in the results of this study was that many participants chose the same associations 
for certain keywords, suggesting that the method could be easily targeted for masquerade 
attacks i f used in practice. Table 4.3 summarises the cases in which the same associations 
were chosen for each keyword. The highest frequency of duplication was 44%, in which 
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respondents had chosen the word "control" as the associative response to the keyword 
"remote". 
Keyword Frequent word associations 
Blue Sky (41%), Sea (15%) 
House Big (15%) 
Table Food (22%) 
Computer Work (11%), Game (7%), Internet (7%) 
Peace War (15%) 
Glass Wine( 22%), Broken (11%) 
Sea Blue (11%) 
Love Hate (11%), Marriage (7%) 
Music Rock (15%), Dance (7%) 
Fire Red (11%), Alarm (11%), Engine (7%) 
Seven Film (15%), Seven (7%), Days (7%) 
Video Games (11%), Movie (11%), Tape (7%) 
Father Mother (19%), Names (15%) 
Remote Control (44%) 
Fast Food (22%), Car (19%) 
Door Key (11%), Open (11%), Closed (7%) 
Table 43 - High frequency associative responses 
For the final technique, the hnagePIN, the participants had to recall their graphical PIN by 
reselecting the original icons in the correct order, with 63% being successfiilly 
authenticated. Even though the implementation of the method offered the participants the 
opportunity to somewhat undermine the security by selecting the same icon five times, 
only two participants actually did this. 
Figure 4.5 summarises the overall results of the authentication tests, indicating the 
percentage of respondents who would have been successftilly authenticated using each of 
the methods. 
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FiRure 4.5 - Authentication methods success 
Having experienced the techniques and witnessed their own performance, the participants 
were asked to rate the approaches on the basis of user-friendhness, security, and overall 
preference. 
In terms of user-friendliness, participants were asked to assess the methods on a five-point 
scale, progressing from *easy' to 'hard". The best outright indicator of preference in this 
case was where methods were ranked as *easy'. In this context, passwords were ranked 
first, receiving 48%, followed by the PIN method with 44%. The third position was shared 
by the cognitive question and ImagePIN methods, with 22% respectively. Last was the 
associative method with only 4%. Taking a wider view, and considering the total 
percentages for which methods were rated 'medium" or above, the password was still 
favourite, with 96%, followed by the PIN with 93%, cognitive questions with 81%, the 
ImagePIN with 59%, and associative questions with 48%. Looking from this viewpoint 
serves to place some separation between the cognitive and ImagePIN methods, and shows 
that more people tended to express concern over the friendliness of the latter technique. 
The fli l l results are presented in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 - Perceived user-friendliness 
The second ranking addressed the perceived level of security. In this case, the password 
still fared well, with a combined total of 78% rating it to offer a 'medium* to 'high' level 
of protection. In this instance however, the popularity was also equalled by the cognitive 
and ImagePIN methods (and it can be noted that both of these methods actually exceed the 
results for passwords i f only the 'high' and 'medium high* ratings are considered). 
Meanwhile, the PIN method attained 53%, and the associative approach was again ranked 
lowest, with 45% ranking it in the 'medium* to 'high' range. Figure 4.7 presents the 
perceived level of security for each authentication method. 
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Figure 4.7 - Perceived security 
The final question asked the participants to rank the methods according to their overall 
preference. The password method was again the most preferred form of authentication, 
with 44%, as shown in Figure 4.8. In second place is the PIN method with 22%, and third 
is the ImagePIN method with 19%. It is, therefore, demonstrable that the more traditional 
and familiar methods of authentication are still the most readily accepted. However, i f the 
rationale behind the alternative methods is accepted (i.e. that passwords and PINs are open 
to compromise), then it is relevant to give fiirther consideration to the results and responses 
in the other categories. This is not to suggest that the alternatives are themselves incapable 
of compromise - they wil l still be bound by the limitations of the implementation and the 
behaviour of the users. 
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Figure 4,8 - Overall preference of triallcd methods 
4.2.5 Discussion 
Although people clearly prefer passwords and PINs, the other results obtained continue to 
suggest concerns about the level of security they actually provide. For example, analysis 
showed that 48% of the participants selected passwords that might be easily guessed or 
cracked (e.g. based upon dictionary words, variations of their name, or foreign words 
written in English characters). Only 38% of participants used an alphanumeric 
combination, and fewer still (4%) introduced other symbols into their passwords. These 
results increase the attractiveness of the other methods, which may be less vulnerable to 
such unintentional compromise. 
The participant's performance in relation to the cognitive questions was relatively strong, 
with 59% achieving successftjl authentication (interestingly, a previous study by Haga and 
Zviran (1991) reported better results, 74% success, for a broadly similar set of cognitive 
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questions). Further points noted about the cognitive technique were the relatively time 
consuming nature of the profiling phase, in which the participants had to provide answers 
for all 20 questions. In addition, several participants expressed concern about the nature of 
the information that was requested, and were reluctant to provide genuine answers to the 
questions during the trial for fear that the information might be accidentally divulged. 
Particularly notable questions in this respect were in relation to mother's maiden name (a 
commonly used identity verification question in other contexts, such as bank accounts), 
place of birth, and age of first kiss. Overall, however, this method was ranked relatively 
high in terms of perceived user-fiiendliness and security. 
The associative approach proved to be weak as an authentication method, with the 
performance of the participants (4% success) suggesting that it cannot deliver an adequate 
level of effectiveness. It is considered that this poor performance can in part be explained 
by the fact that users still have to remember potentially abstract information (as opposed to 
the more recognition-oriented approaches of cognitive questions), placing more or less the 
same demand on their memory as the password method. In addition, the results raise 
questions over the level of security that the approach would provide - the fact that many 
participants chose the same word associations suggests that the method would be 
vulnerable to attackers attempting to guess the likely associations. At the very least, this 
requires that more care must be taken in the selection of the keywords, to ensure that none 
of them have obvious first-choice answers. A previous study of the same basic method 
reported a far higher success rate, with an overall average 69% recall after a period of three 
months (Haga and Zviran 1991). It must be noted, however, that there was a significant 
difference in the experimental procedure in this case, as participants were asked to select 
their own keywords, as well as the appropriate associative responses. 
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The ImagePIN approach demonstrated positive results in the authentication phase, with 
63% success, placing it very close to the results observed for passwords. This result is 
partially explained by the findings from previous surveys, which have shown that people 
tend to have less difficulty in recognising previously seen pictures than they do in recalling 
passwords or phrases from the memory (Bensinger, 2000 & Sasse et al., 2001). In addition 
to its practical effectiveness, the ImagePIN scored well in terms of user acceptance, which 
was considered to bode well for the rating that it might receive i f users were given 
additional time to familiarise themselves with it. Another point worth noting is that the 
ImagePIN method as implemented for the study was rather crude, with a set o f standard 
Windows icons having been used as the selection of available images. With more 
consideration given to the number and range of images available, it was considered likely 
that the perceived user friendliness of the approach could be further improved. Having 
said this, there was also a fairiy high proportion of respondents who put it as their clear 
least favourite, whereas most of the other methods did not elicit such strong negative 
opinions. 
Although some techniques suggested themselves as potential alternatives to standard 
passwords and PINs, it does not necessarily follow that they would make good replacement 
methods in all contexts. For example, the use of cognitive questions could potentially be 
too time consuming as a regular means of login authentication. The technique could, 
however, provide a good secondary level of authentication, which could be invoked in a 
number of scenarios (e.g. when a user tries to perform a sensitive activity, in response to a 
suspected masquerade attack, or simply at random intervals). Image based authentication 
techniques could be more easily implemented as an initial login technique, but their 
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applicability would be limited to systems that are able to offer sufficient graphical displays 
(e.g. mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants and Automated Teller Machines). 
With the exception of the associative approach, the practical effectiveness of the 
techniques was closely comparable. However, in terms of the overall preference, the 
known and familiar methods of passwords and PINs were, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
favoured. However, as indicated previously, i f passwords and PINs were used in a secure 
manner (in accordance with guidelines) it is likely that the acceptance rates for these 
methods would decrease. I f the previous arguments and evidence regarding the 
weaknesses of these methods are accepted, then it may be reassuring to consider that the 
cognitive and ImagePIN methods are already comparably effective fi-om a user recall 
perspective, and given ftjrther training and exposure these methods may gain greater 
acceptance. 
Although the initial results are encouraging the judgements relating to user-fi-iendliness of 
the methods were based on a relatively brief level of exposure to the question and answer 
approaches and the ImagePIN method. The next section describes a longer-term trial in 
which participants used two of the alternative methods in day-to-day operations, in place of 
their normal passwords or PINs. 
4.3 A Longer Term Study Of Alternative Methods 
While the initial trial had primarily assessed the effectiveness of the methods (i.e. the 
users' ability to recall the necessary information), the aim of the second trial was to 
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evaluate the long-term user acceptance of the most promising of the alternate approaches, 
namely cognitive question and Image-PIM, with each technique being used in practice for 
several weeks (the associative question approach was not considered due to its weak 
performance in the first trial). For example, some users who initially found one or other of 
the new methods attractive might change their view in the longer term, whereas others who 
might have initially preferred passwords could come to prefer one of the alternatives once 
they became more familiar with it. 
4.3.1 The Profiler 
The software implementation of the profiler was based upon that used in the previous study 
(described in section 4.2.1) with some cosmetic changes to the interface of the ImagePIN 
approach. The original implementation had used relatively small, iconic images, which 
some participants had commented were not very meaningful, and so it was considered that 
using larger, more colourful images would aid their recall. The use of larger images has 
some drawbacks; most significantly it increases the potential for "shoulder-surfing" (i.e. 
the act of observing a user over the shoulder). It would, therefore, be necessary to 
introduce further safeguards to ensure the security of the chosen images in a typical office 
environment. It would also be necessary to consider the selection of images carefully in a 
live environment to ensure there is no link between an end-users lifestyle/hobbies and the 
available image library. The images used for this trial are pictured in Figure 4.9. 
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1 
Figure 4.9 - New image sets used for ImagePIN 
4.3.2 The Authenticator 
Having collected the necessary information for each participant, the two authentication 
phases worked in the same manner as the first trial (pictured in Figure 4.10). Following 
each login attempt, the program logged the user's results to a file. This enabled the 
research team to track the number of times that participants actually used the system, and 
how well they performed. 
NHti I t ' j I f J t U 1 L U U N H I V L U U t S l l U N S 
(.onnitive f j u i ^ i l i o n 
ia How marw cowrtt doyou haw? 
J9k 
^ IX IX r r 
FMTFB 
Figure 4.10 - Authenticator programs for cognitive questions and ImagePIN 
For technical reasons (relating to the difficulty in interacting with the underiying security 
of Windows NT) it was not possible to replace the actual login authentication mechanism 
at the system level. However, in order to encourage users to make regular use of the 
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mechanisms on trial, the execution of the authenticator program was added as a scheduled 
task on participating systems. This ensured that the program would run automatically and 
remind the user to participate. However, in order to ensure that the program did not 
become unnecessarily intrusive (e.g. interrupting the user in the middle of important work), 
there was nothing to prevent users from terminating the program without actually entering 
any information. It is possible that some users may have chosen to close the program 
rather than respond to a specific, inconvenient, authentication challenge; however, the 
benefits of allowing users to tenninate an inconvenient challenge in this trial were 
considered to outweigh the drawbacks of alienating test subjects. 
Following the authentication trial periods, the acceptability and robustness of the 
techniques was assessed by means of a questionnaire. Key points of information collected 
included indications of: 
• the perceived user friendliness of the techniques; 
• the perceived security of the techniques; 
• which, i f any, of the trialed techniques could replace existing ones. 
The trials were conducted for a total of ten weeks, split equally between the two alternative 
methods. 19 participants took part in the first stage, but unfortunately one user was not 
able to provide responses to the second stage and the subsequent questionnaire. The 
participants were primarily male post-graduate research students, in the 25-30 year age 
group. Although this represented a fairly limited sample from which to draw definitive 
conclusions about the methods, it was considered to provide a suitable basis for 
determining general results to accompany those from the initial study. In addition, the fact 
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that all participants came from a computing background meant that they were well-versed 
in the use of the traditional authentication mechanisms against which they would be asked 
to contrast the new approaches. 
4.3.3 Experimental Results 
Despite concerns, it was discovered that each of the participants made a suitable degree of 
use of each approach (rather than simply choosing to close the authenticator application), 
with the cognitive question method being attempted an average 25 times per user, and the 
ImagePIN being used an average of 21 times per user. These figures correspond to 
approximately one use per participant per day, and are considered to be a sufficient basis 
for the participants to offer more informed opinions about the suitability o f the methods as 
they would have had a similar level of exposure to the new techniques as currently 
experienced with typical usemame/password authentication. 
Before considering the opinions, it is relevant to consider how effective the methods 
proved to be from an authentication perspective. In the cognitive question trial, the 
criterion for successftil authentication was to correctly answer all five of the questions 
asked randomly by the program. The results indicated that 64% of the participants had 
succeeded to authenticate themselves using the cognitive question method. This was 
actually a slight improvement on the effectiveness observed in the original study, in which 
the cognitive question approach scored 59%. Nonetheless, the results still showed that 
some users had problems in memorising the required information, even though it was 
related to personal details. Figure 4.11 shows how the distribution of correct answers 
broke down across the sessions. Unexpectedly, it was founded that factual questions were 
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the ones that participants often answered wrongly. For example, questions 2, 8, 10, 12, 
and 19 were mostly answered incorrectly (refer to Table 4.1). A possible reason could 
have been the case sensitivity of the program; for example, some people may have entered 
words in upper case, but then entered them in lower case during authentication and were 
rejected. A further explanation could be the potential for variation in answering questions, 
for example, the question "What is your favourite music?" could be answered with a group 












0 out of 5 1 out of 5 2 out of 5 3 out of 5 4 out of 5 5 out of 5 
Figure 4.11 - Distribution of correct answers for the cognitive questions method 
When considering the results for the ImagePIN, the criterion for successful authentication 
was the correct recall of the images in the same order they were selected in the profiling 
stage. The results, shown in Figure 4.12, indicated that 84% of the participants had 
succeeded in authenticating themselves. 
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Figure 4.12 - Distribution of correct answers for the ImagePIN method 
It can be noted that the participants' overall performance was again notably better than in 
the original study (84% versus the previous ImagePIN resuh of 63%). One reason for the 
improved result (for both this method and the cognitive questions) could have been that the 
participants made use of the methods very soon after creating the profile, whereas in the 
first study they had been forced to wait a month (in order to evaluate their recall of the 
information). However, another contributing factor to the high success of the ImagePIN 
was that two thirds of the participants had chosen potentially weak sequences. Examples 
here included a sequential Hne of images, in the same horizontal row or vertical column, or 
selecting five instances of the same image (approaches which clearly made the information 
easier to remember). Possible solutions to this would be to prevent selection of duplicates, 
and to reposition the images each time the program runs. However, there would be a 
strong possibility of this reducing the success rate. 
Following the trial period, the eighteen remaining participants were asked to provide 
answers to the evaluation questions. They were firstly required to indicate whether they 
believed that either of the new techniques could replace the existing ones (i.e. passwords or 
PINs) for login authentication. The responses revealed that 56% of users supported this 
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idea. However, as Figure 4.13 shows, the two techniques did not meet with equal approval, 














Cognit ive ImagePIN Either 
Figure 4.13 - User preference for replacement method 
Continuing the evaluation, participants were asked to assess the techniques in terms of 
their ease of use, using a four-point scale, progressing from "Very easy" to "Very hard". 
The results are shown in Figure 4.14. conveying the impression that the overall ditTiculty 
associated with the cognitive questions approach is less than that for the ImagePIN (with 
none of the participants rating the cognitive approach as 'very hard'). By contrast, the 
ImagePIN results suggest that the method is more likely to elicit strong feelings from the 
users, with many more responses focusing at the two extremes of the scale. 
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Figure 4.14 - User ratings for perceived ease of use 
Given that one of the principal problems with traditional passwords and PINs is that people 
often find them hard to remember, it was relevant to consider this aspect with the new 
methods. When asked i f they had difficulty in remembering the required information, the 
participants responded as shown in Figure 4.15. This indicates that users have found the 
cognitive questions most difficult, contrasting with the earlier findings from Figure 4.13, 
which indicated that 70% preferred this method. It should be noted that the results in 
Figure 4.15 arc based on the fijll population of participants, whereas Figure 4.13 was only 
based upon 56% of them as participants were only asked to answer if they believed the 










Cognit ive ImagePIN Both 
Figure 4.15 - Perceived difficulty to remember the required information 
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Another important factor was the resulting security that the replacement techniques were 
perceived to provide. The reason for considering the replacement of existing passwords 
and PINs is that they have been found to be vulnerable to compromise by legitimate users, 
and to attack by impostors. In order to evaluate the perceived security of the selected 
methods, users were asked to rate them on a four point scale, progressing from "Very 
easy" to "Very hard", when considering the possibility of an impostor being able to guess 
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Figure 4.16 - User ratings for ease with which methods could be brol^en 
The results show that 55% of the participants believed the ImagePIN to be the easier to 
guess which contrasts with the earlier findings (Figure 4.7) where 47% of the participants 
perceived ImagePIN's to have a high/medium-high level of security. Their feedback 
suggested that it would be easy for an impostor to find the appropriate sequence by sitting 
behind the user, or simply by guessing possible sequences. The latter observation was 
possibly reflective of the fact that many users had chosen weak sequences, and considered 
that other people would do likewise. A larger variation was found in the earlier results for 
cognitive questions where 55% perceived a low/medium-low level of security compared 
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with 77% who later considered the method to be hard/very-hard to be bypassed. This 
perhaps indicates a change of opinion following prolonged exposure to the method. 
In order to fijrther, evaluate the Image-PIN method participants were asked to assess the 
difficulty to remember the 5-images selected from the image grid provided. The 
participants were asked to assess the method on a four-point scale, progressing from "Very 
easy" to "Very hard". The results are shown in Figure 4.17. While over 60% of users 
considered the approach to be easy/very easy, a significant number considered the 
approach to be hard/very hard. This approach may be viable as an authentication 












Very e a s y E a s y Hard Very hard 
Figure 4.17 - Perceived ease of remembering a 5-image sequence 
The final question asked the participants i f they would be prepared to use the methods for 
login authentication. Findings indicated that 56% of users would be prepared to use the 
cognitive questions method for login, and 39% of users for the Image-PIN method 
respectively (Figure 4.18). 
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Figure 4.18 - Overall user acceptance of the techniques 
Most of the users that rejected the cognitive question method for login authentication did 
so on the basis that the method was time consuming and that they had problems relating to 
the entry of the data. By contrast, most of the users that rejected the ImagePIN method 
expressed concerns regarding the interface design and the selection of the images, as well 
as security implications. With such a high level of user rejection for the evaluated 
techniques, it is clear that further work is required to improve the user perception/practical 
issues as well as addressing the technical aspects. It can be observed that for the user 
community as a whole, neither technique represents the natural successor to passwords. 
However, the results do suggest that they offer some potential in some contexts. 
4.3.4 Discussion 
The participant's comments about the methods highlighted some further interesting points 
that were not apparent from the statistics alone. In some cases, these opinions raised 
further legitimate questions about the viability of the techniques, whereas in others they 
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flagged issues that would be unlikely to be genuine considerafions in practice. Nonetheless, 
the fact that such comments were made even within a small sample populafion suggests 
that similar misconceptions could also be reflected within a wider user community. 
In the case of the cognifive quesfions method, individual opinions suggested that it would 
be easy for impostors to acquire the required information by social engineering (e.g. 
having brief conversations with the user, or fiiends of the user in order to find answers to 
the questions). Set against this, however, is the fact that an impostor must know all the 
answers in order to guarantee successftil access to the system, because the questions are 
presented randomly to the user. In addition, even i f the attacker found the answers, they 
must also know how they were typed in the profile stage (e.g. for the question "How many 
cousins do you have?", did a user with three cousins enter their answer as "Three", "three", 
or "3"). 
A problemafic aspect of the cognirive question approach was that it was considered to be 
too time consuming, ruling it out for login authentication, and suggesting that it should 
only be used where higher security requirements justified the effort. Another valid point 
was that basing the authemication on factual information meant that answers would be 
impossible to change i f the method was compromised (i.e. users cannot simply change 
their answer to a quesfion such as "What is your mother's maiden name?" in the same way 
that they could change a password). This would mean that the questions themselves would 
have to change as well. As such, invesfigalion of how well users are able to adapt to 
changing questions would be another valid avenue of fijrther research arising fi-om this 
study. 
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In the context of the ImagePfN, there were several comments about the user interface. 
Participants suggested that the method should have more image grids or different images 
for selection, as well as better images, and the option to choose individual images in order 
to complete the grid. Addressing these factors would have the potential to improve the 
level of user acceptance. Further potential refinements could consider the random 
positioning of images (as previously mentioned), or the use of a static subset of images 
fi-om a much larger collection so that users could select their preferred images (i.e. the user 
would select 20 images fi^om a large collecfion and then select their ImagePrN fi-om the 
subset - for authentication, only the subset would be presented, this would allow a user to 
select similar images that are only distinct to them). I f a much larger set of images were 
available, authentication could be conducted with a randomly selected range of images (i.e. 
4 or 5 valid images with a number of random invalid images). Another refinement could 
involve selecting each image individually fi-om a random group o f images. This would 
increase the number of invalid images for each part of a 4 or 5 image PIN and thus increase 
the number of combinations (e.g. a 5x5 grid of images shown five times would give a total 
of neariy ten million combinations). However, randomising the images in this manner 
could adversely affect the usability and acceptance of the technique as there would be an 
increased delay while the user identified the position of the image(s). A potential solution 
to this would be to reduce the number of images presented (with a subsequent impact on 
the level of security of the method). 
Although many participants appeared to consider the ImagePIN vulnerable to compromise 
by guesswork, it is worth noting that the probability of a property selected sequence being 
broken by this means is 0.000000041. However, the clear problem fi-om practical 
experience was that many users did not select appropriate sequences, leading to the 
88 
Chapter 4 : Assessing Alternative Methods of User Authentication 
conclusion that the implementation of such a technique could be a high risk for security-
unaware users. As with all access control systems, i f the authentication mechanism is too 
difficult or inconvenient to use, end-users will find ways to subvert the system. 
Given the inherent difficuUies in the above methods (spelling mistakes, forgetting images 
etc.), all of the proposed methods could suffer from some of the same issues that make 
passwords weak, namely that users will forget their login details and may have to write 
them down. Preventing users from doing this may increase the loading on administrators 
with users requesfing ImagePINs to be reset, or answers to be retrieved. To resolve this, 
users need education in appropriate selecfion of their authentication responses. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The two trials described in this chapter have provided interesting results regarding the use 
of alternative secret-based authentication techniques. The first trial suggested that longer 
exposure to the methods would allow a more accurate impression of user acceptance to be 
gained. The second study demonstrated that longer exposure to the methods can improve 
both acceptance and the rate of successful authentication, suggesting that each of the 
techniques offers some potential as a replacement or supplementary authentication 
mechanism. However, none of the evaluated techniques appeared to represent an ideal 
solution that could consequently be used to replace traditional passwords and PINs for all 
users in all contexts. In addition, full-scale implementation of the techniques could still be 
hampered by the ways that people can potenfially misuse them. 
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In parallel with considering alternative authentication methods, there is also a need for 
improved user education, both in terms of selecfing appropriate information to act as their 
authentication secret, and also in appreciating the level of security offered by different 
techniques. The solution to login authentication lies not just in technical implementations, 
but also in the way end-users interact with the measures employed. 
The results of these trials suggest a number of fiarther research projects that will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 9. 
Having evaluated these approaches, it is clear that software-based approaches are popular 
with users and could compare favourably with passwords i f implemented properly. The 
results do, however, indicate that users still had difficulty in selecting both unique and non-
predictable secret information. This again serves to reinforce the fact that users frequently 
undermine authenticafion systems through misuse (albeit often inadvertent). In order to 
build on the use of software-based techniques, whilst moving away from secret-based 
methods, the next chapter presents the use of keystroke analysis as an alternative 
authenfication mechanism to the traditional usemame/password, before considering a 
similar trial to evaluate the use of keystroke analysis in chapter 6. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 identified the need for a method of transparent continuous user authentication, 
with the respondents indicating a preference for a method based upon keystroke analysis. 
Before looking at the keystroke analysis methods, alternative software-based 
authentication techniques were evaluated and described in the previous chapter - this 
chapter determined that alternative secret-based authentication has potential but may best 
be applied as a response mechanism for specific authentication challenges. This chapter 
sunmiarises the potential approaches to keystroke analysis, presents a novel method based 
on application-specific user profiling and considers the use of multiple metrics to create a 
composite supervision system. 
The concept of keystroke analysis is by no means a recent development. Previous work, 
published in 1980, first identified the profiling of key-presses as a potential method of user 
authenfication (Gaines et al, 1980). Since then a number of research projects have been 
conducted to evaluate different methods of data gathering (using a range of operating 
systems and considering a variety of metrics) and post-processing techniques (ranging 
from purely statistical to Al/neural network approaches). Later in this chapter these 
projects are summarised and compared. 
Before looking at the results of previous work in this area, it is first necessary to determine 
which characteristics of typing are viable for profiling and authenticating against. Previous 
studies have identified a selection of data acquisition techniques and typing metrics upon 
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which keystroke analysis can be based. The following secfion summarises the basic 
methods and metrics that can be used. 
5.2 Metrics 
There are a variety of possible keystroke metrics that can be profiled as the basis for 
subsequent comparison. The main methods are based on timings between consecutive 
keystrokes, and consider either the latency between two consecutive keypresses (digraphs) 
or three consecutive keypresses (trigraphs). Other possibilities include the mean typing 
and error rates. 
• Digraph latency - Digraph latency is the metric that has traditionally been 
used for previous studies. This measures the delay between two 
consecutive keypress events that are produced during normal typing (e.g. 
when typing the word 'THE' two digraph timings can be generated - T-H 
and H-E). Given a suitable volume of digraph samples the character 
distribution of the English language will ensure that a range of commonly 
occurring digraphs will be generated that can subsequently be profiled. In 
most cases, some form of low and high pass filter is applied to remove 
extraneous data fi-om the session/profile data (discussed in section 5.5.1). 
• Trigraph latency - Trigraph latency extends the previous metric to 
consider the timing for three successive keystrokes (e.g. T-H-E). Spaces 
are usually ignored - e.g. the word THERE could generate three trigraph 
samples, T-H-E, H-E-R and E-R-E, with the final trigraph R-E-[space] 
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ignored. As with digraph latencies, the application of a low and high pass 
filter is usually required. It should be noted that the occurrence of 
trigraphs (and digraphs) would normally comply with the rules of English 
- i.e. T-H and T-H-E are likely to be the most commonly occurring. 
However, as new words (and in particular acronyms) are introduced these 
distributions may change. For example, the introduction of the world-
wide-web has introduced the trigraph W-W-W that would have been 
unlikely to occur twenty years ago. It is probable that over time, the 
distribution of digraphs and trigraphs will change and as such, any system 
that relies upon these measures will also have to change (i.e. profiles wil l 
have to undergo periodic refinement). 
Key^vo^d latency - Keyword latencies consider the overall latency for a 
complete word, or may consider the unique combinations of 
digraph/trigraphs in a word-specific context. The use of keyword 
latencies allows not only profiling of commonly occurring words, but also 
the ability to monitor words that could be interpreted as commands to the 
operating system or applications running on the system - i.e. a command 
with a high misuse risk (e.g. delete or format) could be specifically 
monitored or a specific ftinction in an application (e.g. entering an 
application-specific command with a high risk consequence). 
Keystroke duration - Keystroke durafion considers a different metric to 
that of the digraph and trigraph latencies. This approach considers the 
duration of each individual keypress (i.e. the time between the key-down 
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and key-up events for a single key as opposed to the latency between 
two/three key presses). While this approach is worthy of investigation, it 
does introduce significant limitations. 26 letters of the alphabet provide far 
fewer profile-able characteristics than digraphs - with a maximum of 676 
(26*26) discernible values. The actual number of digraphs encountered in 
typed language is likely to be less than this as certain digraphs do not 
commonly occur (e.g. ZZ, QA). It is also likely that the keypress duration 
will be less variable than digraph latency as there would be no hand 
movement or changes between hands in the keypress duration - unlike the 
digraph latency. 
Keystroke pressure - Keystroke pressure relates to the level o f pressure 
applied for each keypress. It is not possible to obtain pressure values from 
a standard computer keyboard, and as such the use of a customised 
keyboard specifically designed to produce pressure values in addition to 
the usual keypress would be required. While this approach may have 
some potential, the need for a modified keyboard makes this inappropriate 
for practical use. 
Mean typing rate - Whilst this may not be user specific, it may be 
possible to classify users into a generic category, according to their typing 
ability, which can then be used as an additional authentication method or 
potentially to set filter thresholds. 
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• Mean error rate - Finally, the mean error rate can be used to provide an 
indication of the competence of the user during normal typing. It might 
also be feasible to evaluate a users' typing errors - e.g. certain users may 
mistype the same word or words consistently. As with the mean typing 
rate, individuals could be classified according to their typing ability and 
hence evaluated based on their average typing accuracy. 
While the final two metrics indicated above are unlikely to provide a suitably fine-grained 
classification of users for direct authentication judgements, they may be used to provide a 
more generic set of user categories that can contribute to a combined measure. The 
environment in which they are used will determine the useflilness of such non-specific 
metrics. For example, monitoring typing speed and error rate within a pool of touch-
typists would be of little value, as there is unlikely to be any significant deviation between 
each user's profile. 
5.3 Collection methods 
In addition to the variety of metrics that can be recorded, there are also variations in the 
methods of data collection. The following list presents a number of ways in which user-
typing patterns can be acquired and subsequently used for authentication purposes. 
• Static at login - Static keystroke analysis authenticates a typing pattern 
based upon a known keyword, phrase or some other pre-determined text. 
The captured typing pattern is then compared against a profile previously 
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recorded during system enrolment. Static keystroke analysis is generally 
considered to be an initial login enhancement as it can supplement the 
traditional usemame/password login prompt, by checking the digraph 
latencies of the usemame and/or password components (i.e. authenticating 
the user on the basis of both what they typed and how they typed it). 
Periodic dynamic - Dynamic keystroke analysis authenticates a user on 
the basis of their typing during a logged in session. The captured session 
data is compared to an archived user profile to determine deviations. In a 
periodic configuration, the authentication judgement can be intermittent; 
either as part of a timed supervision, or, in response to a suspicious event 
or trigger. This method provides distinct advantages over the static 
approach. Firstly, it is not dependent upon the entry of specific text, and is 
able to perform authentication on the basis of any input. Another factor is 
the availability of data; in static keystroke analysis, the range of digraphs 
and fi-equency of their occurrence is likely to be significantly limited 
compared with a dynamic approach. Even an inexperienced typist is 
likely to produce sufficient digraph pairs to allow an authentication 
judgement to be derived. This is an important factor as it is necessary to 
have a large volume of keystroke data in order to generate a user profile. 
Continuous dynamic - Continuous keystroke analysis extends the data 
capturing to the entire duration of the logged in session. The continuous 
nature of the user monitoring offers significantly more data upon which to 
base the authentication judgement. With this method it is possible that an 
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impostor may be detected earlier in the session than under a periodically 
monitored implementation. On the downside, however, the additional 
processing required will add to the computational overhead of the 
supervision system. 
Keyword-specific - Keyword-specific keystroke analysis extends the 
continuous or periodic monitoring to consider the metrics related to 
specific keywords. This could be an extra measure incorporated into a 
monitoring system to detect potential misuse of sensitive commands. For 
example, under a DOSAVindows environment it may be appropriate to 
monitor the keystroke metrics of a user attempting to execute the 
FORMAT or DELETE commands. This could represent a significant 
enhancement, as a command with a high misuse consequence (e.g. DEL 
*.*) is unlikely to cause sufficient profile deviation when observed ft-om a 
system-wide context, due to the limited selection of digraphs. By contrast, 
static analysis could be applied to specific keywords to obtain a higher 
confidence judgement. 
Application-specific - Application-specific keystroke analysis fijrther 
extends the continuous or periodic monitoring. Using this technique, it 
may be possible to develop separate keystroke profiles for distinct 
applications. For example, a user may be profiled separately for their 
word processing application and email client as a user may type 
sporadically in response to emails while word processing generally has 
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prolonged periods of continuous typing. The potential of this new 
technique is discussed in more detail in section 5.7.2. 
It should be noted that all of the above techniques and metrics could be implemented on a 
standard PC platform, without the need for special hardware (e.g. the only requirements are 
a PC and the ability to run the monitoring software). This offers a significant advantage 
over other alternative authentication and supervision techniques (discussed in Chapter 2), 
as a standard keyboard is present on almost all PC's. However, this approach is not 
without its drawbacks and thought must be given to the ethical and legal questions that 
may arise when proposing such close supervision of computer users. 
5.4 Methods of implementation 
The actual methods of collecting and subsequently verifying user keystroke data vary 
depending on the operating system on which the collection is to take place and also upon 
the nature of the characteristics being monitored. 
There are three potential methods to obtain keystroke data: 
• Custom application - this method can be used to provide a custom front-end 
through which a user's typing patterns can be assessed programmatically or 
added to an existing application to provide context-sensitive analysis of user 
interaction. This could, for example, be used to demonstrate the concept of 
keystroke analysis by presenting the user with a user interface in which they 
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would be required to either type pre-determined text (e.g. a password) or 
allowed to type freely. Depending on the operating system, this may require 
substantial coding to obtain the necessary signals indicating the keypress 
events. This method is limited in its operation, as it will only monitor typed 
content within the specific application. As such, its use is restricted to 
enhancing security within an application or to act as a response to a security 
issue - i.e. to request the user to authenticate with a stronger confidence than 
password only. 
Modification of operating system - this method is considerably more involved 
than the previous approach as it requires an understanding of the underlying 
operating system. Using this approach it is possible to replace the login 
authentication presented under Microsoft Windows (by modifying the 
GINA.DLL that provides the graphical user interface for the login prompt as 
part of the Graphical Identification and Authentication services under 
Microsoft Windows). This process is applied in the Windows software 
product BioPassword described in chapter 2 and illustrated in Figure 5.1. This 
method has distinct advantages in that no specific user action is required in 
order to authenticate as the process of keystroke analysis is integrated into the 
traditional login prompt. As with the previous method, this approach is 
limited in its scope as it would only be activated on login (or when the 
terminal is locked or the Screensaver deactivates - assuming such options are 
available and are enabled). 
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Figure 5.1 - Biopassword login screen 
o Capturing keystroke data - this method uses a custom application to 
effectively 5/i(^keystroke activity by intercepting keystroke messages (under 
Windows) or by redirecting pipes (under Unix/Linux). The appropriate 
software to enable logging of the keystrokes then processes these messages. 
This approach is considered the most flexible (and hence appropriate) of those 
outlined in this section because it can be implemented in a completely 
transparent manner. This approach will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
6 where a prototype system is described. 
5.5 Processing Keystroke Data 
Once the keystrokes have been obtained (using one of the methods outlined in the previous 
section, it is necessary to filter the keystrokes (to remove low and high latencies) and to 
then perform post-processing to extract data on which to base a user profile. 
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5.5.1 Filtering 
For most implementations, some form of low and high pass filter is required to remove 
extraneous samples fi*om the session/profile data. Low pass filtering is important as it 
ensures that undesirable typing characteristics (e.g. stuck keys or repeated key-scans) are 
eliminated fi-om the profile. The use of a high pass filter helps to ensure that excessively 
long digraph timings (which could be indicative of a distraction during typing) are also 
eliminated. The use of such filters could of course have negative side effects - i.e. an 
impostor or masquerador could attempt to bypass security (given appropriate knowledge of 
the system) by typing commands so slowly that the high pass filter would ignore the 
majority of keypresses. To remedy this, it would also be necessary to monitor the 
proportion of f i l tered digraphs to ensure that a number of consecutive incidents are flagged. 
In addition to the filtering of low and high timings, intelligent filtering is usually needed 
(for all methods) to remove certain control keys (i.e. the function keys FI-FI2, CTRL and 
ALT keys etc.) as these are unlikely to provide any meaningful contribution to the profiled 
samples. 
5.5.2 Post processing and comparison 
This section considers the issues of post-processing and comparison from a digraph-centric 
perspective. However, it should be noted that all the points raised are equally relevant to 
trigraph and keyword-based profiling. 
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Once the data is gathered it is necessary to process the raw keystroke samples to provide a 
comparative profile against which session data can be compared. The production of a 
profile is not an insignificant task. If the approach being taken is purely statistical, the data 
must first be cleaned to remove sample outliers that may affect the range of valid values 
for each profiled digraph/trigraph - to tighten the distribution for each profiled digraph (as 
described in the previous section). Once the data is cleaned, the profile is generated based 
on the valid data obtained from the user. One method (described in more detail in chapter 
6) involves the production of a mean and standard deviation for each digraph recorded 
(although there are other statistical techniques employed by the studies described in the 
following section). Once a reference profile has been created, subsequent user data can be 
compared on a digraph-by-digraph basis against the reference profile, recording the 
deviation from the expected typing patterns. The output of such a comparison could be a 
simple count of accepted versus unaccepted digraphs, but could also consider the number 
of consecutive matched, unmatched, accepted and rejected samples (matched and 
unmatched refers to samples where a valid digraph profile does or does not exist - i.e. the 
user profile may not have a recorded entry for a specific digraph pair). 
An alternative to the statistical approach is to use a neural network method. To use a 
neural network approach, the data is split into two parts. The first part of the data would be 
used to generate a profile - typically selecting the top n occurring digraphs for the user and 
then feeding each digraph timing through a neural network. Once the network is trained 
using the first data set, the second set can be used to verify and improve the network's 
performance. Finally, the data from other users can be fed through the same network to 
determine the false acceptance rate for the users' profile. The output of this method would 
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normally be a classification accuracy - i.e. the confidence that the sampled data matches 
the expected users' profile. 
Both of these methods have been considered by a number of trials investigating the use of 
keystroke analysis utilising digraph samples (a selection are listed in Table 5.1). However, 
there are significant problems with the use of either method. A purely statistical approach 
relies upon sufficient data being available to allow a profile to be generated - i f too little 
data is present, the accuracy of the profile will be jeopardised as the deviation for each 
profiled digraph could be very high (more samples are needed to make the high/low 
timings less significant). The neural network approach requires a reduced subset of 
digraphs (typically choosing the n most commonly occurring) as any increase in the 
number of inputs to the neural network (where one input is required for each profiled 
digraph) increases the complexity of the networks and the time taken to process the data. 
This results in a trade-ofif between reducing the number of inputs to speed up the data 
processing while ensuring enough data to accurately authenticate a user. 
The neural network method, while limited by the volume of data collected in keystroke 
analysis, may be able to identify patterns in user profiles (i.e. identifying distinguishing 
digraphs for each user) that would be missed by a purely statisfical approach. While not 
considered in the first trial described in chapter 6, the use of neural networks will be 
revisited in chapter 8. 
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5.6 Summary of previous work 
The idea of using keyboard characteristics for authentication is not unique, and there have 
been a number of previous published studies in the area. To date, however, virtually all 
published studies have focussed upon static or context-independent dynamic analysis, 
using the inter-keystroke latency timing method. From the earliest studies in 1980 (Card et 
al & Gaines et al), the focus has been on the analysis of digraph latencies. Later studies, 
such as those by Joyce & Gupta (1990) and Mahar et al (1995) fijrther enhanced the work, 
identifying additional statistical analysis methods that provided more reliable results. 
In Legget et al. (1991), the concept of dynamic keystroke analysis was first proposed, with 
the introduction of a reference profile that could be used to monitor a live user session. 
Brown and Rogers (1993) also explored the idea of dynamic analysis, presenting 
preliminary results. 
A summary of some of the main results fi-om studies to date is presented in Table 5.1 
below, which illustrates the effectiveness observed (in terms of false acceptance and false 
rejection errors), as well as the type of keystroke analysis technique employed 
(digraph/trigraph etc.) and the analysis approach taken (statistical or neural network). 
As can be seen fi-om Table 5.1 the range of results shows the inherent unreliability of the 
keystroke analysis approach - with large variations in both FAR and FRR rates. It can be 
observed that in almost all cases, the FAR rates have either been fixed at 0% (optimising 
the system under test to reject all known impostor activity) or have been less than 10% 
(less than 1 in 10 impostors would be authenticated by the keystroke analysis system). 
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However, with some experiments producing FAR rates in excess of 10% it is clear that the 
previous work in the area has still not entirely addressed the problem of false acceptance. 
As different organisations will have differing security requirements, there is no single FAR 
rate that will prove acceptable to all - while all organisations will aspire to 0% FAR, it is 
unlikely to be feasible due to the inverse relationship with the FRR rate (Figure 2.2) and 
the consequent affect on user attitudes and opinions when high rejection rates are 
encountered. Several studies have forcibly fixed the FAR to 0% by optimising the 
software to reject all impostor attempts during the experiment run. However, this can only 
be achieved at the expense of the false rejection rate. By fixing the FAR at 0%, the system 
has to be much more precise about accepting a login attempt - this results in an increased 
FRR. 
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Table 5.1 - Previous keystroke analysis studies 
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The effect of an increased FRR is not so obvious when considering the classic C-l-A trio 
(Confidenfiality, Integrity and Availability) as usually the only impact is on the latter, 
availability. Forgetting or mis-typing a password is a common occurrence and as such 
users may be somewhat forgiving of a system that asks them to re-type their password. 
However, i f the supervision system is reliant on keystroke analysis it is not what the user 
types but how the user types that is important. A user is likely to become annoyed and 
confused at having to retype the same authentication details knowing that they are typing 
in the correct information. I f the user is unaware that the system is also monitoring how 
they are typing this could result in poor acceptance of such techniques. As such, it is 
important to attain a balance between the two, or, to optimise the FAR to 0% whilst 
minimising the FRR to as near to 0% as possible. 
There is also an issue of logged data size with the experiments summarised in Table 5. J. It 
is difficult to make direct comparisons based solely on the error rates without considering 
the size of the acquired data sets. While all the experiments listed provided details of the 
number of participants (ranging from 10 to 67), none provided details of the size of the 
sampled data. Without this information, the comparisons made between studies can only 
be based on the statisfics available; namely the error rates, analysis method and number of 
participants. It is possible that the experiments achieving the best error rates could have 
been based on more samples than the others - in theory providing a broader range of 
samples on which to base a profile. 
It should be noted that Table 5.1 does not fully reflect the entirety of published work in this 
domain, as a number of papers did not provide results in an appropriate format (i.e. the 
outcomes of the trials did not specify overall acceptance/rejection rates). 
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5.7 New approaches 
The previous section summarised a range of published trials considering the applicafion of 
keystroke analysis using digraph samples. It has already been indicated that there are other 
metrics that can be considered and the following sections will discuss the use of trigraph, 
keyword and applicafion profiling. While these new approaches are not used in the inifial 
trial described in the next chapter, the larger trial discussed in chapter 7 considers these 
methods in a pracfical implementafion. 
5.7.1 Trigraph/keyword profiling 
Previous works have concentrated on the use of digraph profiles to authenticate users' 
typing pattems with few suggesting the possibility of using trigraphs - combinations of 
three characters (Song et al, 1997, Bergadano et al, 2002) or keywords. The use of trigraph 
profiling presents a wider range of available profile samples (i.e. the English language 
provides more three character combinations than two character) and also improves the 
likelihood of obtaining a wider range of fimings (i.e. short digraph timings would be 
removed using the low pass filter whereas with trigraphs it is probable that a short timing 
on the first and second characters could be offset by a longer timing on the second and 
third character fimings. It would still be necessary to have a high/low pass filter to cut of f 
the extreme outliers, but this should still leave enough samples on which to base a profile. 
The same process applies to the application of keyword profiling; this could either be 
based upon a subset of commonly occurring words or based on specific rules (e.g. 
usemame or password) 
108 
Chapter 5 : Approaches to Keystroke Analysis 
Once enough data is gathered, it is likely that trigraphs would be evaluated in the same 
manner as digraphs, either adopting a statistical approach or using a neural network 
method (with a reduced range of trigraphs). 
5.7.2 Application profiling 
A fiirther variation in the data analysis can be introduced through the consideration of 
application specific keystroke profiles. I f we accept ft-om previous work that individual 
users have a distinct typing pattern, it can be hypothesised that an individual's typing 
pattern may also vary depending upon the application in use. For example, a user 
participating in a chat session may type in a fairly relaxed conversational style, while the 
same user may type in a significantly different way when producing a document. As such, 




(e.g. rntemet Explorer) 
Instant Messaging 




M Profi e E Profile 
Figure 5.2 - Application profiling 
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5.7.3 Numeric profiling 
It should also be noted that certain categories o f user might use the numeric keypad for 
large quantities o f data entry. Under these circumstances the volume and diversity o f the 
keystroke digraphs w i l l vary tremendously when compared to the more usual alphanumeric 
typing encountered with most user profiles. Previous research has been carried out in this 
area (Ord & Fumell, 2000), which has shown that analysis o f numeric keystrokes can 
provide a viable authentication measure. This is an area receiving on-going attention 
through a separate research project in the Network Research Group (Clarke et al, 2003). 
5.7.4 Composite keystroke dynamics 
The results shown earlier in Table 5.1 demonstrated that the concept o f keystroke analysis 
is feasible as an authentication mechanism. However, these trials were limited and 
provided variable results. While the approaches outlined in this chapter have focussed on 
the application o f a single latency measure (i.e. using a digraph, trigraph or keyword 
method) it may be possible to obtain better results using a composite approach. By 
combining the confidence measures o f multiple metrics (e.g. monitoring digraphs and 
trigraphs), coupled with monitoring specific keywords (e.g. the typing patterns for high-
risk words - format, delete etc.), it may be possible to provide a higher level o f confidence 
in the authentication o f the user. The potential for this method w i l l be considered further 
in a practical implementation in chapter 7. 
110 
Chapter 5 : Approaches to Keystroke Analysis 
5.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the range o f metrics available for monitoring keystroke 
analysis and the methods for processing such data. A number o f possible additional 
measures have been identified that could be employed to improve the performance o f 
digraph-only keystroke analysis. 
The fol lowing chapter describes an initial trial investigating the application for keystroke 
analysis (digraph based) within a limited number o f trial participants over a one-month 
period. While this trial only used digraph profi l ing, a later trial (discussed in chapter 7) 
profiled users based on digraph, trigraph and word specific samples. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the concept o f keystroke analysis was introduced with a 
description o f the various keystroke metrics that can be evaluated, together with an 
overview o f the ways in which keystroke samples can be obtained. This chapter presents 
the results o f a small-scale trial conducted to evaluate the viabili ty o f unconstrained, non-
intrusive keystroke analysis (i.e. transparently monitoring a users' normal session). Before 
looking at the results, it is first necessary to describe the technical implementation o f the 
software used to monitor the trial users, and to then consider the processing performed 
upon the acquired sample data. 
This initial trial used an analytical approach for detecting deviation from a users' historical 
keystroke profile captured under a multi-tasking windowed environment. A n alternative 
technique, a Data Mining ( D M ) approach, was also considered in order to determine the 
potential for improving user classification. These trials aimed to determine which 
approach provides the best basis for further research, and were not intended to produce a 
statistically valid conclusion (rather its aim was to provide a "proof o f concept" that could 
then be used to demonstrate the viability o f this approach). 
6.2 Experiment Overview 
While keystroke analysis has been investigated (and hence implemented) in previous 
studies, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) environment (e.g. Microsoft Windows) 
introduces new challenges. In previous published studies, the user has been required to 
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type and interact with a specific application (typing either pre-defined or fi-ee-form text). 
While this approach makes the development o f the keystroke monitoring software simple, 
and maintains the consistency o f the test environment, i t is not representative o f normal 
typing behaviour as the user becomes focussed upon the task o f typing, rather than 
focussed upon a task that involves typing. I f the aim is to produce static keystroke analysis 
for occasional authentication judgements (e.g. supplementing login authentication) then 
this approach w i l l work well . However, to implement continuous supervision it is 
necessary to monitor the users' normal behaviour when interacting wi th their normal 
applications and operating system environment. Even providing a simulation o f these 
environments may not be sufficient to obtain valid sample data on which to base a profile. 
In order to address this problem, software was developed that would transparently monitor 
and log all typing activity. The system was designed to allow keystroke data to be 
collected under the Microsoft Windows N T environment (although the technique is equally 
applicable in all Microsoft Windows operating systems). In order to collect the required 
data, it was necessary to implement a mechanism for acquiring user typing patterns across 
all applications running within a users' active session. This is important as the experiment 
was designed to create a profile for each user based upon their typical typing patterns when 
using their computer (not constrained to a specific application or task). The 
implementation o f the keylogger utilised several key features o f the Windows operating 
system and the underlying chains o f messages on which the operating system is built. 
These are briefly discussed in the fol lowing section. 
JJ4 
Chapter 6 : System- Wide Keystroke Analysis 
6.2.1 Windows messages 
The Windows operating system works on an event driven principle - when a key is pressed 
on the keyboard, or the mouse is moved, or any other monitored event occurs, the 
operating system generates a message that is sent to any application (or service) in the 
event chain. 
I f we imagine a hierarchy, representing the operating system and the applications running 
under i t , messages are normally passed from the operating system, to each application 
registered to receive the appropriate messages. For example, almost all Windows 
applications process mousemove events - these are used to detect when the mouse has 
entered an application window. When an application is loaded, it notifies the operating 
system that it wishes to receive specific events when they occur, and from that point 
onwards the operating system provides notification o f events to each application listed for 
each event. Windows applies a level o f intelligence to message handling, such that when a 
notifiable event occurs (e.g. a keypress on the keyboard), the foreground application with 
the focus (i.e. the current application) w i l l receive the message. This ensures that when 
typing into one application, others running in the background do not inadvertently receive 
the messages. However, i f there are a series o f applications that request the event 
notification, the events are passed through the event chain starting with the foreground 
application and working down to the most recent addition (Figure 6.1 shows this message 
handling in a simplified form). 
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Message 
Keycode 
Microsoft Windows Message Handler 
/ 
/ H i ^ I Foreground Application 
/ 
Reserved 0 /S Messages 
^ LJzf^ Background Application 1 
; "S I I 
Background Application ... 
Figure 6.1 • Normal Windows messaging 
When a key is pressed an event is raised in the operating system that is used to create a 
Windows message. Depending on the content o f this message (the keycode in the event o f 
a keypress), the message is routed to one or more applications or services. Generally (for 
keypresses) the message is directed at the current foreground application. However, i f the 
message relates to a reserved operating system event (e.g. the C T R L - A L T - D E L sequence), 
this message is redirected to other system processes (e.g. the GINA D L L mentioned in the 
previous chapter). This is an important feature as, without it, an application would be able 
to obtain notification o f the C T R L - A L T - D E L sequence and potentially override the 
underlying operating system's authentication routines. This could then be used 
(theoretically) to present a bogus login prompt with the aim o f surreptitiously obtaining 
user login details. 
In order to obtain keystroke messages under Windows (so that logging o f keystrokes can 
occur across all applications) it is necessary to insert an application into the highest 
position o f the event chain. This is important as once an application has received and 
processed a message (e.g. fol lowing a keypress event) it is removed from the hook chain 
and lower applications w i l l not receive the message. To achieve this, a special form o f 
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application must be written which implement a system-wide hook ftinction. System-wide 
hooks allow a specified code block (the hook-ftinction) to receive the required Windows 
messages irrespective o f the target application (i.e. it is possible for a hook ftinction to 
receive keystroke notifications for all currently running applications). This effectively 
allows application keystroke data to be sniffed and directed towards the data logger on the 
client workstation (Figure 6.2). 
Message 
Keycode 
Microsoft Windows Message Handler 




Background Application 1 
Bacl^ground Application 
Figure 6.2 - Insertion of system-wide hook function 
Once the hook function receives the message from the operating system it is important to 
ensure that the message is processed quickly and then sent on (dispatched) to the next 
application in the chain. I f this is not done, the hook function (the keylogger in our case) 
w i l l effectively absorb all keypresses and w i l l not allow lower level applications to see any 
user activity - which is clearly undesirable. 
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6.2.2 System-wide hook implementation 
The implementation o f the keylogger required a system-wide hook to intercept all 
keystroke messages, and an application to filter and log keystrokes. The first attempt at 
implementing this utilised Visual Basic v6 Enterprise Edition to develop a simple 
application to log all keystrokes entered within the application window. Once the user had 
completed typing, the application would create a typing profile based upon typical typing 
patterns (illustrated in Figure 6.3). Figure 6.4 shows typing profiles fi^om three different 
users with the lines indicating average typing speed per digraph. It should be noted that 
this application was a simple proof-of-concept program to determine the abilities o f 
Windows to capture keystroke information and produce accurate digraph latencies 
transparently - no actual profi l ing was carried out based upon the results o f this program 
and it is presented here simply to demonstrate the principle o f capturing keystroke data. 
i . Keystroke Analysis Module - Profile Generator fLlnl>c"l 
This application logs all keypressses entered 
within this application. On the left hand side, 
this window accepts text typed in by the user. 
Beside this window we have a recoid of aD 
typed dgraphs sorted alphabetically. To the 
far right we have a recoid of logged 
keysliokes. Finally, at the bottom, we have a 
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0 li A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P O R S T U V W X Y Z 
Figure 6.3 - Simple application for keystroke logging (vertical axis - time in ms) 
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Figure 6.4 - Comparative profiles from three users (same typed text) 
The digraph plots shown in Figure 6.4 show significant differences in typing patterns 
(particularly apparent in the third chart) - it should be noted that the actual digraph 
distribution varies slightly among the users as typing errors were also logged. While this 
application was able to successfully log all keystrokes typed within its text box, there were 
several limitations. The first (and obvious) limitation is that the keystrokes were only 
logged for the test application (i.e. all other applications were ignored). Secondly, and o f 
more concern at this stage, was that the t iming accuracy for digraph latencies were 
somewhat unreliable. A series o f tests demonstrated that the t iming resolution under 
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Visual Basic was in the order o f 10 milli-seconds (the timings shown in Figure 6.3 show a 
resolution o f 10ms) - far too large for keystroke latencies which are expected to be in the 
range 40-750ms (i.e. a 10ms resolution may not provide sufficient distinction between user 
samples). In order to address this, further investigations were conducted to locate a more 
accurate timer. The obvious alternative was to use the Windows API GetTickCountQ 
function - while this provides a timer with a resolution o f I ms, it is somewhat unreliable as 
the counter used by this function uses a fixed range data type and can overflow (wraps 
around back to zero) there are also problems due to locking o f threads that prevents the 
GetTickCountQ function registering CPU cycles. Fortunately the Windows Application 
Programming Interface (API) provides another alternative, a simple solution in the form o f 
the QueryPerformanceCounter (located in the kernel D L L ) . 
The QueryPerformanceCounter functions provide access to a "high-resolution performance 
counter" (Microsoft, 2004). Using the two counter functions it is possible to obtain a timer 
with a resolution o f approximately Ips (Table 6.1). 
Function Purpose 
QueryPerformanceCounter Returns a large integer equivalent to the tick-
count (i.e. number o f clock ticks since boot 
time). 
QueryPerformanceFrequency Returns a large integer containing the 
performance-counter frequency, in counts per 
second. This can be used to determine the 
number o f clock ticks occurring per second and 
hence convert the counter value into a time in 
seconds. 
Table 6.1 - Timer functions under Windows API 
The functions listed in Table 6.1 are available in all versions o f Windows from Windows 
95 onwards - however, not all computer systems provide access to this counter (the high-
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performance counter is a feature o f the system's CPU and almost all processors since the 
386 support this, however, it is still hardware dependent). It is therefore important to 
check the return values o f these fiinctions to ensure that the counters are actually available 
on the system under test. 
To use these timer fiinctions for digraph latency timings, the counter needs to be stored 
when the first keystroke is released ( t imel ) and at second keystroke is pressed (time2). To 
determine the latency in seconds it is necessary to use both functions together. Subtracting 
the times provides the number o f counter intervals that have occurred between the 
keystrokes, which can then be divided by the counter frequency to give a time in seconds 
(the inter-keystroke latency). 
l a t e n c y = (time2 - ti m e l ) / frequency 
Having obtained the necessary timing resolution, the problem o f system-wide keystroke 
capture was addressed. The common approach to this problem is to implement a system-
wide hook to capture all events o f a specific type (keypresses in this case). This however 
was not possible in Visual Basic. To intercept keyboard messages it is necessary to call 
the SetWindowsHookEx fianction in the Windows API (code below). As part o f this 
ftinction call, a pointer is passed providing the memory address o f a function to receive the 
intercepted messages. While Visual Basic ( V B ) is able to provide a function to receive the 
messages, it cannot be accessed by other applications (i.e. the messages must have 
originated within the V B application). The normal method for implementing system-wide 
hooks is to implement the code in a standard Windows Dynamic Link Library ( D L L ) file. 
Unfortunately V B is unable to produce standard D L L ' s ( V B can however create O L E - D L L 
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files - but these are very different in structure). To resolve this problem, a D L L had to be 
written in Visual C - H - V6 ( V C ) in order to create the necessary code. 
HHOOK SetWindowsHookEx(idHook, I p f n , hMod, dwThreadId) 
Parameters: 
idHook - Specifies the type of hook procedure to be installed. 
I p f n - Pointer to the hook procedure. 
hMod - Handle to the DLL containing the hook procedure. 
dwThreadID - identifier of the thread with which the hook procedure is to be 
associated 
Code Sample 1 - SetWindowsHookExQ function prototype 
The important parameter is the final one. The dwThreadID parameter specifies which 
thread (effectively which application) the hook w i l l be installed for. While V B was able to 
install a hook, its use was constrained to the current thread (i.e. the application calling the 
ftinction). To enable a system-wide hook across all threads (and hence all applications) it 
is necessary to pass the value zero - this w i l l then ensure that the hook procedure is 
associated with all existing threads running in the same desktop as the calling thread. 
Finally, the code to process the messages was developed. This function had to evaluate 
each Windows message in turn to check the nature o f the message and to then pass this 
information back to a program that could process and log each keypress/release event. It 
was decided that this would be a two-stage process. Windows messages would be received 
by the KeyboardProc ftinction (the keyboard system-wide hook ftjnction) and would then 
be filtered. Keypress events (both key-up and key-down messages) would then be sent to a 
V B application for ftirther processing and logging. This sequence is represented in Figure 
6.5. 
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Appiicalion 










Background Application 1 
Keylogger Background Application 
Figure 6.5 - Keylogger inserted with system-wide scope 
To send the keystroke data to the keylogger, messages were directly sent to the V B 
application replicating the keypresses received by the hook function (and destined for the 
original target application). This effectively meant that the keylogger saw all system-wide 
keypress events as i f they had occurred locally within the V B application. This was 
achieved by using the PostMessage A P I function to not i fy the target application (the 
keylogger) o f a specific event. This is the same process used by Computer Based Training 
(CBT) packages to take remote control o f an application and demonstrate normal user 
interaction e.g. typing and mouse movements (this is usually referred to as injecting 
messages). 
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The KeyboardProc function code (to receive and process keypress messages) is listed in 
Code Sample 2. 
LRESULT VCKEYBOARDHCX)K_API s c d c a l l K e y b o a r d P r o c ( i n c nCode, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM IParam) 
( 
//Only examine HC_ACTION messages - OLher messages c o n t a i n no d a t a . 
i f (nCode==HC_ACTION) 
( 
//Handle key-up a c t i o n 
i f (HIWORD{lParam) & KF_UP) 
{ 
PoscMessagedoggerWindow, WM_KEYUP, wParam, iParam) ; 
} 
//Handle key-down a c t i o n . 
e l s e i f ((!(HIWORD(lParam) & KF_UP)) & (!(HIWORD(lParain) & KF_REPEAT))) 
{ 




// Once we have looked a t the message and p a s s e d i t to the k e y l o g g e r 
// the message must be p a s s e d to t h e o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a t i o n 
// We w i l l p a s s a l l messages on to CallNextHookEx. 
// 
return(CallNextHookEx(keyboardHook, nCode. wParam, I P a r a m ) ) ; 
) 
Code Sample 2 - KcyboardProcQ implementation 
As messages are received they are split into key-up and key-down events. Key-down 
events are further checked to eliminate repeat keys (i.e. when a key is held down causing 
multiple, repeated characters). Messages are then posted to the V B keylogger (which then 
sees the key events as local keypresses) and finally the original message is sent on to the 
original destination (e.g. to Microsoft Word). The wParam value holds the virtual key-
code for the keypress event, while the IParam value holds a 32 bit value where the bit 
sequences indicates additional parameters, such as the nature o f the keypress event (key up, 
down or repeat), the number o f repeat occurrences o f the key, scan-codes and the status o f 
the extended keys (e.g. the A L T key). Keyboards generate scan-codes for each 
keypress/release - with each key generating a unique make and break scancode. Scan-
codes provide low-level keyboard information - e.g. the ability to distinguish between the 
numerals at the top o f the letter keys and those found in a dedicated numeric keypad. 
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A n additional feature was introduced to the hook ftinction to monitor the handle o f the 
application in which the keypress occurred (a handle is a numeric value that uniquely 
identifies the application window within Windows). This would allow the keylogger to 
also record the title o f the foreground application window (i.e. the program in which the 
user was actively typing). The code for this is presented below and simply monitored the 
foreground window handle for any change. When a change in application focus occurred, 
the keylogger was notified o f the change o f focus by a Windows message - as keypress 
message were already in use to not i fy the keylogger o f keyboard activity, the keylogger 
was notified o f a change o f application focus by sending a lef^ button mouse-click message. 
This would then allow the keylogger to request the title o f the application window (via the 
API) and subsequently log this information, together with the keystroke data and the 
usemame o f the currently logged in user. 
hwndCurrent=GecForegroundWindow(); 








Code Sample 5 - Notincation of application focus change 
6.2.3 Keylogger implementation 
The V B keylogger had a relatively simple implementation. Once started, the application 
loaded the hook function into memory by initiating the D L L file. The hook fijnction was 
then inserted into the message event chain with system-wide scope. As part o f this, the 
hook function was also passed a handle to a picture box located on the keylogger interface. 
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This control was chosen as it can receive keystroke and mouse click messages while 
presenting no visual interface - i.e. i f a user opened the application they would not be able 
to interfere with the key logging process. This handle was used by the hook function to 
post messages directly to the VB keylogger application (Figure 6.6). 
IMS Keyslroke Aiidlysis 
84 72 135 Untitled - Notepad pdowtand 
84 73 207 Untftled • Notepad pdowland 
73 83 64 Untitled - Notepad pdowtand 
73 83 52 Untitled - Notepad pdowtand 
69 63 118 Untitled - Notepad pdowland 
79 82 52 Steven FuineD • Conversation pdowlanc 
79 69 108 Steven FurneD - Conveisation pdowland 
69 83 108 Steven Fumell • Conversation pdowland 
69 89 79 Google • Microsoft Internet Explorer pdowland 
83 84 188 Google - Miaosoft Internet Explorer pdowlartd 
83 82 255 Google • Miaosoft Internet Explorer pdowland 
65 78 63 Google - Microsoft Internet Explorer pdowland 
65 76 51 Google • Microsoft Internet Explorer pdowland 
76 89 143 Google - Microsoft Internet Explorer pdowland 
89 83 46 Google - Microsoft Internet Explorer pdowfand 
83 73 91 Google • Microsoft Internet Explorei pdowtand 






Minimize to Tray 
Figure 6.6 - Key logging across multiple applications 
When running, the keylogger was discreetly added to the system tray to avoid any 
inconvenience to the user (shown as the furthest right icon in Figure 6.7). 
^ l l M 5 Keystroke Analysis | 
^ ' ^ ^ I c ^ ^ ^ 12:57 II 
Figure 6.7 - System tray icon for keystroke analysis 
For each digraph pair logged, the application stores five items of information - these being 
written to a text file after every 500 digraphs (Table 6.2). 
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Item Data types 
Left character ASCII code representing character 
Right character ASCn code representing character 
Latency Integer representing inter-keystroke latency 
in milliseconds 
Application String containing the window title from the 
foreground application. 
Usemame String containing currently logged-in user 
Table 6.2 - Keylogger attributes logged per digraph 
6.2.4 Filtering 
To eliminate extreme short/long digraph latencies that may adversely affect the distribution 
of digraph times, any digraph pair whose latency fell outside a nominal range was 
excluded from the log files. For the purpose of this experiment the range was restricted to 
times above 40ms and below 750ms. These thresholds were based on previous work 
conducted by Fumell (1995), and were designed to eliminate samples where two keys may 
have been accidentally struck together (thus, producing an infeasibly small latency) or, 
where the user may have made a pause in their typing and thus introduced an unnaturally 
large inter-keystroke latency. 
6.3 Final implementation 
The final implementation of the keylogger application is shown in Figure 6.8. This shows 
the messages passed from the hook (implemented in the DLL in C) and the keylogger 
(implemented in Visual Basic and deployed as a system tray application). The keylogger 
functioned completely transparently to the user, requiring no user action to start or stop the 
logging process. The application was automatically started when the operating system 
(O/S) booted (run from the Startup program group on the start menu) and shut down 
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automatically when the 0/S closed. Gathered data was automatically saved after every 500 
digraphs pairs and when the application was closed. To reassure users, an option was 
included to suspend logging of keystrokes. This was included due to concerns expressed 
by some users about monitoring of specific inputs - e.g. the typing of on-line banking 
login details. 
Application 
(e.g. M S Word) 
Keylogger 




Microsoft Windows Message Handler 
\ S \ i: f i 
System-Wide Hook 
Foreground Application 
Mouse down message 
(Change of application 
notification) 
Background Application 1 
41 
I 
^ ^ Log Files 
Background Application .. 
Figure 6.8 - F ina l implementation of kcylogger 
6.4 Trial participants 
For this experiment a total of ten users were profiled over a period o f three months. The 
trial participants were drawn from students and staff from the Network Research Group. 
As the intention was to evaluate the analysis mechanisms without implementing a large-
scale trial, tests were carried out using a small set of test subjects. The main limiting factor 
was the need to collect data over a prolonged period (weeks rather than hours). Despite the 
small scale of the trial, it still proved difficult to collect sufficient data in order to provide a 
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valid comparison between users. Several users disabled the keylogger when entering 
sensitive information and consequently forgot to re-enable it. This resulted in large 
variations in profile size (discussed in the following section). 
Due to this limited set of data, some of the discussion and analysis in the following 
sections focuses on the six main users who provided the largest profiled data sets in order 
to best illustrate the trends observed. 
6.5 Analysis 
Following the initial filtering described in the previous section, the experimental data for 
each user was processed off-line to calculate the mean and standard deviation values for 
each unique digraph pair. In the event that any digraph pair had a standard deviation 
greater than its mean value, the digraph samples were sorted and the top/bottom 10% were 
then removed, followed by subsequent re-calculation of the mean and standard deviation 
values - this was only attempted where at least ten samples were available for the digraph 
pair. The reason for this additional step was to remove digraph samples where the 
latencies would have an adverse affect on the standard deviation (i.e. the distribution of 
samples was tightened). 
Once a profile of digraph pairs was produced (with corresponding mean/standard deviation 
digraph latency values), the user's profile was further constrained by filtering out digraph 
pairs where the sample count fell below a nominal threshold value. This initial experiment 
fixed this value at fifty samples; however, the sofhvare used for analysis allowed a variable 
threshold (Figure 6.9). 
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Key Logger Analyser 
Profile Infoimation-
Select pioiile: QVDocumenU and Selting5VAdrninistralor\My Documenls\Work Select 
Minimum Samples pei Digraph: 
Total Digraph Samples: 
1 
SDev>Mean Compensation Analyse 
15513 Unique Digraph Pairs: 469 
Initial Results-
Digraph Time Mean 1 SDev 1 
AC 1B5 142.8... 3a49... 
AD 88 150.5... 7a45... Retkiced D^raph Pairs; 
AE 105 21Z3... 71.51... :I 
Al 59 lOl.B... 88.87... Average Di^aph Latency: 
AL 175 137.2.. 11Z5... 
AN 147 105.5... 81.99... 




Select profile: C\Documents and Seltings\Admini$tiator\My Documenls\Work Select 
Number ol Standard Deviations: • 1 ( 1 1 1 • I I I 1 • 
j Compare 
Results-
Total Digraph Samples: P^13 
Highest Cumulative Alert 
LeveL 
Accepted Profiled Digraphs: 





Highest Consecutive^ Rejected 
Digraphs: 
Rejected Profiled Digraphs: 




Figure 6.9 - Profile generation and testing 
The profile generator and analyser is split into four separate sections with a number of 
options/results displayed. This is discussed in the following sections. 
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6.5.1 Profile settings 
Figure 6.10 shows the profile selection frame within the application. This allows the 
selection of the original user keylogger data files (stored as a plain text file) and options to 
change the minimum number of samples per digraph, as well as the option to re-calculate 
digraph sets where the standard deviation is greater than the mean. The first setting allows 
a variation in the minimum number of samples required to produce a viable digraph profile. 
This ensures that only digraphs with a large number of samples are used in the final profile. 
The example in Figure 6.10 shows a profile loaded containing 15,613 individual digraph 
samples (a very small data set) which comprises 469 unique digraph pairs - this gives an 
average of only 33 samples per digraph. By applying a threshold value (set to 50 in the 
figure) the least frequently occurring digraphs are removed from the final profile. 
Profile Infofmalion-
S elect profile: C:\Documenls and Setttngs\Adminisbatoi\My Documents\Woik Select 
Minimum Samples per Digraph' ^ ^ I I 
SDev>Mean Compensation Analyse 
Total Digiaph Samples: 15S13 Unique Digraph Pairs: 469 
Figure 6.10 - Profile selection 
The setting to select filtering of digraphs where the standard deviation is greater than the 
mean is used to filter digraphs with high variance. Where this condition is found true, the 
top/bottom 10% of samples are removed and the standard deviation and mean are 
recalculated with this process repeated until the variance is reduced. This will result in a 
digraph pair being removed from the profile altogether i f the number of eligible samples is 
reduced below the threshold set in the first option. To give an indication of this, the test 
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run shown in Figure 6.9 resulted in the number of profiled digraphs being reduced fi-om 
469 to just 92. 
6.5.2 Generated profile 
Figure 6.11 shows the profile generated from the selected keylogger data file following the 
processing selected and described in the previous section. The reduced set of digraphs (92 
in this example) are shown together with their associated mean and standard deviation 
values. Note that the digraphs are sorted alphabetically rather than by fi-equency of 
occurrence - this was by design to allow rapid searching of the profile for specific digraph 
pairs when comparing raw keylogger data files. The variance shown between digraphs is 
quite significant - the digraph pair A-C has a profile of 142.8ms ± 39.49 while the digraph 
pair A-L has a profile of 137.2ms ± 112.5. This variance can be adjusted in the later 
settings described in the next section. 
r niiiil Results -


































— _ _ — _ j 
Figure 6.11 - Generated profile 
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6.5.3 Test profile selection and settings 
Figure 6.12 shows the test profile settings frame, hi this section the comparison keylogger 
data file is selected (the users' data that will be compared against the generated profile) and 
the level of deviation from the profile is determined. When the comparison is started, each 
digraph is compared against the reference profile and a simple analytical comparison is 
performed. I f the test digraph is within the permitted range of the reference profile the 
digraph is accepted. The permitted deviation is determined by the slider control that selects 
the number of standard deviations from the mean. 
digraph mean ± (digraph standard deviation * permitted deviation) 
rTes t Profile-
Select profile: QVDocuments and Setlings\Adminislrator\My DocumentsVWork Select 
Number of Standard Deviations: ^ -^^  I I I • I I I I I I I t I I I I I • I > ) 
[ Compare 
Figure 6.12 - Test profile selection and settings 
The comparison described above is repeated for each captured digraph in the comparison 
keylogger data file and a number of statistics calculated (described in the next section). 
6.5.4 Test profile results 
Figure 6.13 shows the results frame. This presents the results from the analysis conducted 
on the keylogger data file when compared against the reference profile, hi total eight 
values are presented, as described in Table 6.3. 
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R esults — - — — 
Tolal Digiaph Samples: 
I H ighest Cumulative Alert 
Level: 
Accepted Profiled Digraphs: 






Highest Consecutively Rejected 
Digraphs: 





Figure 6.13 - Test proflle results 
Item Description 
Total Digraph Samples Total number of digraphs in the keylogger data file. 
Analysed Digraphs Total number of digraphs that match digraphs in the 
comparison profile. 
Highest Cumulative Alert 
Level 
A running alert level is maintained which is 
incremented/decremented with each digraph decision. A 
live system would need a threshold value (probably 
individually set for each user) beyond which the user would 
be more explicitly challenged for authentication. 
Highest Consecutively 
Rejected Digraphs 
A count of the highest number of consecutively rejected 
digraphs. This may provide evidence of a poor match 
between reference profile and comparison keylogger file. 
Accepted Profiled Digraphs Total number of accepted digraphs (i.e. those that match the 
reference profile within the permitted deviation). 
Rejected Profiled Digraphs Total number of rejected digraphs (i.e. those that do not 
match the reference profile ± permitted deviation). 
%'ge Alert Level Alert level represented as the highest alert level divided by 
the number of analysed digraphs. 
%'ge Accepted Digraphs Percentage of digraphs accepted - provides an indication of 
the goodness of the match between reference profile and 
comparison keylogger data file. 
Table 6.3 - Description of profile comparison results 
6.6 Results 
Although ten users participated in the trial run, only eight produced enough data to warrant 
further investigation. A summary of the user data generated in this trial is shown in Table 
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6.4. This shows considerable variation in the size of keylogger data files across the eight 
users with sample sizes in the range 7,000 to 350,000 digaphs. As such, users f and g were 
removed from most of the data processing as the quanfity of the logged keystrokes was too 
small to provide a reliable profile (i.e. there were too few digraph pairs in the profile, with 
too few samples per profiled digraph). 





Digraph Pairs^ ^ 
: Average / c • 
Typing Speed 
User A 178,710 466 317 151ms 
^ User B . 59,787 405 232 145ms 
User C 80,167 412 257 206ms 
UserD 58,987 461 224 162ms 
User E 15,613 469 92 243ms 
UscrF 8,696 391 55 285ms 
V UserG 7,435 405 42 272ms 
. , N User H c 350,567 610 369 297ms 
Table 6.4 - Summary of user profile statistics 
Once each user profile was generated, the reference profile was evaluated by comparison 
against the users' raw keylogger data. This allowed the test profile to be evaluated using 
the users' own data (to test the False Rejection Rate - FRR) and against other users' 
keystroke data (to test the False Acceptance Rate - FAR). 
As there is likely to be significant variation in a users' own session data, a compensatory 
factor was applied to the standard deviation that could be varied in a "live" environment 
according to the security needs of the organisation. This factor allowed the number of 
standard deviations from the mean to be adjusted. For the purposes of this experiment, 
four weightings were considered, namely 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2. These weightings were 
selected based on experimental work by Mahar et al. (1995) This produced an acceptable 
digraph range: 
digraph range = mean ± (standard deviation * weighting factor) 
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When viewing the preliminary results (Figure 6.14), i f we consider the six users A, B, C, D, 
E and H and follow the vertical columns of data, we can see a peak for each user's data 
when compared with their own profile. This is most noticeable for user D where a peak is 
observed (nearly 50% of all digraphs accepted) compared with 32% when user B's raw 
keylogger data was tested against the same profile. 
Prof i les 
User A 
U s e r B 
U s e r C 
U s e r D 
U s e r E 
U s e r H 
User A U s e r B U s e r C U s e r D U s e r E 
Raw Key logger Data S e t s 
U s e r H 
Figure 6.14 - User profile comparisons 
Although there was a correlation between user D's profile and data, i f we consider user A, 
there was a high FAR for data fixjra users B and H (impostors) when compared with user 
A's profile. We can also see that in user C's profile the impostors A and B actually 
achieved higher acceptance rates (52% and 55% respectively) against the valid user (C) 
with only 51%. It is clear from these results that an additional measure of 
acceptance/rejection is required. To fiirther test the FAR/FRR of the test system, the 
analysis software monitored the number of consecutively rejected digraph pairs -
representing the highest alert level of the system (Figure 6.15 & Figure 6.16). Further 
136 
Chapter 6 : System-Wide Keystroke Analysis 









• ? 10 - Acceptance Rate 
Alert Level 
1 1 















- « — Acceptance Rate 












User A UserB UserC UserD UserE UserH 
Figure 6.16 - User H profile comparison 
When considering Figure 6.15 we can identify two distinct trends. Firstly, the top line 
plots the digraph acceptance rate for all user data sets against user E's profile. Here we can 
see a peak correlating to user E's own data and corresponding reductions in the acceptance 
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rates for the other users' data. Secondly, the lower line indicates the highest alert level 
detected by the analysis software. This is simply a record of the highest count of 
consecutively rejected digraph times (excluding non-profiled digraph pairs). Again, we 
can see a correlation between user E's own data when compared with their profile, and 
corresponding increases in the alert level as impostor data sets are compared with the target 
profile. Figure 6.16 fxirther demonstrates this using user H's profile. User H also shows a 
significant correlation between their own profile and raw keylogger data. It is important to 
note that while the charts shown here (and in Appendix B) show simple comparisons 
between profiles, a live system would utilise thresholds for each user that would be used to 
determine the acceptance/rejection level for each user. For example, in Figure 6.15, user 
E's rejection rate is significantly smaller than even the closest impostor. It would be 
possible (for this user) to assign a relatively low threshold for consecutively rejected 
digraphs as user E had a highest count of 42 consecutively rejected digraphs whilst users B 
and C had counts in excess of 6000 when compared to user E's profile (i.e. as impostors). 
6.7 Data mining analysis 
The previous sections have considered a simple analytical approach to the problem of 
keystroke analysis. While this approach has shown some success both in this trial and in 
previous work, there are other alternatives that can be considered. One technique that was 
evaluated was the use of Data Mining (DM) algorithms, a previously untried approach in 
this field. This work was conducted in association with Harjit Singh and is covered in 
detail in Singh et al (2001). This part of the study will not be covered in detail here, except 
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to compare the FAR/FRR percentage accuracy with the approach used in the previous 
sections. 
6.7.1 Methodology 
For the DM analysis, the data sets were split into a ratio of 9:1 creating two parts; a 
training set and a testing set. The Intelligent Data Analysis (IDA) Data Mining Tool 
(Singh et al, 1999) was used to analyse the sample data sets. The IDA tool incorporates 
algorithms from the fields of Statistics, Machine Learning and Neural Networks, with six 
algorithms being selected (k-NN, COG, C4.5, CN2, OCl and RBF). The algorithm or 
classifier was subjected initially with the training set, and then the classification accuracy 
was tested using the unseen data set or testing set. The results give an indication of the 









S 20 u 
15 
10 
cn2 OCl knn cog 
Data Mining Algorithms 
SamplB 1 Sample 2 — • — S a m p l B 3 | 
rbf C45 
Figure 6.17 - Varying sample sizes with fixed number of classes and attributes 
The percentage classification accuracy obtained is encouraging as depicted in (Figure 6.17), 
which shows that when the sample size is increased, the classification accuracy obtained 
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increases proportionally, except for COG (a statistically based algorithm) and RBF (a 
Neural Network based algorithm). This is important when considering the size of data 
being analysed. 
The initial results suggest that Machine Learning (OCI and C4.5) and Stafistical (k-NN) 
based algorithms are suitable for these types of data sets. While these results show a 
classification accuracy approaching 50%, this is still far short of an acceptable level of 
false rejection. It is likely that with more data, and a reduced set of core (commonly 
occurring) digraphs, higher classification accuracies would be attainable. However, these 
techniques are still of marginal benefit due to the time taken to process the data sets. As 
such, this study proceeded with the analytical approach and the application of data mining 
to keystroke analysis will be revisited in chapter 9 as part of the future work proposals. 
6.8 Application-specific keystroke analysis 
Following the digraph-based keystroke analysis discussed earlier in this chapter, the final 
investigation considered the use of application-specific keystroke analysis. In this case, the 
analysis was conducted with a view to determining the viability of application-specific 
keystroke profiling (referring back to Table 6.2, the application from which the keystrokes 
were typed was logged in addition to other characteristics). To this end, it was necessary 
to identify a series of applications for profiling, with the selection criteria being those for 
which sufficient keystroke data had been logged during the sampling period. A review of 
the keystroke data revealed that the applications satisfying this requirement were Microsoft 
MSN Messenger, Internet Explorer, Word, Outlook and PowerPoint. While it was 
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considered that a numerically intensive application such as Excel would have provided an 
interesting candidate, insufficient keystrokes were captured to enable the creation of a 
profile. Additionally, of the eight users sampled during the trial (who produced sufficient 
data for digraph analysis), only five produced sufficient samples to analyse from all of the 
aforementioned applications. Although the resulting sample group was very small, it was 









Internet Explorer Messenger Word Outlook PowerPoint 
Figure 6.18 - Acceptance rate for application specific keystroke data compared 
against a system-wide context user proHle 
In Figure 6.18, a single user's application-specific keystroke data is compared against the 
reference profile from the same user. The reference profile was based on all keystroke data 
acquired from all applications. Although the figure does not show distinct differences in all 
cases, there is a clear distinction beUveen PowerPoint & Internet Explorer and Messenger, 
Word & Outlook. This can be explained when the nature of these applications is 
considered. Messenger, Word and Outlook are all significantly textual in their usage, and 
users will typically type within them for considerable periods of time. In contrast, while 
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Internet Explorer and PowerPoint sessions may both involve significant elements of 
keyboard activity, the typing is more likely to occur in sporadic bursts. As such, any 
dynamic that emerges is likely to be markedly different to that which would emerge in 
applications where more sustained typing is the norm. Considering the information 
portrayed above, the creation of application specific profiles would be likely to increase the 
acceptance rates observed. This could be significantly more effective given more 
keystroke data - it may be possible (with sufficient data) to distinguish between typing-
intensive applications like Word, Outlook and Messenger. For example, it may be possible 
to monitor the frequency o f specific keys (e.g. the return/enter key) or combinations o f 
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User A User B User C User D User H 
Figure 6.19 - Acceptance rate for two user proflles using Internet Explorer 
In Figure 6.19, two users' profiles (users D and H when using Internet Explorer) are 
examined, showing there is a clear difference between other users' keystroke data 
(impostors) with appropriate peaks in acceptance rate for the valid users. 
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While the results shown do not indicate a suitably discriminative metric upon which to 
base a satisfactory authentication judgement, they do show a level of correlation between a 
user's typing patterns in an application-specific context. These preliminary results 
therefore suggest that further work is needed to investigate the use of application-specific 
keystroke analysis. 
6.9 Conclusions 
It is clear from the results presented in this chapter that there is potential for continuous 
user authentication based upon keystroke analysis. However, it is also clear that while the 
analytical approach provides a level o f correlation between reference profile and raw data, 
the quantity (and range) of raw keylogger data is insufficient to draw any positive findings. 
The DM approach was limited due to the nature and volume of the data gathered, and is 
worthy of further investigation (discussed in chapter 9). 
Following the findings of this trial, a more comprehensive experiment commenced in 
November 2003 with more users being profiled over a similar period of time. The next 
chapter describes the nature of this further trial, and investigates the usefulness of 
monitoring both trigraph keystroke combinations (timings for three consecutive 
keystrokes) and word-graph timings (timings for frequently occurring words). 
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Chapter 7 
A Long-Term Trial of Keystroke Analysis 
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7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described an experiment evaluating keystroke analysis based upon 
inter-keystroke digraph latencies under Windows. Although the trial results demonstrated 
the viability of this method, the results showed that reliable authentication would need user 
profiles to be based upon much larger sample sizes. The previous trial was also based on a 
limited number of users in order to quickly evaluate the viability of the technique. 
This chapter presents the results of a large-scale trial that was aimed at evaluating a range 
of techniques using a larger number of participants. 
7.2 Experiment Overview 
The first trial concentrated upon the capture and subsequent analysis of digraph latencies 
and focussed upon inter-keystroke timings. Additionally, contextual information was also 
stored to allow a preliminary analysis of application-specific keystroke analysis to be 
conducted. This trial captured and evaluated trigraph and keyword latencies in addition to 
digraph timings. 
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7.2.1 Keylogger implementation 
The method of keylogging was basically the same as used in the earlier trial with 
appropriate modification to allow for the logging of trigraphs and keyword latencies 
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Figure 7.1 - Advanced keylogger 
Due to the increased volume of information expected during this trial, the data was logged 
to an Access database installed as part of the key-logging software (this allowed faster, 
more flexible extraction of data for the analysis stage). For each digraph pair logged, the 
application stored six items of information - these being written to the Access database 
after every 500 digraphs (Table 7.1). This process was also repeated for each trigraph and 
keyword latency (i.e. trigraphs were stored as three consecutive characters and keywords 
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as a string as shown in Table 7.2). As can be seen fi-om these examples, significant 
quantities of data were stored for later analysis. 
Item Data t>'pcs 
AutoID Auto-incrementing record number. This is 
used to maintain the order of the keystrokes 
typed as the timestamp is only accurate to 1 
second. 
Left character (CI) ASCII code representing character 
Right character (C2) ASCII code representing character 
Latency Integer representing inter-keystroke latency 
in milliseconds 
Application String containing the window title from the 
foreground application. 
Timestamp A timestamp is added to every keystroke 
logged for later use. 
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Google - Microsoft Internet Explorer 










Document20 - Microsoft Word 
Document20 - Microsoft Word ; 








314 R E 
457 R E 
460 R E 
- Message - Microsoft Word 
- Message - Microsoft Word 





Table 7.2 - Example keystroke log entries 
While digraph and trigraph logging were based upon all keystrokes entered, keyword 
logging was based on a look up list. The top 200 commonly occurring words in the 
English language (based on the lexicon provided by the Oxford English Dictionary) were 
stored in the database file, and as each word was entered, its latency was recorded (the 
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complete word list can be found in Appendix C). The list used by the keylogger contained 
a small number of additional keywords for later investigation e.g. usemames and 
passwords that have been removed from the list presented in the appendix for 
confidentiality. 
7.2.2 Filtering 
As with the first trial, extreme short/long digraph latencies that could adversely affect the 
distribution of digraph times were excluded from the log files. In the first trial the range 
was restricted to 40ms - 750ms (i.e. any digraph pair whose latency fell outside a nominal 
range). Unfortunately, the low pass filter was responsible for substantial quantities of data 
being removed from the user profiles and, as such, was reduced to 10ms for the purposes 
of this trial. If a digraph was removed due to the filtering, this also reset the trigraph and 
keyword logging so no further thresholds were needed for these two measures. 
7.3 Trial Participants 
For this experiment a total of 35 users were profiled over a period of three months. The 
trial participants were drawn from students and staff in the Network Research Group, the 
Department of Psychology and two external companies; TMA Global and John Nichols 
Builders Limited. As with the previous trial, several users disabled the keylogger when 
entering sensitive information and consequently forgot to re-enable it. Despite this, the 
key-logging trial collected considerable volumes o f data with neariy six million samples 
collected across digraphs, trigraphs and keywords (Table 7.3). There was again 
considerable variation in the sample sizes with the smallest digraph log file of 15,951 
samples and the largest with 353,867 samples. 
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Digraphs Trigraphs Words : 
User 1 91 Best 34352 23352 1403 
User 2 156 Average (skilled) 53306 36912 2599 
User 3 99 Best 156718 107107 6154 
User 4 251 Average (non-skilled) 27324 18688 1310 
User 5 112 Good 50822 36713 1465 
User 6 154 Average (skilled) 50167 34484 1885 
User 7 106 Good 78579 54959 4349 
U s e r s 130 Good 50102 35102 2932 
User 9 97 Best 37618 24755 1741 
User 10 145 Average (skilled) 70337 48942 4643 
User 11 147 Average (skilled) 227660 145846 10617 
User 12 102 Good 20216 14142 1032 
User 13 157 Average (skilled) 65312 43015 1730 
User 14 - 141 Average (skilled) 33639 23090 1784 
User 15 139 Good 15951 11159 1068 
User 16 150 Average (skilled) 42839 30299 2037 
User 17 106 Good 105543 68068 3173 
User 18 177 Average (skilled) 89730 59292 3121 
User19 „ 117 Good 103876 71635 4617 
User 20 121 Good 78597 53495 4479 
User 21 141 Average (skilled) 80626 55881 2807 
User 22 . 110 Good 117365 79534 6557 
User 23 131 Good 118805 77013 5682 
User 24 ^ 89 Best 201260 131954 8517 
User 25 ' 203 Average (skilled) 38944 26655 2266 
User 26 192 Average (skilled) 48469 33907 2555 
User 27 125 Good 33068 23115 1679 
User 28 . : 91 Best 70217 47033 2128 
User 29 ' 104 Good 88059 55707 3815 
User 30 202 Average (skilled) 40741 28789 1007 
User 31 86 Best 310823 211419 19726 
User 32 93 Best 353867 237274 18056 
User 33 ' 144 Average (skilled) 276669 183455 6057 
User 34 143 Average (skilled) 124409 87079 953 
User 35 , 130 Good 140044 85413 6240 
Totals 3,436,054 2,305,283 150,184 
Table 73 • Participant typing skill 
Before considering the data from each user, the typing skill for each participant was 
evaluated based on the categorisafions proposed by Card et al. (1980), where typists are 
broadly categorised into one of five categories (Table 7.4). These results are also 
presented in Table 7.3 and presented graphically in Figure 7.2. The results are weighted 
towards typists with above average skills due to the nature of the test subjects (i.e. all 
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subjects were regular computer users who spent prolonged periods typing). This was 
considered acceptable as the likely use for a fully implemented system would be in 
environments with semi-skilled users (i.e. relatively few unskilled typists). 
Categor>' Average Keystroke 
Interval (Seconds) 
Best typist (135wpm) 0.08 
Good typist (90wpm) 0.12 
Average skilled typist (55wpm) 0.20 
Average non-skilled typist (40wpm) 0.28 
Worst typist - unfamiliar with keyboard 1.20 
Table 7.4 - Classincation of t>pist skill (Card e( al. 1080) 
1 
(skilled 
Figure 7.2 - Participant typing skills 
The trial results presented in this chapter were based upon all 35 users (unlike the previous 
trial that had to eliminate three users due to small sample sizes). It is interesting to note 
that the relationship betw een the volume of data obtained and the False Acceptance Rate is 
not as might first be expected. I f we consider Figure 7.3, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the relationship would be linear; i.e. as the number of samples increased, the FAR 
should decrease (as the system is able to construct better profiles). However, the figure 
indicates that there is no direct relationship between these two variables. TTiis can be 
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assumed to indicate a stronger relationship between the user and the acceptance rate rather 
than the acceptance rate and the volume of data logged (i.e. simply having large volumes 














• False Acceptance Rate (FAR) at 0.7 S.D. 
User 23 
User 30 
Userl User 33 








Figure 7.3 - Relationship between keylogger sample size 
and digraph F A R at 0.7 standard deviations 
The results illustrated in Figure 7.3 show four users for whom high false acceptance rates 
are encountered. The results presented in this chapter (and in chapter 8) show that these 
users consistently produce higher FAR rates than other users - this is demonstrated later in 
this chapter when these users are removed and the results recalculated. 
I f we consider the deviation of a users' own typing, the standard deviation from the mean 
digraph latency is used to show the overall variance in a user's typing profile. The results 
from the trial participants are shown in Figure 7.4, which show significant variation across 
the users - effectively showing each users' consistency. The results are ordered by 
increasing average digraph latency with error bars indicating the standard deviation range 
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for each user. For reference, an ideal chart is shown in Figure 7.5 which shows a much 
more even distribution between users (and therefore better distinction between the classes 
of users). Figure 7.5 is based on the same mean latency with error bars indicating a 0.5 
standard deviation fi-om the mean. 
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Figure 7.5 - 'Ideal' chart based on Figure 7.4 
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7.4 Analysis 
NB due to the volume of data produced in this study, the body of the thesis, and the accompanying material 
in appendix C, contain only selected results. The fidl results can be found on the accompanying CD. 
In the previous trial the experimental data for each user was processed off-line to calculate 
the mean and standard deviation values for each unique digraph pair. This process was 
again conducted on the captured data from this trial, but was repeated for each stored 
metric (digraphs, trigraphs and keyword latencies). Due to the volume o f data, a profile 
generating utility was developed in Visual Basic (illustrated in Figure 7.6). 
Profile Generator 
Load Data Create Profile 
iDVDocuments and SettingsVAdmini$tratoi\My Doajments\WorkPackage5a\Data proce 
jCADocuments and SettingsVAdministfatoiVMy Documents\WorkPackage5a\Data 
Count Average Standard Dev 
Digraph 153306 |l56.06ms 
Recalculate 
0 1^ [o 
Trigraph |36912 1 |381.29ms J |141.63ms 1 
Word |2593 1 |70B.69ms J |242.G6ms | 
Profile 
Digraph Count Mean Sid Dev 
m 1408 125.996448863... 48.2719654200... 1 
IN 1201 176.333055786... 60.8720021690... f j ] - 1 
HE 1001 79.2387612387... 71.6717931690... 
AN 993 153.913393756... 116.841629063... 
RE 926 93.9870410367... 53.9175531212... - J r ' ' 
TE 910 111.329670329... 58.5201731871... \0: } 
ND 901 136.715871254... 74.067:^62088... •m tt:c.; 
ER 823 95.5419198055... 84.389:S33655... 
ON 779 197.740693196... 69.6585098526... - i a i e i 
OU 724 162377071823... 55.9804853791... m 
ES 714 173.700280112... 82.045G878497... iy 
ir OR 670 139.901492537... 99.4294297855... 
j n CflQ 
Figure 7.6 - Profile generator 
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The profile generator ran a series of queries against the original data (digraph, trigraph and 
keyword), and produced a table of results for each profiled value. For each of these, the 
count of samples, mean and standard deviation values were calculated and then stored to 
another Access database (the profile database). This resulted in a single database file 
containing 105 reference profiles (one each digraph, trigraph and keyword profile for each 
user - 3 X 35). As with the previous trial, in cases where the standard deviation was 
greater than the mean, the dataset was reduced by 10% to tighten the distribution. In a 
small number of cases (two users) this automatic adjustment did not provide sufficient 
change in the variance of the calculated values. In these cases, the data was recalculated 
manually for the problem digraphs. Where a digraph (or trigraph/word) required 
recalculation, this was shown as a cumulative count in the profile generator. The figure in 
red indicated the number of digraphs that required manual intervention (a total of eight 
digraph pairs from two users required this manual procedure - there were no incidents of 
trigraphs/words requiring manual intervention). 
Completed profiles were then compared against the original keylogger files to determine 
the proportion of logged digraphs that were represented in the user profile. The quantity of 
unmatched samples (and resulting proportion represented as a percentage) are shown in 
Table 7.5 and graphically in Figure 7.7 (the results shown in Figure 7.7 are ordered by 
ascending sampled digraphs). These results show a clear relationship between the size of 
the raw sampled data (i.e. the number of sampled digraphs) and the proportion of matched 
digraphs when compared with the generated profile. This is significant as it demonstrates 
the importance of a substantial volume of keystroke data required to generate a usable 
profile. 
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U s e r l 34352 20869 60.8% 
User 2 53306 17425 32.7% 
U s e r s 156718 17179 11.0% 
User 4 27324 15211 55.7% 
U s e r s 50822 18636 36.7% 
User 6 5016? 17679 35.2% 
U s e r ? 78579 15547 19.8% 
User 8 50102 18381 36.7% 
U s e r s 37618 18794 50.0% 
User 10 70337 15505 22.0% 
User 11 227660 13908 6.1% 
U s e r l 2 20216 12600 62.3% 
User 13 65312 19509 29.9% 
User 14 33639 17201 51.1% 
User 15 15951 11747 73.6% 
User 16 42839 15776 36.8% 
U s e r l ? 105543 20026 19.0% 
User 18 89730 17888 19.9% 
User 19 103876 18549 17.9% 
User 20 78597 16553 21.1% 
User 21 80626 16647 20.6% 
User 22 117365 17616 15.0% 
User 23 118805 20181 17.0% 
User 24 201260 16608 8.3% 
User 25 38944 16997 43.6% 
User 26 48469 16321 33.7% 
User 2? 33068 17817 53.9% 
User 28 70217 21064 30.0% 
User 29 88059 19817 22.5% 
User 30 40741 17569 43.1% 
User 31 310823 14563 4.7% 
User 32 353867 14378 4.1% 
User 33 276669 16721 6.0% 
User 34 124409 15696 12.6% 
User 35 140044 18066 12.9% 
Table 7.5 - Unmatched captured digraphs 
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Figure 7.7 - Unmatched digraphs compared with digraph sample size 
Once all the user profiles were calculated, the data comparator was used to generate tables 
of results for each of the methods. The data comparator (Figure 7.8) was based upon the 
original analyser described in section 6.5 in the previous chapter. A small number of 
additional features were introduced to the comparator to cater for the inclusion of trigraphs 
and keyword profiles. Firstly, a series of radio buttons were included to allow the selection 
of profile metrics (to compare based on digraphs, trigraphs or keywords). Secondly, a 
check box was added to allow the alert level (as described in the previous chapter) to be 
increased by unmatched digraphs. 
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TS Data Comparator 












Process Profile Data 
S.Dev's 
Increase Alerl on Unmatched Digraph/Trigiaph 
' 1 ® Digraph Q> Trigraph O; Word 
ll^ l Start Time |l9/02/2004 16j5:53 
ProfHeMDB 
End Time | 
|C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\WorkPackage5a\Datapr^ 
Data directorv • end ^ ' 
|C:\Documerjsand SettirgsVAdrr^ Documents\WorkPackage5a\Data pfocessinj 
Word Digraph Trigraph 
Profiled Digraphs [34" 
Matched [35881 
Unmatched 117425 
Consecutive Unmatched [14 
High Accepted [25" 
High Rejected [IG" 
Highest Alert Level [so" 
Figure 7.8 - Data comparator 
In the previous trial, when a digraph was processed that did not exist in the reference 
profile, the alert level remained stafic (simply increasing the count of unmatched digraphs). 
This trial considered the role of unmatched digraphs as they are a potential indicator of 
impostor activity - i.e. i f a user types a specific digraph pair infi-equently (to the extent that 
there is insufficient data on which to base a profile), it is reasonable to assume that these 
occurrences are un-representative of that user's normal typing behaviour. By default, in 
this trial, an unmatched digraph increases the alert level by one, whilst a matched 
accepted/rejected digraph pair varies the alert level by two accordingly. This behaviour 
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can be adjusted by selecting the checkbox - once unchecked, the alert level is not affected 
by unmatched samples. 
Before starting the ftill profile comparisons a trial comparison was conducted based upon a 
random selection of five users in order to determine the optimum settings for the deviation 
threshold. In the previous study the deviation settings were chosen fi-om a range of 0,5, 1.0, 
1.5 and 2.0 standard deviations with the best results obtained at 0.5. In order to determine 
an optimum setting, profile comparisons were made between 0.5 and 1.0 standard 
deviations (values below 0.5 had already been assessed). For the randomly selected users 
the best results were obtained at 0.7, with an increase in alert level above and below this 
threshold. As such, the later comparisons were performed with standard deviations 
settings of 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. 
Once the profile comparison was started, each users' reference profile was loaded and then 
compared against the raw keylogger data files for all 35 users. This produced a table of 35 
sets of results for each user (i.e. 35 tables each with 35x6 result values). This process was 
repeated for trigraphs and keywords with the three different profile deviation settings (0.6, 
0.7 and 0.8 standard deviations fi-om the mean). It should be noted that a setting of 0.5 
standard deviations was introduced to the trigraph and keyword comparisons due to poor 
performance at 0.6 and 0.7. This provided approximately 125,000 result values. With an 
average of nearly 100,000 samples per data file, each data comparison took approximately 
two hours, with a total of 18 comparisons conducted - six for digraph, eight for trigraph 
and four for keywords (see Table 7.6). 
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Metric Standard Deviations (S.D.) 
Digraphs 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 S.D. 
Trigraphs 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 S.D. 
0.5 added due to poor 
performance at 0.6 and 0.7 
Keyword 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 S.D. 
0.5 added due to poor 
performance at 0.6 and 0.7 
Table 7.6 - Proflle comparison settings 
0.6 S.D. DIGRAPHS Reference Profile : User 3 









User 1 28143 6209 65 12 18 15513 
User 2 46797 6509 10 9 28 42469 
User 3 139539 17179 11 17 14 72 
User 4 24234 3090 15 6 40 32450 
User 5 42111 8711 23 12 32 21713 
User 6 43399 6768 16 14 29 36460 
User 7 69491 9088 10 14 18 29808 
U s e r s 44356 5746 9 10 28 30932 
User 9 31808 5810 87 11 18 14980 
User 10 62110 8227 6 8 29 49329 
User 11 194687 32973 29 13 32 165327 
User 12 17574 2642 6 8 32 20580 
User 13 53395 11917 95 19 32 54845 
User 14 29885 3754 7 10 21 22528 
User 15 14037 1914 6 9 21 9774 
User 16 36891 5948 7 11 38 32348 
User 17 87249 18294 14 18 25 36618 
User 18 78351 11379 10 11 34 65447 
User 19 89323 14553 28 11 49 42925 
User 20 68617 9980 10 11 48 41558 
User 21 70145 10481 24 10 26 61197 
User 22 100206 17159 22 14 21 45379 
User 23 97646 21159 45 12 24 70889 
User 24 169445 31815 16 16 22 56372 
User 25 33843 5101 6 7 38 45697 
User 26 42281 6188 6 6 38 54008 
User 27 28297 4771 10 13 15 10809 
User 28 60018 10199 19 14 16 10513 
User 29 75695 12364 13 13 34 31960 
User 30 34376 6365 24 13 51 37715 
User 31 269989 40834 48 17 23 5486 
User 32 304826 49041 29 15 23 150798 
User 33 216573 60096 31 11 40 197230 
User 34 100837 23572 25 20 28 94940 
User 35 117220 22824 48 1 14 26 61550 
Table 7.7 - Sample output file 
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Once the profile comparison was completed, the results were exported to an Excel 
spreadsheet (an example is shown in Table 7.7). In this table, the highlighted result line 
indicates the comparison between user 3's raw keylogger data and their generated 
reference profile with the other rows indicating the comparison of other users (i,e. 
impostors) compared against the reference profile (user 3). The spreadsheets contained a 
number of functions to derive 2-dimensional tables of data from the raw results from the 
comparator (Table 7.8) from which the FAR/FRR figures could be derived. 
User. 1- •:• •• ! - User Z; -^'"-^ -, ,:.;User n' ;;'r''„ User 35 rV-' 
User 1- 54 39186 15513 57030 
User 2 - 16277 54 42469 112493 
User n " 51355 27329 72 44405 
User 35 58229 91420 21713 50 
Table 7.8 - Combined results showing highest alert levels 
Following the basic analysis described in this section, a further modification was made to 
the comparator to determine how many keystrokes were needed before either the valid user 
was challenged or an impostor detected. The threshold for this challenge was based upon 
the best performance thresholds from the earlier trials and was initially set at an alert level 
of 70. The results from this trial using the digraph keylogger files at a threshold of 0.7 
standard deviations are presented in Table 7.9. The results from this trial were somewhat 
variable, while some users had good results (e.g. users 7, 10 and 26), most user profiles 
had only moderately successftil results. I f we consider user 2, while 29/34 (85%) 
impostors were challenged in less than 100 digraphs, user 16 (when acting as an impostor 
against user 2*s reference profile) was able to type over 40,000 digraphs before being 
challenged. 
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V 
515 
Table 7.9 - Number of keypresses before a challenge 
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The results in Table 7.9 can also be considered in terms of the average number of 
keystrokes required before a challenge is issued. The results show that an average of 6,390 
digraphs were accepted before an impostor was challenged compared with an average of 
68,755 digraphs before the valid user was challenged. While these results seem to provide 
the appropriate differentiation between impostor and valid user, giving an impostor the 
opportunity to type over 6,000 digraphs presents a major security risk. This figure is 
reduced to 4,300 digraphs i f the users identified in Figure 7.3 are removed (i.e. the users 
for whom keystroke analysis is shown to be unworkable). 
For this trial the False Rejecfion Rate (FRR) was fixed at 0% (i.e. the valid user would not 
have been rejected by the system). The False Acceptance Rates (FAR) were calculated for 
each user at the deviation thresholds specified in Table 7.6 and are shown in Table 7.10. 
When the results were calculated, the False Acceptance Rates per user were averaged 
across all users to provide an average FAR for each metric. The averaged results for this 
approach are shown in Table 7.11. It should be noted that the keyword latencies did not 
use the unmatched alert increase due to the use of a word list/dictionary. It was not 
appropriate to include an unmatched alert increase as the system is designed to monitor 
specific word occurrences unlike the digraph/trigraph approach that monitors all possible 
combinations - i.e. only words that are being monitored would actually be logged. 
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Digraph FAR Trigraph FAR Keyword FAR 
standard 
Dcvlttlon 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 o.i 0.5 
0.6 0.7 OJ 
Unmatched 
Alart N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
N N N N 
Usar 1 2.9 2.9 2.9 8.6 2.9 se 8.6 17.1 8.6 8.6 8.6 25.7 8.6 31.4 97.1 97.1 91.4 91.4 
Usar 2 0.0 2.9 2.9 5.7 2.9 11.4 34.3 0.0 34.3 34.3 34.3 5.7 31.4 8.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 5.7 
Usar3 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.7 5.7 11.4 74.3 5.7 62.9 62.9 54.3 20.0 40.0 25.7 0.0 8.6 20.0 28.6 
Usar 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.7 0.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Usar 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 0.0 11.4 Z8.6 2.9 28.6 28.6 28.6 14J 28.6 22.9 S.6 11.4 14.3 20.0 
Usar 6 0.0 2.9 0.0 8.6 0.0 22.9 28.6 2.9 28.6 28,6 28.6 5.7 25.7 11.4 34.3 11.4 2.9 8.6 
Usar 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 34.3 0.0 28,6 28.6 25.7 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Usart 11.4 5.7 2.9 5.7 2.9 40.0 28.6 17.1 2B.6 28.6 25.7 28.6 25.7 37.1 0.0 0.0 2.9 S.6 
Usar 9 2.9 2.9 2.9 0,0 0.0 14.3 17.1 5.7 17.1 17.1 17.1 11.4 14.3 20,0 22.9 25.7 34.3 34.3 
Usar 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 s .6 2.9 14.3 37.1 0.0 31.4 31.4 28,6 2.9 22.9 8.6 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
U M T I I 0.0 0.0 2.9 14.3 17.1 22.0 82.9 2.9 65.7 65.7 51.4 0.0 11.4 11.4 37.1 5.7 2.9 28.6 
Usar 12 0.0 5.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 14.3 2.9 14.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 22.9 2.9 Z8.6 22.0 25.7 31.4 40.0 
Usar 13 8.6 11.4 5.7 11.4 14.3 11.4 40.0 2.9 40.0 40.0 37.1 11.4 37.1 11.4 8.6 8,6 11.4 14.3 
Usar 14 2.9 2.9 2.9 8.6 0.0 34.3 8.6 S.6 8,6 S.6 8.6 22.9 5.7 28.6 0.0 2.9 5.7 5.7 
Usar 15 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 8.6 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 0.0 20.0 22.9 17.1 25.7 25.7 
Usar 16 0,0 5.7 0.0 2.9 0.0 5.7 22.9 0,0 20.0 20.0 14.3 2.9 14.3 5.7 0.0 0,0 2.9 14.3 
Usar17 0.0 0.0 2.9 11.4 14.3 25.7 48.6 2.9 48.6 48.6 45.7 8,6 40.0 11.4 5.7 5.7 5.7 11.4 
Usar IS 8.6 11.4 17.1 8.6 17.1 25.7 48.6 17.1 42.9 42.9 40.0 0.0 37.1 5.7 28.6 8.6 11.4 17.1 
Usar 19 0.0 2.9 2.9 5.7 2.9 S.6 65.7 0.0 62.9 62.9 62.9 8.6 62.9 11.4 5.7 14.3 20.0 17.1 
Usar 20 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.7 22.9 42.9 0.0 40,0 40.0 31.4 5.7 28.6 8.6 0.0 2.9 2.9 5.7 
Usar 21 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 2.9 2.9 40.0 0.0 2S.6 28.6 17.1 2.9 5.7 2.9 0.0 2.9 5.7 8.6 
Usar 22 2.9 SO 5.7 8,6 s.6 25.7 65,7 0.0 57.1 57.1 45.7 5.7 31.4 17.1 0.0 5.7 5.7 11.4 
Usar 23 68.6 54.3 51.4 62.9 60.0 80.0 71.4 45.7 71.4 71.4 68.6 34.3 68.6 45.7 37.1 37.1 45.7 45.7 
Usar 24 2.9 0.0 2.9 5.7 5.7 8.6 62.9 2.9 54.3 54.3 25.7 14.3 14.3 28.6 0.0 2.9 8.6 14.3 
Usar 25 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.9 0.0 14.3 14.3 0.0 8.6 8,6 8.6 2.9 8,6 0,0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Usar 26 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 5.7 22.9 0.0 22.9 22.9 20.0 0.0 17.1 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 5.7 
Usar 27 z.s 2.9 2.9 17.1 2.9 48.6 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 28.6 11.4 45.7 8.6 2.9 5.7 5.7 
Usar 28 2.9 2.9 2.9 5.7 2.9 17.1 42.9 8.6 42.9 42.9 42.9 17.1 42.9 14.3 8.6 17.1 2S.6 37.1 
Usar 29 5.7 5.7 2.9 22.9 20.0 48.6 48.6 11.4 42.9 42.S 42.9 20.0 42.9 22.9 11.4 8.6 14.3 31.4 
Usar 30 14.3 S.6 14.3 14.3 11.4 20.0 22.9 20.0 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 20.0 37.1 45.7 28.6 28.6 8,6 
Usar 31 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.9 5.7 S.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.7 
Usar 32 0.0 0.0 2.9 8.6 11.4 20.0 54.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 0.0 14.3 2.9 5.7 14.3 14.3 
Usar 33 17.1 14.3 17.1 14.3 22,9 28.6 88.6 77.1 82.9 82.9 65.7 54.3 57.1 71.4 80.0 68.6 20.0 28.6 
Usar 34 5.7 2.9 11.4 14.3 14.3 14,3 60,0 0.0 48,6 48.6 42.9 0.0 37.1 2.9 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 
Usar 35 22.9 14.3 5.7 34.3 25.7 54.3 71.4 25.7 65,7 65.7 55.7 25.7 62.9 45.7 34.3 5.7 11.4 14.3 
Avaraga 5.2 5.0 4.9 9.8 S.1 20.5 38.2 9.1 33.3 33.3 29.5 13.0 25.2 18.9 18.3 15.2 16.5 20.2 
Table 7.10 - Results from single-metric measures 
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Metric S.D. Unmatched Alert FAR 
Digraphs 0.6 No 5.2% 
0.6 Yes 5.0% 
0.7 No 4.9% 
0.7 Yes 9.8% 
0.8 No 8.1% 
0.8 Yes 20.5% 
Trigraphs . 0.5 No 38.2% 
0.5 Yes 9.1% 
0.6 No 33.3% 
0.6 Yes 33.3% 
0.7 No 29.5% 
0.7 Yes 13.0% 
0.8 No 25.2% 
0.8 Yes 18.9% 
Words ^  • 0.5 No 18.3% 
0.6 No 15.2% 
0.7 No 16.5% 
0.8 No 20.2% 
Table 7.11 - Final results 
While the results shown in Table 7.11 show some encouraging FAR levels there is still 
significant variation with the best results obtained at 0.7 standard deviations for digraphs, 
0.5 standard deviations for trigraphs (with increased alert levels for unmatched digraphs) 
and 0.6 for keywords. However, when the full results are considered (as shown in Table 
7.!0), even at the optimum settings, certain users show high FAR levels (e.g. user 23's 
profile returned FAR levels of 51.4%, 45.7% and 37.1% respectively for digraph, trigraph 
and keywords at the optimum settings). It can also be clearly observed that the results for 
trigraphs and keywords are significantly worse when compared with those for digraphs -
this is most likely to be related to the number of underlying samples used for these 
techniques (i.e. the number of sampled digraphs were significantly higher than that for 
trigraphs and keywords, with a corresponding increase of samples per digraph). It is 
probable that over a longer period of time, the profiles could be refined for trigraphs and 
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keywords to produce a more distinct user profile with a corresponding reduction in the 
FAR. 
These results also demonstrate that the techniques can be very effective for some users 
while very ineffective for others. For example, when considering digraph FAR's at 0.6 
standard deviations (where 0% FAR was actually experienced for 19 out of the 35 users -
54.3%) the average FAR (5.2%) has been heavily influenced by a single user (user 23), 
whose 68.6% FAR dramatically increases the average. In a full implementation, it would 
be likely that the use of keystroke analysis would only form a part of a comprehensive user 
monitoring system. As such, a users' typing would only be monitored i f the method was 
shown to be a discriminating authentication technique for that user. The removal of user 
23 from the results in Table 7.10 significantly affects the average FAR's presented in 
Table 7,11, reducing the best digraph results from 4.9% to 3,5%, trigraph results from 
9.1% to 8.0% and keywords from 15.2% to 14.5%. 
Further optimisation can be achieved by removing the worst 5 participants (15%) from the 
trial results. This provides an improvement in the results of the technique with average 
FAR's as low as 1.7% for digraphs, 4.4% for trigraphs and 12.8% for keywords (Table 
7.12). While the keyword FAR in particular remains unacceptably high, a reference back 
to Table 7.10 reveals that there were still almost a third of users for whom 0% FAR was 
observed at the 0.5 standard deviation threshold. This suggests a clear potential for using 
the technique in a subset of cases - which could also increase i f additional keyword typing 
samples were obtained to support the profiling. 
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Metric S.D. Unmatched Alert ^ FAR 
Digraphs 0.6 No 1.7% 
0.6 Yes 2.4% 
0.7 No 2.2% 
0.7 Yes 7.0% 
0.8 No 4.9% 
0.8 Yes 17.0% 
Trigraphs 0.5 No 34.5% 
0.5 Yes 4.4% 
0.6 No 29.3% 
0.6 Yes 29.3% 
0.7 No 25.6% 
0.7 Yes 10.6% 
0,8 No 21.2% 
0.8 Yes 15.2% 
Words 0.5 No 13.8% 
0.6 No 12.8% 
0.7 No 15.3% 
0.8 No 19.7% 
Table 7.12 - Optimised results 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the results of a series of trials aimed at implementing and 
evaluating keystroke analysis with a large number of trial participants over a longer period 
of time than the trials outlined in the previous chapter. 
It is clear fi-om the results presented here that there is considerable potential for continuous 
user authentication based upon keystroke analysis. The long-term sampling of keystroke 
digraphs has served to reinforce the validity of the technique, while the introduction of 
trigraph and keyword-based monitoring has provided additional metrics that can be used as 
alternative (or complimentary) techniques. In particular, the use of keyword monitoring 
has considerable potential when used to monitor for specific, high-risk typed words (e.g. 
delete, format etc.). 
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8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a range of results derived fi-om single-metric measures. 
While these measures provided good overall results, there was potential for improvement. 
This chapter considers the use of a composite approach to keystroke analysis, combining 
the three previously evaluated metrics - digraphs, trigraphs and keywords. It should be 
noted that the results presented in this chapter represent a subset of the overall results. Due 
to the number of variations in thresholds and standard deviation settings for each metric it 
was not possible to evaluate every possible setting and threshold. As such, this chapter 
presents initial optimum settings that provide reasonable results (the future work in the 
next chapter will suggest further refinements to this approach). 
In addition to the composite approach, this chapter also describes a brief trial conducted 
using neural networks in an attempt to improve the performance of the digraph-based 
keystroke analysis considered in the previous chapter. Finally, the discussion presents 
details of a prototype real-time keystroke analysis system developed to demonstrate the 
concept of continuous, non-intrusive user authentication. 
8.2 A composite approach 
In order to evaluate a composite approach to keystroke analysis, the three separate 
keylogger data files described in the previous chapter were recombined (using Access 
queries) to create a single composite keylogger table. This resulted in a 700MB Access 
database containing 35 user keylogger tables. 
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Once the composite keylogger database was complete, a composite profile comparator was 
developed. This application was again developed in Visual Basic and was based on the 
data comparator presented in the previous chapter. The composite comparator (Figure 8.1) 
had a number of additional options and settings to determine the manner in which the 
composite data was compared to the reference profile. 
r^ . IMS Keystroke Analysis 1 3 
Keyjtrokes Logged | 13S5S1 j Digiaph | _ 7 ^ 7 _ J AppliMtion | MicKmrfMntemet^ Exptae^^ 
InvaSd Keystrokes | 28677 ~ | Ttigiaph | _ 5 3 4 3 5 ^ Alert Level | ~ 50 IstAIeit | Q || 
Typing Speed M | 121 ~ Woid | 4479 1 High Alert | 50 fi Challenges r~0 '|| 
Settings-





I ' LoadRdte! Run 
Starting Value 
Piofie MOB 
• ] Inaease Aleit on Unmatched 
(7,) Inciease Aleit on Unmatched 
Di^aph I 247 
Tiigiaph | 340 
Woid I _J (K_ 
iDSDocumenU and Setting?VAdmhisliaIoi\My Dogiments\WoikPackage5aVDatajfocesarig\^^^ 
Composite Database 
|D:\data\corrposHe.mdb 
Figure 8.1 - Composite data comparator (running) 
In the original comparator, each metric (digraph, trigraph and keyword) was evaluated 
separately, with a standard deviation setting adjustable for each profile. For the composite 
approach, all three settings were adjustable simultaneously together with an alert threshold 
and a variable starting value for the alert level (i.e. the initial confidence threshold was 
variable). In addition, the unmatched alert level increase was selectable for both digraphs 
and trigraphs. Once the profile had been selected fi-om the drop down list and the 
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appropriate settings selected, the comparator was started. The comparator performed the 
same basic operation as the single-metric version described in the previous chapter. The 
users' profile was loaded and the digraph, trigraph and keyword profiles stored in memory 
for comparison. The alert level was initialised to a pre-determined value and then the 
composite data was loaded and processed one sample at a time. Each sample (either 
digraph, trigraph or keyword) was compared against the user profile and the alert level 
adjusted dependent on the match/unmatched status and the deviation ft-om the mean with a 
set tolerance (according to the standard deviation setting). 
sample mean ± (sample standard deviation • permitted deviation) 
In the previous experiments the main consideration was to evaluate the alert level and to 
determine the FAR rate while fixing the FRR rate at 0%. The aim of this constraint was to 
ensure minimum inconvenience to the legitimate user (i.e. the monitoring software was 
optimised to never challenge the valid user). In this trial, a level of user inconvenience was 
considered acceptable - on the assumption that the user would pass any explicit challenge 
issued by the system (the nature of these challenges could be based upon basic passwords, 
or the authentication methods considered in chapter 4). While a number of user profiles 
offered 0% FAR in the previous trial, the difference between an impostor and the genuine 
user was fi-equently small (e.g. in one case the genuine user reached a highest alert level of 
50 compared with the nearest impostor who reached 66). By fixing the FRR at 0%, it is 
possible that the nearest matching impostor (even when detected) were not significantly 
different to that of the genuine user. 
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Digraph Trigraph Word Unmatched Alert 
SD SD SD Digraph Trigraph 
User1 0.6 0.5 0.7 No No 
User 2 0-6 0.5 0.5 No No 
U s e r s 0.6 0.5 0.5 No No 
User 4 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
U s e r s 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 6 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
U s e r ? 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
U s e r s 0.7 0.6 0.5 No Yes 
U s e r s 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 10 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 11 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 12 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 13 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 14 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 15 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 16 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 17 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 19 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 20 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 21 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 22 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 24 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 25 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 26 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 27 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
User 28 0.7 0.6 0.6 No No 
User 29 0.6 0.5 0-6 No No 
User 31 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 32 0.7 0.6 0.6 No Yes 
User 34 0.6 0.5 0.6 No No 
Table 8.1 - Composite profile settings 
In order to address this issue (and to potentially improve the FAR rates in the previous 
chapter), this trial concentrated upon the number of keystrokes accepted for each user 
before a challenge was issued. This effectively fixed the alert level for all users at 70, the 
starting confidence/alert level at 50 and then varied the standard deviation and unmatched 
alert increase settings for each user profile comparison. The application settings WQTC 
varied for each profile comparison in order to achieve the best distinction between the 
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genuine user and the impostors. The initial settings for each user were based upon the best 
performing settings fi-om the earlier single-metric trials, and were then adjusted to obtain 
the best results (i.e. the optimisation was considered complete when the genuine user was 
able to type significantly more than an impostor before a challenge would have been issued 
by the system). The settings used for each user are shown in Table 8.1. 
The results presented in Table 8,2 aimed to only challenge the genuine user after a 
significant number of samples had been processed (i.e. a genuine user would be 
infi*equently challenged compared with the impostors). These results also show that an 
average of 4,759 digraphs were accepted before an impostor was challenged compared 
with an average of 76,228 digraphs before the valid user was challenged. While allowing 
an impostor to type large amounts of text is a considerable security risk, the average figure 
(4,759 samples) is significantly affected by a small number of users. When looking at 
Table 8.2, it is clear that the majority of impostors are detected in less than 200 samples 
(comprising digraphs, trigraphs and keywords). For most users, 200 samples equates to 
approximately 2 minutes o f typing and as such is sufficient time to detect and challenge an 
impostor who is not intent on conducting serious damage. It is however possible that 200 
samples would be more than enough to allow an impostor to issue sufficient commands to 
cause serious damage. For example, an impostor typing a high risk command like 
"format" would only generate 5 digraphs, 4 trigraphs and one keyword sample -
insufficient to cause a challenge using the techniques described in this section. As such, it 
would be necessary to monitor for specific strings requiring a more definitive 
authentication prior to allowing the execution of the command. 
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Table 8.2 - Number of keypresses before a challenge (composite) 
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When considering the inconvenience to genuine users the results indicate that a user would 
only be challenged after approximately 5 hours of work - with some users only being 
challenged after 50 days o f typing. Given that most users will authenticate at least once a 
day, an authentication challenge after the equivalent of 50 days of typing is unlikely to ever 
occur in normal operation. 
8.3 Neural Network Approach 
Following the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, a brief final trial was conducted 
using a neural network approach. There has been relatively little research conducted using 
neural networks to authenticate keystrokes with the two published works listed in chapter 5 
(Brown & Rogers, 1993 and Fumell et al., 1996) both considering the use of neural 
networks on static keystroke data. The work presented in this section considers the use of 
neural network techniques on dynamic keystroke data (i.e. continuous monitoring). 
Due to the volume of data and the complexity of the required networks, it was necessary to 
create a reduced subset of data upon which to base the neural network analysis. The first 
stage was to extract a number of common samples across all user profiles. For the 
purposes of this experiment, the top ten commonly occurring digraphs (across all profiles) 
were selected. It should be noted that while lists are available for common digraph pairs in 
the English language; these did not match the data logged by these experiments with the 
top ten digraphs showing variation across all users. Table 8.3 presents the minimum and 
maximum occurrence counts for each digraph pair across all user profiles (this reflects the 
range of sample sizes originally presented in the previous chapter). 
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Digraph Min Max 
T H 319 8845 
IN 214 8643 
H E 212 7901 
T E 352 7503 
E S 135 6298 
O N 271 5824 
AN 135 5239 
A T 193 5164 
S E 167 4553 
S T 92 3530 
Table 83 - Profile counts of common digraphs 
As it was necessary to have a common sample size for each input chosen for the neural 
network, the minimum sample count for each digraph pair determined the profile sample 
size (i.e. each user's data needed to share a common subset of digraphs with a common 
number of samples per digraph). In order to optimise the accuracy of the network; a 
number of user profiles were removed in order to increase the fixed sample size for the 
neural network (a higher number of samples is likely to increase the classification 
accuracy). Having removed the worst performing profiles (the five users identified in 
earlier experiments), the resultant digraph counts are shown in Table 8.4. 
Digraph Min Max 
T H 407 8845 
IN 512 8643 
H E 426 7901 
T E 333 7503 
E S 356 6298 
O N 328 5824 
AN 446 5239 
A T 206 5164 
S E 258 4553 
S T 227 3530 
Table 8.4 - Reduced profile counts of common digraphs 
The reduced profile counts shown in Table 8.4 provide a maximum data set size of 200 
samples per digraph. This effectively provided 2000 samples per user (200 samples x 10 
digraphs). This data was randomly extracted fi-om the original keylogger files (i.e. for each 
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digraph, 200 random samples were selected from the raw keylogger file and then saved as 
text files in preparation for the neural network analysis). 
The neural network was configured as a ten input, multi-layer perceptron network with 
each of the ten inputs representing one of the digraphs (Figure 8.2). The data was then fed 










Figure 8.2 - Neural network configuration (21:5:1) 
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ThrattwU 
Figure 8.3 - Overall F A R / F R R rates for all users 
Figure 8.3 shows the relationship between the average FAR and FRR with an Equal Error 
Rate (EER) of approximately 24.9%. It should be noted that the neural network approach 
utilised only a small proportion of the overall data set and as such is only an indication of 
the potential performance that this technique may offer. For several users, the common ten 
digraphs were not representative of the ten highest occurring digraphs for their profile - it 
is likely that by increasing the number of inputs to the network a higher degree of 
authentication could be achieved (i.e. increasing the number of digraphs on which users are 
classified). 
The results ft^om the neural network approach are presented here as an indication of the 
applicability of the approach to the problem of keystroke analysis, and it is hoped that 
fijrther work would improve the classification of users and hence reduce the EER by 
optimising the training and size of the neural network. 
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8.4 A prototype demonstrator for comprehensive user 
authentication 
In addition to the comparator illustrated in Figure 8.1 (that processed keystroke data 
effectively off-line), a real-time keystroke analysis demonstrator was developed. This 
program implements the keylogging and profile comparison features into a single 
application. The screen-shot shown in Figure 8.4 illustrates the dynamic alert level as a 
continuous moving line in white, with alerts/challenges shown in red. In addition, the 
digraph alert level is shown in green with corresponding lines for trigraphs (yellow) and 
keywords (blue). In this example, a challenge would have been issued at the mid-point of 
the plot where the alert level reached 75 (the threshold for a challenge was set at 70 and is 
indicated in the figure by a broken cyan line). The screen-shot also indicates the number 
of challenges in the current session together with the number of keystrokes before the first 
challenge was issued. It should be noted that the example chart in Figure 8.4 shows no 
further activity in the latter part of the plot - i.e. the horizontal lines indicate no keyboard 
activity. It can also be observed that there is no deviation in the keyword (blue line) alert 
level as this profile had relatively few profiled keywords. 
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AlortLevdl eg HirfiAlort | 75 J 
Figure 8.4 - Live keystroke analysis demonstrator - impostor (detected) 
Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 illustrate two further typing sessions. Both figures are based 
upon a genuine user typing with different profile settings. Figure 8.5 was based on the 
default settings (i.e. not optimised for the individual user) and shows considerable 
difference between the digraphs (shown in green - high acceptance) and the trigraphs 
(shown in yellow - low acceptance) thus resulting in a moderate composite acceptance rate 
(shown in white). When considering Figure 8.6, the same user has a much better (and 
more consistent) overall acceptance rate and hence a lower alert level for digraphs and 
trigraphs. 
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Figure 8.5 - Live keystroke analysis demonstrator - genuine user (default settings) 
l i v e tivysloVf Arirtlyw* 
fttartLeval^ 46 Hi^Alort j ^2 \ R — t | S M t E«t 
Figure 8.6 - Live keystroke analysis demonstrator - genuine user (optimised settings) 
The live keystroke analysis application also has a similar options window to that of the off-
line comparator shown in Figure 8.1, which allows a range of options to be selected to 
determine the comparisons made against the reference profile (illustrated in Figure 8.7). 
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Figure 8.7 - Live keystroke analysis options 
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has ftjrlher extended the novel approach to keystroke analysis. The 
combination of all three metrics into a single composite metric has shown significant 
potential, with genuine users able to work unhindered for hours (up to days) while 
impostors (with few exceptions) were only able to type for two minutes prior to an 
authentication challenge being triggered. 
In addition to the results for the composite techniques, this chapter has also presented an 
overview of a demonstrator system capable of composite keystroke analysis coupled with a 
selection of challenge techniques to respond to alerts raised by the system. 
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While the results show keystroke analysis is a viable authentication technique, it is also 
clear that the analytical approach does not provide sufficient distinction for all users and a 
live implementation would have to consider which metric ( i f any) is most appropriate for 
each user. Over time, the profiles would also need to be updated to reflect variations in 
typing style and the possibility of improvement (or degradation) in a user's typing abilities. 
It is envisaged that keystroke analysis would become only one of a number of monitoring 
techniques used by a more comprehensive system together with other authentication and 
supervision techniques. Such a system would be able to select appropriate authentication 
and supervision techniques for the current user working with the resources available on the 
computer. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Achievements of the research programme 
The research programme has met all of the objectives outlined in the first chapter. The 
main achievements of this research programme were. 
• Identifying user attitudes and opinions to login and continuous user 
authentication. This justified the selection and development of the alternative 
authentication techniques. 
• Implementation and evaluation of novel continuous user authentication 
approaches based upon digraphs, trigraphs and keywords. The use of trigraph 
and keyword authentication represents novel work in the authentication 
domain. 
• Design of novel methods for implementing and evaluating composite 
continuous user authentication. The use of composite user authentication 
represents entirely new work in this domain. 
• Development of a proof-of-concept prototype composite authentication and 
response system. This demonstrated the concept of continuous non-intrusive 
user authentication using keystroke analysis. 
The thesis began by describing current authentication techniques and proposing 
alternatives before evaluating user attitudes and opinions to the current authentication 
methods as well as their opinions on a range of alternative authentication and continuous 
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supervision techniques. Having identified a preference for secret-based approaches, the 
thesis presented the results of a series of trials conducted to evaluate the use of password, 
ImagePIN and cognitive/associative questions. These approaches demonstrated that while 
users still prefer secret-based methods, their fi-equent inability to use them both reliably 
and properly (in accordance with guidelines on correct use) indicated that alternative 
techniques are needed. While other methods were available, a key requirement concerning 
the selection of an alternative approach was that an ideal technique must be transparent to 
the user (i.e. it must have little/no impact on the users' normal activity). In order to 
achieve this objective, non-intrusive authentication mechanisms were considered. Having 
eliminated a number of alternatives (due to their intrusive nature or the cost of dedicated 
hardware), keystroke analysis was selected for a number of experimental trials. 
To evaluate keystroke analysis, a series of experiments aimed at implementing and 
evaluating alternative user authentication techniques were conducted and are described in 
detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8. These experiments evaluated keystroke analysis in an 
unconstrained manner monitoring keystroke activity across all applications in a users' 
session. Users were authenticated on digraph, trigraph and keyword metrics with ftjrther 
trials conducted to evaluate the performance of composite metrics. 
In addition to the simple analysis approach used, a number of alternatives have been 
considered. In chapters 6 and 7, the use of data mining and neural network approaches 
were evaluated and while both of these techniques were able to provide a level of user 
classification, there was insufficient time to fully investigate their applicability and as such 
they will be discussed in section 9.3 as part of the future work proposals. In addition to 
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these two techniques, section 9.3 also outlined the potenfial for the applicafion-specific 
keystroke analysis method described in chapter 6. 
Several papers relating to the research programme have been presented at refereed 
conferences and in appropriate international journals (a complete list is presented in 
Appendix D together with a subset of relevant papers). As such, it is believed that the 
research has made valid and useftil contributions to the information system security field. 
9.2 Limitations of the research 
Although the research programme met the objectives outlined in chapter 1, there were a 
number of limitations to the research. 
1. The survey conducted in chapter 2 assessed a limited range of participants and 
as such is not representative of the wider population. User attitudes towards 
alternative forms of user authentication have, as a consequence, been assessed 
by dominantly IT-literate individuals (mainly drawn ft-om academic staff and 
students). Had the survey been conducted across a wider cross-section of the 
public, it is probable that acceptance for continuous user authentication would 
have been ranked less favourably due to the big-brother concerns of the 
general public. However, this does not unduly affect the consequent selection 
of non-intrusive continuous monitoring techniques since the most likely use 
for these methods is within an organisational context. 
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2. The alternative techniques described in chapter 4 were assessed using a 
limited number of users - all of whom were drawn fi-om staff and students 
within the University. To give a more rounded viewpoint, it would have been 
ideal to have had a wider population participating in the trial. However, there 
were technical limitations that required a supervised installation and guidance 
for the users before participating. 
3. The experiments conducted in chapters 6 and 7 were both limited in terms o f 
the duration of the trial and the number of participants. The first experiment 
was limited to one month's duration with 10 participants to provide an initial 
set of results to inform the implementation of more comprehensive follow-on 
tests. The later experiment's duration was constrained to three months with 
34 participants in order to meet deadlines for the entire research programme. 
Obtaining more participants was a significant problem in both experiments 
due to reluctance on the part of some users to be monitored and the lack of 
cooperation from management when approached for permission to install the 
software for members of administrative staff. Despite these limitations, the 
experiments were able to proceed, albeit with fewer participants than hoped 
for. 
4. There were also limitations in the analysis techniques used - in particular, the 
data mining and neural network approaches could have been expanded fiirther, 
as described in the next section. 
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9.3 Future work 
Throughout the research programme, a number of extensions to the project have been 
considered. While some of these ideas have been discussed in the body of the thesis, this 
section presents a range of potential ideas for future work to progress the research beyond 
the PhD programme. 
9.3.1 Data mining approach 
In chapter 6, the use of data mining was considered as an alternative approach. This 
technique did not prove to be a reliable method - only achieving a classification accuracy 
of 50%. Using larger data sets and a reduced set o f digraphs (in the same manner as the 
neural network approach discussed in chapter 8), it may be possible to improve the 
classification accuracy quoted. However, the benefits of this approach may not be 
sufficient to warrant the time needed to analyse and classify user samples. It may, 
however, be of use when enrolling users and developing the initial authentication profile, 
as the data mining approach may detect more subtle distinguishing characteristics than the 
current methods. 
9.3.2 Neural network approach 
The results presented in chapter 8 showed an overall Equal Error Rate (EER) of 26% for 
the neural network approach. While this error rate is far too high for a usable system, it 
does indicate a correlation between the genuine user and their profile; and a system able to 
distinguish between genuine users and impostors. Further research may be able to improve 
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the acceptance rates through optimisation of the training methods used coupled with 
changes in the neural network construction and size. 
9.3.3 Optimised composite metric comparison parameters 
In chapter 8, the use of composite keystroke analysis was evaluated using a range o f 
settings in the data comparator (e.g. varying the deviation thresholds etc.). While the 
results fi^om these trials were considered acceptable, further refinement could improve the 
FAR/FRR rates to detect impostors quickly while avoiding any unnecessary interruption to 
the genuine user. Due to the range o f settings that could be applied (e.g. 0.5-0.8 standard 
deviations for the metrics, the inclusion of unmatched alert increases and the alert 
threshold) there are at least six variables that can be adjusted independently of each other 
resuUing in several hundred potential combinations per profile. 
In order to improve the error rates encountered in chapter 8, it would be necessary to 
optimise the settings used for each profile. This would require an iterative approach to 
home-in on a suitable group of settings. 
9.3.4 Application-specific profiles 
Chapter 6 proposed the use of application specific profiles in order to differentiate between 
a users' typing behaviour in individual application contexts. The results fi'om this section 
demonstrated differences in typing styles between classes o f applications, but further work 
is required to (a) determine i f these differences remain once sufficient data is available to 
produce a profile, and (b) determine i f certain users can be authenticated more accurately 
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using application specific profiles or by using the application-independent approaches 
already demonstrated. 
The data gathered in chapter 7 has not, at this stage, been processed for application profiles, 
as such; this will be one of the first elements of the post-thesis research. It is likely that, 
given the increased size of keylogger files, there will be an improvement over the results 
presented in chapter 6. 
9.3.5 Application-specific monitoring 
Following the previous section, it may be advantageous to have specific monitoring 
enabled for individual applications. For example, when a user is interacting with a 
command interpreter (e.g. the DOS shell), they are unlikely to be typing sufficient 
keystrokes to authenticate the user. However, the misuse-potential for such applications is 
high (e.g. the user could reformat the hard disk or delete key files). As such, it may be 
beneficial to monitor specific applications more rigorously than others in order to detect an 
impostor in a shorter period of time (e.g. using keyword-based monitoring). 
9.3.6 Keyword Latencies 
The keystroke analysis presented in this thesis has considered the latencies of digraphs, 
trigraphs and keywords. However, there may also be scope for monitoring of the 
individual digraph (or trigraph) elements of the monitored keywords. For example, when 
monitoring the keyword 'format', rather than just monitoring the overall latency, the 
digraphs FO, OR, RM, MA and AT could be evaluated (equally the trigraphs FOR, ORM, 
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ElMA and MAT could be used). As such, keyword profiles would require a series of 
timings, rather than the single timing value currently used. 
9.3.7 Larger-Scale Trial 
Having demonstrated the reliability of continuous supervision using keystroke analysis, it 
would be necessary to implement a larger trial using a greater number of trial participants 
over a longer period of time. It would also be necessary to ensure the participants 
represent a less homogenous range of users (i.e. ensuring a wider range of typing abilities 
and IT literacy are represented by the trial user group). 
9.3.8 Statistical Analysis 
In addition to extending the trial to include a wider range of participants, further work 
should be conducted to investigate the use of formal statistical analysis on the data 
generated using the techniques described in this thesis. 
9.3.9 Response System 
In addition to the user monitoring proposed in this thesis, it is also necessary to respond to 
the challenges issued by the monitoring system. The ImagePin and cognitive question 
methods from chapter 4 are potential candidates for this role, as they would allow a valid 
user to quickly authenticate and continue to work while preventing an impostor from 
proceeding. The issue o f response is currently being investigated in another research 
programme (Papadaki et al., 2002) 
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9.3.10 Implementation issues 
To implement the proposed monitoring system, it would also be necessary to consider the 
wider framework in which the system would be placed. It is envisaged that a monitoring 
system would be activated upon satisfactory authentication by the operating system. 
Following this, the monitoring system would automatically monitor user activity and 
respond with a challenge in the event that the alert level increased beyond a pre-defined 
threshold. To realise a system of this nature under Windows would require considerable 
low-level access to the operating system in order to guarantee that a user could be denied 
access to their computer in the event of suspicious activity. Investigating the wider 
implementation of a comprehensive monitoring system forms a part of a number of 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) related projects building on the original work of 
Fumell(l995). 
9.4 Conclusions 
The role of information technology in both the work and home environments has increased 
beyond any imaginable boundary. As part of the increasing pervasiveness of IT, we have 
to accept that our computer systems wil l be increasingly vulnerable to attack and misuse. 
The simple fact that computer users are unable to apply even the simplest form of 
protection (the humble password) in a secure and appropriate manner demonstrates that 
alternative forms of securing IT systems are required. 
This research has emphasised the role of security in modem computer systems and has 
focussed upon addressing the need for reliable and dependable user authentication and 
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supervision. The application of a single authentication mechanism or monitoring 
technique is in itself insufficient to guarantee system security. Instead a comprehensive 
security system is required to initially authenticate and subsequently monitor and challenge 
users as appropriate. Such a system would have to adapt to the differences between users, 
and apply appropriate authentication and supervision techniques for each one, as well as 
having the ability to learn from the user over time and to adapt to discrete changes in 
natural behaviour. In addition to the ability to authenticate and monitor, the ideal system 
would also have to respond to perceived impostor activity with an appropriate challenge in 
order to more confidently authenticate the user. Al l of this needs to occur as transparently 
as possible in order to achieve the requirement of non-intrusiveness so often required by 
users. 
In conclusion, the research presented in this thesis has addressed a number o f 
authentication issues. A mechanism has been developed to monitor a users' session in a 
non-intrusive manner by evaluating normal typing patterns. This has demonstrated that a 
user can be authenticated in a transparent manner without requiring any explicit action. 
However, the reliability with which this can be done is dependent on a number of factors 
and, as such, cannot be used as the sole method of authentication. Instead, the techniques 
described in this thesis can evaluate user characteristics that could be monitored as part of 
a much wider authentication and supervision framework. 
Authentication will remain a crucial factor in protecting access to the applications and 
services we depend upon in our day-to-day lives. With greater access to information and 
the introduction of new services like e-Voting, e-Health etc., the need for effective and 
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Additional Survey Material 
This appendix contains additional material to support chapter 3. The first part of this 
appendix includes a printed copy of the questionnaire form that was distributed to potential 
respondents, while the second part presents the collated results fi-om the relevant sections 
of the survey. In addition to the raw results, a number of summary tables are presented, 
together with additional charts not included in the body of the thesis. 
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Computer Crime And Abuse Survey 
A Survey of Attitudes and Awareness 
Paul Dowland 
I am currently undertaking a Ph.D. in the field o f network security. This survey aims to establish 
people's awareness of computer crime and abuse and their attitudes towards it. In addition, 
attitudes towards new security techniques will be assessed. 
The first section of the survey asks about your general details, including use o f computers at home 
and at work. The second section looks at the area of computer crime and abuse, your awareness of 
it and your opinions on how it is treated by the media. The final section assesses your opinions 
about the acceptability of various security techniques and their benefits to different business 
sectors. 
Most o f the questions require tick-box responses although a few require a short written answer. 
Please feel free to add any additional comments wherever you feel it is necessary. 
The survey is anonymous and the information will be treated confidentially. 
The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
Please ensure you have enough time to complete the survey. 
An on-line version of this survey can be found at 
http://jack.see.plym.ac.uk/survey 
Please feel free to distribute this URL. 
Thank you for you co-operation. 
Contact address 
Network Research Group 
School of Electronic, Communication and Electrical Engineering 
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Section One - General Details 
!. Sex 
Male • Female • 
2. Age Group 
16-24 • 25 -34 • 35 -49 • 50 -64 • 65+ • 
3. Which of the following categories best describes your current (or intended) occupation? 
• Govcmmcni • Manufacturing 
• Defence • Engineering 
• Education • Travel Industries and Tourism 
• Health • Property Services 
• Social and Public Services • Communications Industry 
• Banking, Finance and Insurance • Computing Industry 
• Utihty Services (Water. Gas, Electricity etc.) 
Other, please specify 
4. Educational qualifications 
None • GCSEs • 0-lcveb • A-levels • Degree • 
Other, please specify 
5. Do you read a newspaper on a regular basis? I f yes, is it a broadsheet or tabloid newspaper? 
Broadsheet • Tabloid • 
6. Have you ever used a computer? 
Yes • No • if no, ptease go to Section 2. 
7. For how many years have you used a computer? 
Less than 1 year • 1 - 5 years • 6 - 1 0 years • 
11-15 years • 16-20 years • 20+years ' • 
Use of computer at work 
8. Do you use a computer at work? 
Yes • No • //no, please go to Question 15. 
9. Approximately how many hours per day do you use it? 
Less than 1 hour • 1-4 hours • 
4 - 8 hours • More than 8 hours • 
ID. Do you have access to Internet e-mail and the World Wide Web at work? 











Computer Aided Learning 
Often Occasionally Never 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
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12. Have you ever used unlicensed software at work? 
13. Have you ever used the ofTice computer for activities that arc not 
related to your work ? 
14. Have you ever used someone else's password or account without 
their consent or knowledge? 
Use of computer at home 
15. Do you have a computer at home? 









1/ no, please go to Section 2. 
16. Approximately how many hours per week do you use it? 
Never • 1-5 hours • 
6 -15 hours • 15+hours • 
17. Do you have access to the Internet at home? 
Yes • No • 
18. What applications do you use your home computer for? Please indicate how often you use each 
application. 
Often Occasionally Never 
Word-processing • • • 
Spreadsheet • • • 
Database • • • 
Desktop Publishing • • • 
Sofhvare Development • • • 
Graphical Design • • • 
Engineering/Scientiric • • • 
Web-browsing n • • 
E-mail • • • 
Games • • • 
Computer Aided Learning • • • 
19. Have you ever used unlicenced software at home? 
Yes • No • 
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Section Two - Computer Crime and Abuse 
Computer systems and networks arc increasingly becoming a part of everyday life. Many instinitions, 
including banks and hospitals, use them to hold personal records. Many businesses would no longer be able 
to operate without them. As their use increases so the move towards a new society, an information society, 
comes a step closer. It is argued that this information society wil l be, and is. subject to many of the problems 
that exist in society. This section of the survey is dedicated to the problem of computer crime and abuse and 
people's awareness of the problem, as well as the part that the media plays in portraying such news. 
20. Please rate the following acts of computer crime and abuse. Rate on a scale from very serious to no 
crime at all. 
21. 
Viruses. 
Viewing someone else's data. 
Altering someone else's data. 





Do you consider computer crime and abuse to be: 
Agree 
Not a problem? • 
A technical problem? • 
A n ethical problem? • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 





22. Are you aware of the following UK legislation: 
Yes 
D a u Protection Act? • 




23. Please describe in a few words your image of a hacker. 
24. Do you consider "hacking* to be> 
Acceptable? 














25. Do you think that people hack:-
Out of curiosity? 
To make money? 
For the thrill of it? 
To "beat the system"? 
For malicious reasons? 
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26. Regarding confessed or convicted hackcrs:-
Should they be allowed to work in the computing field? 
Should they be allowed to have a computer at home? 
27. Do you think that acting via a computer makes hackers feel 
less responsible for their actions? 
28. Do you think that a user would act differently i f 
their activity was being monitored and recorded? 
29. Is it acceptable to read information on someone else's 
computer, without their permisssion, as long as you do 
















30. Have you read about or heard of any computer 
crime cases in the news? • • • 
31. Are you aware of any of the following: 




















32. Other than the above, do you remember any other computer crime and abuse cases 
or keywords that you have read or heard about? 
33. In your opinion, how does the media treat the issue o f computer crime and abuse? 
34. In your opinion, how do films treat the issue of computer crime and abuse? 
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Section Three - User Authentication and Supervision 
As computers become more widely used, so the need for stronger security techniques becomes more 
important. Current research and evolving technologies are making new security techniques available. These 
techniques ensure that users are who they claim to be - this is known as authentication o f identity. Some can 
also continuously monitor the authenticity of the user and the legitimacy of their activity - this is known as 
supen^ision. Some of these techniques are able to verify a user's identity using their physical characteristics 
whilst others analyse their behaviour. Physical characteristics that can be recognised include a user's face, 
eye (iris scanning), hand and fuigerprint. Behavioural characteristics include a user's typing style (keystroke 
analysis), their use of the mouse (mouse dynamics), the way they sign their name (signature analysis) or 
their voice characteristics (voice verification). 
35. Arc any of the following security monitoring methods currently used in your workplace? 
Password 




Yes No Unsure 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Other, please specify 
K passwords are used, please answer questions 36 - 43 inclusive. 
36. How many different systems or applications do you use that require a password? Please indicate how 
many. 
37. Do you use a different password for each one? 
Yes • No • 





• Less frequently 
• Never 
39. Are you forced to change your password after 







40. Is a minimum password length enforced? • • • 
41. Do you write your password(s) down? • • • 
42. Does anyone else know your password(s)? • • • 
43. Do you think that your password could be easily 
guessed e.g. is it part of your address, name, 
partner's name? • • • 
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I f virus scaiinn 3 ai e used, picaje answer questions 44 and 45. 
44. Is the virus scanner run at login? 
Yes • No • Unsure • 
45. How often is the vir\js scanner run? 
Daily • Weekly • Monthly • Less frequently • Unsure • 
Security techniques 
46 How acceptable to you would the following techniques be when used for:-
a) initial login authentication (where user identification is verified when they begm usmg the system)? 
b) continuous monitoring (where user identification is verified periodically whilst the user is logged m)? 
initial login authentication continuous monitoring 
Password 
77i€ most common method in current 
systems. 
Keystroke analysis 
Research has shown thai users have different 
typing styles and that they can be identified by 
measuring the times between keystrokes. 
Face recognition 
A snapshot of the user, taken by a camera 
positioned on the monitor, is compared with 
a previously stored 'faceprint'. 
Mouse dynamics 
Similar to keystroke analysis, users can be 
identified by the way in which they use the mouse. 
Voice verification 
A user's voice, when speaking a word or phrase 
into the computer's microphone, is compared 
with a previously stored 'voiceprint'. 
Signature analysis 
A user signs their name using a special pen and 
pad. the signature is digitised and compared with 
a previously stored version. 
Iris scanning 
A snapshot of the user s iris, taken by a camera. 
u compared with a previously stored image. 
Hand geometry 
TTiij technique measures the physical dimensions of 
the hand using a smalt camera and compares these 
with previously stored values. 
Fingerprint analysis 
An automated version of the fingerprint identification 
system similar to that traditionally used in criminology. 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
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• 47. Do you consider continuous monitoring, in general, to be acceptable? 
48. Most of these techniques require a user-profile to be set up. This is a stored record o f the user's 
characteristics which gives the computer system a reference for comparisons. 
How long would you be prepared to spend in order to set up your user-profile? 
No lime • 
Up to 5 minutes • 
Up to 15 minutes • 
Up to 30 minutes • 
Up to I hour • 
More than I hour • 
49. Such approaches are not 100% accurate - how frequently would you be prepared for the system to 





50. Would you regard supervision of your activities by 
the computer as an invasion of your personal privacy? 
51. Would you trust your organisation to only use the 
monitoring for security purposes? 
52. Should users be aware that they are being monitored? 
53- Which fields/sectors do you consider would benefit from supervision of users by the computer? 













Govenunent • • • • • 
Defence • • • • • 
Education • • • • • 
Health • • • • • 
Social and Public Services • • • • • 
Banking, Finance and Insurance • • • • • 
Utility Services (Water, Gas, Electricity etc.) • • • • • 
Manufacturing • • • • • 
Engineering • • • • • Travel Industries and Tourism • • • • • 
Property Services • • • • • 
Communications Industry • • • • • 
Computing Industry • • • • • 
Please check that you have answered all the questions. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Collated survey results 
Survey Method 
Count of Method 
Method Total 
Online Online 27 
Paper Paper 148 
(blank) 











Grand Total 175 
Count of 0 2 
Q2 Age group Total 
16-24 0 73 
25-34 1 56 




Grand Total 175 
Q3 Occupation 









Social and Public Services 
Travel Industries and Tourism 
Utility Services (Water, Gas, Electricity etc.) 
Other 
Count of 0 3 















Grand Total 175 
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Q4 Qualifications 
None 














Grand Total 175 
Count of Q5 
Q5 Newspapers Q5 Total 
Broadsheet 0 65 




Grand Total 175 
Q7 Years of computer use 
<1 year 
I- 5 years 
6-10 years 
I I - 15 years 
16-20 years 
20+years 
Q8 Use computer at work 
Yes 
No 





Count of Q6 
Q6 Used a computer Q6 Total 




Grand Total 175 









Grand Total 170 







Grand Total 171 







Grand Total 152 
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Count of 010 
Q10 WWW/Email a c c e s s O10 Total 




Grand Total 147 
Q11a Word Processing 
Count of 011a 
011a Total 
Often 0 115 
Occasionally 1 28 
Never 2 6 
(blank) 
Grand Total 149 
Count of 011b 
Q11b Spreadsheet 011b Total 
Often 0 50 




Grand Total 142 
Count of 011c 
Q11c Database O l l c Total 
Often 0 29 




Grand Total 138 
Count of O l i d 
Q11d Desktop Publishing O l i d Total 
Often 0 17 




Grand Total 137 
Count of Q11e 
Q11e Software Development 011e Total 
Often 0 57 




Grand Total 138 
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Count of Q l l f 








Grand Total 134 
Count of Q11g 








Grand Total 136 
Count of Q11h 








Grand Total 145 
Q11i E-Mail 
Count of Q U I 
Q11i Total 
Often 0 113 
Occasionally 1 20 
Never 2 14 
(blank) 
Grand Total 147 
Count of Q l l j 








Grand Total 143 
Count of Q1 Ik 








Grand Total 136 
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Count of Q12 
Q12 Use of unlicensed software Q12 Total 
Yes 0 53 




Grand Total 154 
Count of 013 
Q13 Use of office computer for non-work 
activities Q13 Total 




Grand Total 154 
Q14 Use of other's password/account 
Yes 
No 







Grand Total 153 
Count of Q15 
Q15 Computer at home Q15 Total 




Grand Total 171 
Count of Q16 
Q16 Hours of use Q16 Total 
Never 0 3 
1 to 4 1 60 




Grand Total 143 
Count of Q17 
Q17 WWW/Email a c c e s s Q17 Total 




Grand Total 143 













Grand Total 141 
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Grand Total 134 









Grand Total 125 









Grand Total 126 
Q18e Software Development 
Count of Q18e 
018e Total 
Often 0 37 
Occasionally 1 52 
Never 2 39 
(blank) 
Grand Total 128 









Grand Total 129 









Grand Total 128 
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Count of 018h 
Q18h Web-browsing Q18h Total 
Often 0 49 
Occasionally 1 20 
Never 2 60 
(blank) 
Grand Total 129 
Count of 018i 
Q18i E-Mail Q18i Total 
Often 0 51 
Occasionally 1 21 
Never 2 58 
(blank) 
Grand Total 130 
Count of Q18i 
Q18j Games Q18j Total 
Often 0 56 




Grand Total 137 
Q18k Computer aided learning 
Count of 018k 
Q18k Total 
Often 0 6 
Occasionally 1 40 
Never 2 81 
(blank) 
Grand Total 127 
Count of 019 
Q19 Use of unlicensed software Q19 Total 




Grand Total 143 
Questions 20 to 34 considered issues relating to computer crime and abuse. These results 
have not been included here as they are not relevant to the PhD research. The full results 
can be found on the CD at the rear o f the thesis. 
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Use of monitoring methods Count of Q35a 
Q35a Password Q35a Total 
Yes 0 160 




Grand Total 171 
Count of Q35b 
Q35b Restricted password attempts Q35b Total 
Yes 0 91 
No 1 44 
Unsure 2 32 
(blank) 
Grand Total 167 
Count of Q35c 
Q35c Audit trails Q35c Total 
Yes 0 47 
No 1 49 
Unsure 2 66 
(blank) 
Grand Total 162 
Count of Q35d 
Q35d Virus scanners Q35d Total 
Yes 0 145 




Grand Total 168 
Count of Q35e 
Q35e Access restrictions Q35e Total 
Yes 0 139 




Grand Total 165 
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Q36 Number of systems using passwords 


















Grand Total 148 
Count of Q37 
Q37 Different password for systems Q37 Total 




Grand Total 151 
















Grand Total 158 
Count of Q39 
Q39 Forced to change password Q39 Total 
Yes 0 56 




Grand Total 156 
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Q41 Write down passwords 
Yes 
No 


















Count of Q40 
Q40 Minimum password length Q40 Total 
Yes 0 111 
No 1 26 
Unsure 2 21 
(blank) 
Grand Total 158 







Grand Total 158 









Grand Total 158 









Grand Total 158 









Grand Total 154 













Grand Total 154 
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Question 46 considered the acceptability of a range o f authentication techniques, the left 
pivot tables present the rating o f the approach specified for initial login authentication 
while the right pivot tables present the rating for continuous monitoring. 
Count of Q46aa 
Q46a Password Q46aa Total 
0=Totally Acceptable 0 148 
1 =Acceptable 1 10 
2=lndifferent 2 5 
3=Unacceptable 4 1 
4=Totally Unacceptable (blank) 
Grand Total 164 
Q46b Keystroke Analysis 
Q46c Face Recognition 
Q46d IVIouse Dynamics 








Grand Total 161 








Grand Total 161 








Grand Total 160 








Grand Total 157 








Grand Total 157 








Grand Total 156 








Grand Total 156 
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Q46e Voice Verification 
Q46f Signature Analysis 








Grand Total 161 








Grand Total 162 








Grand Total 155 








Grand Total 156 
Q46g Iris Scanning 








Grand Total 161 








Grand Total 155 
Q46h Hand Geometry 
Q46i Fingerprint Analysis 








Grand Total 162 








Grand Total 162 








Grand Total 156 








Grand Total 156 
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Grand Total 164 
Q48 User-profile set-up time 
Count of 048 
048 Total 
No time 0 18 
Upto 5 mins 1 59 
Upto 15 mins 2 39 
Upto 30 mins 3 22 
Upto 1hr 4 19 
> Ihr 5 8 
(blank) 
Grand Total 165 
Count of 049 
Q49 Frequency of system rejection 049 Total 
Hourly 0 12 
Daily 1 45 
Weekly 2 60 
Never 3 48 
(blank) 
Grand Total 165 










Grand Total 168 










Grand Total 168 
Count of 052 
Q52 Awareness of monitoring 052 Total 
Yes 0 149 




Grand Total 168 
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The final question (53) presented a list o f sectors and asked for comments on the benefit to 
each sector. 
Q53a Government 
Count of Q53a 
Q53a Total 
Great benefit 0 128 
1 27 
Indifferent 2 10 
3 1 
No benefit 4 3 
(blank) 
Grand Total 169 
Q53b Defence 
Count of Q53b 
Q53b Total 
Great benefit 0 152 
1 10 
Indifferent 2 4 
3 1 
No benefit 4 2 
(blank) 
Grand Total 169 
Count of Q53c 
Q53c Education Q53c Total 
Great benefit 0 40 
1 42 
Indifferent 2 62 
3 11 
No benefit 4 13 
(blank) 
Grand Total 168 
Count of Q53d 
Q53d Health Q53d Total 
Great benefit 0 85 
1 46 
Indifferent 2 27 
3 5 
No benefit 4 6 
(blank) 
Grand Total 169 
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Count of Q53e 
Q53e Social & Public Services Q53e Total 
Great benefit 0 68 
1 47 
Indifferent 2 33 
3 11 
No benefit 4 10 
(blank) 
Grand Total 169 
Count of 053f 
Q53f Banking, Finance & Insurance 053f Total 
Great benefit 0 129 
1 27 
Indifferent 2 9 
No benefit 4 3 
(blank) 
Grand Total 168 


















Count of 053h 
053h Total 
Great benefit 0 26 
1 41 
Indifferent 2 76 
3 18 
No benefit 4 8 
(blank) 
Grand Total 169 








Grand Total 169 
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Grand Total 169 








Count of 053k 
Q53k Property Services 053k Total 
Great benefit 0 27 
1 33 
Indifferent 2 79 
3 15 
No benefit 4 
(blank) 
15 
Grand Total 169 








Grand Total 169 








Grand Total 170 
232 
Appendix A : Survey Form and Results 
Summarised Data 
Question 1/2 
Mate Female Total 
16-24 64 37% 8 5% 72 
25-34 42 24% 14 8% 56 
35-49 26 15% 8 5% 34 
50-64 8 5% 4 2% 12 





















































































































Totally Acceptable 148 61 76 59 83 72 78 74 85 
Acceptable 10 21 30 16 26 25 28 28 24 
Indifferent 5 45 28 44 29 33 25 30 23 
Unacceptable 1 15 15 16 11 14 10 12 10 
Totally Unacceptable 0 19 12 25 12 18 20 18 20 
Total 164 161 161 160 161 162 161 162 162 
Continuous 
Totally Acceptable 40 43 39 46 32 24 34 29 36 
Acceptable 13 35 22 29 27 10 16 18 15 
Indifferent 35 41 39 40 36 32 29 31 29 
Unacceptable 30 10 25 13 25 33 33 39 35 
Totally Unacceptable 39 28 31 28 35 57 43 39 41 
Total 157 157 156 156 155 156 155 156 156 
Login 
Acceptable 158 82 106 75 109 97 106 102 109 
Unacceptable 1 34 27 41 23 32 30 30 30 
Login 157 48 79 34 86 65 76 72 79 
Continuous 
Acceptable 53 78 61 75 59 34 50 47 51 
Unacceptable 69 38 56 41 60 90 76 78 76 












































































































Great Benefit 128 152 40 85 68 129 45 26 34 17 27 67 83 
_ 27 10 42 46 47 27 38 41 43 31 33 43 39 
Indifferent 10 4 62 27 33 9 63 76 63 80 79 38 28 
_ 1 1 11 5 11 3 11 18 19 25 15 12 11 
No Benefit 3 2 13 6 10 G 11 8 10 16 15 9 9 
Benefit 155 162 82 131 115 156 83 67 77 48 60 110 122 
No Benefit 4 3 24 11 21 3 22 26 29 41 30 21 20 
Rank 151 159 58 120 94 153 61 41 48 7 30 89 102 
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Additional Charts 





User Opinion on Authentication Methods 
(Faco itocognitlon) 
• Contiunus 
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User Preference for Continuous 
Authentication Methods 
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A p p e n d i x B 
Initial Trial Results 
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A d d i t i o n a l T r i a l R e s u l t s 
This appendix contains additional material to support chapter 6. The first part of this 
appendix presents the summarised results for the initial trial, together with additional 
charts not included in the body of the thesis. The second part presents summarised results 
for the application-specific profiling, toget-her with a selection of charts based upon these 
results. 
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T r i a l R e s u l t s 
Comparison of reference profile against other user raw keylogger data 
Acceptance Rate 
User A UserB UserC User D UserE UserH 
User A 57 44 40 33 42 47 
UserB 46 52 41 36 41 42 
UserC 52 55 51 43 49 . 49 
User D 23 32 29 47 26 30 
UserE 45 42 44 32 55 45 
UserH 46 41 38 35 41 55 
Cumulative Alert Level 
User A UserB UserC User D UserE UserH 
User A 332 6749 15376 18986 2355 17409 
UserB 11996 182 12485 14636 2441 53941 
UserC 507' 67 182 7709 360 8790 
UserD 82163 19976 29543 3069 6369 125025 
UserE 11669 6402 6486 12713 42 22572 
UserH 15574 i0501 18905 17125 2667 1750 
Highest Ale rt Level 
User A UserB UserC UserD UserE UserH 
User A 25 26 28 26 23 49 
UserB 43 16 28 34 19 119 
UserC 26 11 20 22 14 100 
User D 60 28 38 19 23 36 
UserE 26 19 34 35 10 129 
UserH 29 21 34 25 15 64 
%*ge Cumu lative Alert 
User A 
.evel 
UserB UserC User D UserE UserH 
User A 0.19 11.86 20.27 33.99 16.09 5.17 
UserB 7.88 0.33 17.36 27.86 17.8 17.1 
UserC 0.31 0.12 0.24 14.11 2.55 2.68 
UserD 54.32 36.91 41.36 5.54 47.24 39.67 
UserE 10.88 16.65 12.63 35.51 0.41 10.1 
UserH 8.94 17.87 24.12 29.62 17.62 0.51 
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User A UserB UserC User D User E UserH 
User A - 0% FRR, 0% FAR 
Reference Profile : User B 
60 
50 
S 40 c 
u 30 
S 
S 20 a 
10 
- ^ - Acceptance Rate 







User A UserB UserC User D User E UserH 
User B - 0% FRR, 0% FAR 
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User A User B User C User D User E User H 
User C - 0% FRR, 3.3% FAR 











- « — Acceptance Rate 










User A UserB UserC UserD User E UserH 
User D - 0% FRR, 0% FAR 
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Reference Profile : User E 
60 
S 50 
i 40 S 
I 30 
I20 
10 Acceptance Rate 









User A UserB UserC UserD UserE UserH 
Reference Profile : User H 














+ 4000 ^ - Acceptance Rate 
- ^ A l e r t Level 
User A UserB UserC UserD UserE UserH 
User H - 0% FRR, 0% FAR 
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A p p l i c a t i o n S p e c i f i c R e s u l t s 
Internet E x p l o r e r 
User A UserB UserC User D UserH 
User A 56 42 38 27 22 
UserB 41 50 38 29 13 
UserC 56 57 53 44 18 
UserD 28 34 27 49 . 23 
UserH : 17 10. 10 . 17 50 
O u t l o o k 
UserB UserC User D UserE UserH 
UserB 54 40 37 39 43 
UserC ' 56 53 43 51 52 
User D 33 30 48 27 33 
User E 41 : 42; 28 53 47 
UserH 39 38 36 44 61 
W o r d 
User A UserB UserC UserD 
User A 56 . 41 56 28 
UserB 42^  50 57 34 
UserC 38 38 53 27 
User D 27 29 44 49 
S u m m a r y 
User A UserB UserC User D UserE UserF UserG UserH 
ALL 57 52 51 47 55 52 60 55 
IE 55.4 51.1 50.6 49.1 50.8 52.5 60.3 20.3 
Messenger 55.9 52.3 58.4 
Outlook 52.7 51.3 47.5 55.5 50.1 55.6 58.5 
Word 59.1 52.9 52.6 46.1 56.8 51.3 61.2 57.4 
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UserB UserC UserD UscrE UserH 
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Word Results 
- User C 
User D 
- U s e r H 
User H J UserC User A 
Single User (H) Profile Comparisons 









Interne* Explofer Messenger Outlcx* PowerPoint 
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A p p e n d i x C 
Long-Term Trial Results 
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A d d i t i o n a l T r i a l R e s u l t s 
This appendix contains additional material to support chapters 7 and 8. This appendix 
contains the list of keywords used for keyword latency monitoring. This appendix also 
includes the acceptance rate tables (in summarised form) for each of the main settings for 
digraph, trigraph and keyword. Finally, tables are presented summarising the effectiveness 
of the techniques by determining the number of keypresses required before an impostor (or 
the genuine user) is challenged. In all of these summarised tables, the reference profile is 
shown running across the table rows with the comparisons running vertically down the 
columns. Where the genuine user is compared against their own reference profile, the 
table cell is highlighted. For the challenge point tables (the last three) the optimum setting 
is achieved when there is a clear distinction between genuine users (with a high number of 
keypresses) and an impostor (with a low number of keypresses) indicating the number of 
keystrokes a user can press before the alert level generates a challenge. The other tables 
present the highest alert level of the system at various settings for the individual metrics 
and, as such, the aim is to obtain a low alert level for the genuine user and a high alert level 
for all impostors. 
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Monitored keywords: 
word little number keep paper 
network very great children hard 
research after tell feet near 
group words small land sentence 
that called every side better 
with just found without best 
they where still once across 
this most between animals during 
from know name life today 
have through should enough others 
what back home took however 
were much give sometimes sure 
when before line four means 
there good under head knew 
your write read above told 
which used last kind young 
their same never began miles 
said right left almost ways 
will look along live thing 
each think while page whole 
about also might earth hear 
them around next need example 
then another sound hand heard 
many came below high several 
some come something year change 
these work thought mother answer 
would three both light room 
other word those parts against 
into must always country turned 
more because looked father three 
like does show night learn 
time part large following point 
could even often picture city 
make place together being play 
than well asked study toward 
first such house second five 
been here don't eyes using 
people take world soon himself 
made things going times usually 
over help want story 
down years school boys 
only different important since 
find away until white 
water again form days 
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A Long-term Trial of Keystroke Profiling using 
Digraph, Trigraph and KeyAvord Latencies 
Paul S. Dowland and Steven M. Fumell 
Network Research Group, School of Computing, Communications and Electronics, 
University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth. PL4 8AA, United Kingdom, 
info@network-research-group. org 
Abstract: A number of previous studies have investigated the use of keystroke analysis 
as a means of authcnlicaling users* identities at the point of initial login. By 
contrast, relatively little research has focused upon the potential of applying 
the technique for identity verification during the !ogged-in session. Previous 
work by the authore has determined that keystroke analysis is a viable metric 
for continuous monitoring, provided that sufUcicnt data is captured to create a 
reliable profile. This paper presents a series of results from a three-month trial 
in which profiles were created using digraph, trigraph and keyword-based 
keystroke latencies. The profiles were based upon a total of over 5 million 
keystroke samples, collected from 35 participants. The results demonstrate 
that the techniques offer significant promise as a means of non-intrusive 
identity verification during keyboard-related activities, with an optimum false 
acceptance rale of 4.9% being observed at a rate of 0% false rejection. 
Key words: Authentication, Misuse Detection 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, the concept of keystroke analysis has been the 
focus of considerable research as a means of user authentication. The 
potential for profiling of keypresses was first identified by Gaines et al 
(1980). Since then, a number of research projects have been conducted to 
evaluate different methods of data gathering (using a range of operating 
systems and considering a variety of metrics) and post-processing techniques 
(ranging from purely statistical to AJ/neural network approaches). 
To date, however, virtually all published studies have focussed upon 
looking at the application of sialic strings, such as usemame and password 
pairs using the inter-keyslroke digraph latency timing method. From the 
earliest studies in 1980 (Card et al & Gaines et al), the focus has been on the 
analysis of digraph latencies. Later studies, such as those by Joyce & Gupta 
(1990) and Mahar el al (1995) further enhanced the work, identifying 
additional statistical analysis methods that provided more reliable results. 
In Leggel et al. (1991), the concept of dynamic keystroke analysis was 
first proposed, with the introduction of a reference profile that could be used 
to monitor a live user session. Brown and Rogers (1993) also explored the 
idea of dynamic analysis, presenting preliminary results. 
The authors' previous research (Dowland et al., 2002) described an 
experiment evaluating keystroke analysis based on inter-keystroke digraph 
latencies under Windows. This earlier trial concentrated upon the capture 
and subsequent analysis of digraph latencies using inter-keystroke timings. 
The trial results demonsU t^ed the viability of this method, but suggested 
that, to be a reliable authentication measure, user profiles would need to be 
based upon much larger sample sizes. The previous trial was also based on a 
limited number of users in order to quickly evaluate the viability of the 
technique. 
This paper presents the results of a long-term trial that was aimed at 
evaluating a range of techniques using a larger number of participants. This 
trial captured and evaluated trigraph and keyword latencies, in addition to 
digraph timings, under the Windows operating system. The paper begins by 
introducing the technical aspects of the trial conducted over a three month 
period before considering the statistical approach taken with the data 
analysis stage. The results are presented and discussed, leading to some 
overall conclusions, and proposals for future work. 
2. CAPTURING K E Y S T R O K E DATA IN WINDOWS 
While keystroke analysis has been investigated (and hence implemented) 
in previous studies, a GUI environment (e.g. Microsoft Windows) introduces 
new challenges. In previous published studies, the user has been required to 
type and interact with a specific application (typing either pre-defined or 
free-form text). While this approach makes the development of the 
keystroke monitoring software simple, and maintains the consistency of the 
test environment, it is not representative of normal typing behaviour as the 
user becomes focussed upon the task of typing, rather than focussed upon a 
task that involves typing. If the aim is to produce static keystroke analysis 
for occasional authentication judgements (e.g. supplementing login 
authentication) then this approach will work well. However, to implement 
continuous supervision using dynamic keystroke analysis it is necessary to 
monitor the users* normal behaviour when interacting with their normal 
applications and operating system environment. Even providing a 
simulation of these environments may not be sufficient to obtain valid 
sample data upon which to base a profile. 
In order to address this problem, software was developed that would 
transparently monitor and log all typing activity. The system was designed 
to allow keystroke data to be collected under the Microsoft Windows XP 
environment (although the technique is equally applicable in all Windows 
operating systems). In order to collect the required data, it was necessary to 
implement a mechanism for acquiring user typing patterns across all 
applications running within a users' active session. This is important as the 
experiment was designed to create a profile for each user based upon their 
typical typing patterns when using their computer (not constrained to a 
specific application or task). The implementation of the keylogger utilised 
several key features of the Windows operating system and the underlying 
chains of messages on which the operating system is built (these are briefly 
discussed in the following section). The authors have not investigated the 
applicability of these techniques under other operating systems but it is 
likely that the same system could be developed under other systems 
providing access is given to the keypress events at an appropriate level. 
Figure 1 illustrates the software architecture used to capture and log 
keystroke activity under Windows. As keys are pressed, messages are 
generated by Windows for both key up and down events. These messages 
are captured through the use of a hook fijnction that redirects messages to a 
nominated program. The messages are passed from the hook (implemented 
as a system-wide DLL written in C) to the keylogger (implemented in Visual 
Basic and deployed as a system tray application). The keylogger ftinctioned 
completely transparently to the user, requiring no user action to start or stop 
the logging process. The application was automatically started when the 
operating system (0/S) booted (run from the Startup program group on the 
start menu) and shut down automatically when the 0/S closed. Gathered 
data was automatically saved after every 500 digraphs pairs and when the 
application was closed. To reassure users, an option was included to 
suspend logging of keystrokes. This was included due to concerns expressed 
by some users about monitoring of specific inputs - e.g. the typing of on-line 
banking login details. 
^ Message 
^ Keycode 
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Background Application 1 
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Figure I. Implementation of keylogger 
For each digraph pair logged, the application stored five items of 
information (Table 1) - these being written to an Access database after every 
500 digraphs. This process was also repeated for each trigraph and keyword 
latency (i.e. trigraphs were stored as three consecutive characters and 
keywords as a string). 
Table I. Keylopgcr attributes logged per digraph 
Item Data types 
AutolD 
Left character (CI ) 




Auto-incrementing record number. This is used to maintain the order 
of the keystrokes typed as the timestamp is only accurate to 1 second. 
ASCII code representing chariicter 
ASCII code representing character 
Integer representing inter-keystroke latency in milliseconds 
String containing the window title from the foreground application. 
A timestamp is added to every keystroke logged for later use. 
While digraph and trigraph logging were based upon all keystrokes 
entered, keyword logging was based on a look up list. The top 200 
commonly occurring words in the English language were monitored, and as 
each word was entered, its latency was recorded. 
3. E X P E R I M E N T A L P R O C E D U R E 
For this experiment a total of 35 users were profiled over a period of 
three months. Unfortunately several users disabled the keylogger when 
entering sensitive information and consequently forgot to re-enable it. 
Despite this, the key-logging trial collected considerable volumes of data 
with nearly six million samples collected across digraphs, trigraphs and 
keywords (Table 2). 
Table 2. User profile results 




Digraphs Trigraphs Words 
User 1 91 Best 34352 23352 1403 
User 2 156 Average (skilled) 53306 36912 2599 
User 3 99 Best 156718 107107 6154 
User 4 251 Average (non-skilled) 27324 18688 1310 
Users 112 Good 50822 36713 1465 
User 6 154 Average (skilled) 50167 34484 1885 
User? 106 Good 78579 54959 4349 
Users 130 Good 50102 35102 2932 
User 9 97 Best 37618 24755 1741 
User 10 145 Average (skilled) 70337 48942 4643 
User 11 147 Average (skilled) 227660 145846 10617 
User 12 102 Good 20216 14142 1032 
User 13 157 Average (skilled) 65312 43015 1730 
User 14 141 Average (skilled) 33639 23090 1784 
User 15 139 Good 15951 11159 1068 
User 16 150 Average (skilled) 42839 30299 2037 
User 17 106 Good 105543 68068 3173 
User 18 177 Average (skilled) 89730 59292 3121 
User 19 117 Good 103876 71635 4617 
User 20 121 Good 78597 53495 4479 
User 21 141 Average (skilled) 80626 55881 2807 
User 22 110 Good 117365 79534 6557 
User 23 131 Good 118805 77013 5682 
User 24 89 Best 201260 131954 8517 
User 25 203 Average (skilled) 38944 26655 2266 
User 26 192 Average (skilled) 48469 33907 2555 
User 27 125 Good 33068 23115 1679 
User 28 91 Best 70217 47033 2128 
User 29 104 Good 88059 55707 3815 
User 30 202 Average (skilled) 40741 28789 1007 
User 31 86 Best 310823 211419 19726 
User 32 93 Best 353867 237274 18056 
User 33 144 Average (skilled) 276669 183455 6057 
User 34 143 Average (skilled) 124409 87079 953 
User 35 130 Good 140044 85413 6240 
Totals 3,436,054 2,305,283 150,184 
Before considering the data fi-om each user, the typing skill for each 
participant was evaluated based on the categorisations proposed by Card et 
al. (1980) where typists are broadly categorised into one of six categories. 
The results are presented in Table 2 together with the quantity of samples for 
each user (shown separately for digraph, trigraph and keywords). The 
results are weighted towards typists with above average skills due to the 
nature of the test subjects (i.e. all subjects were regular computer users who 
spent prolonged periods typing). This was considered acceptable as the 
likely use for a ftilly implemented system would be in environments with 
semi-skilled users (i.e. relatively few unskilled/poor typists). 
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
To eliminate extreme short/long digraph latencies that may adversely 
affect the distribution of digraph times, any digraph pair whose latency fell 
outside a nominal range was excluded from the log files. For the puqDose of 
this experiment the range was resUicted to times above 10ms and below 
750ms. In an earlier trial the range was restricted to 40ms - 750nis, with 
these thresholds based on previous work conducted by Fumell (1995), and 
were designed to eliminate samples where two keys may have been 
accidentally struck together (thus, producing an infeasibly small latency) or, 
where the user may have made a pause in their typing and thus introduced an 
unnaturally large inter-keystroke latency. Unfortunately, the low pass filter 
was responsible for substantial quantities of data being removed fi-om the 
user profiles and, as such, was reduced to 10ms for the purposes of this trial. 
If a digraph was removed due to the filtering, this also reset the trigraph and 
keyword logging so no fiirther thresholds were needed for these two 
measures. 
Following the initial filtering, the experimental data for each user was 
processed off-line to calculate the mean and standard deviation values for 
each unique digraph, trigraph or keyword. In the event that any profiled 
sample had a standard deviation greater than its mean value, the samples 
were sorted and the lop/bottom 10% was then removed, followed by 
subsequent re-calculation of the mean and standard deviation values. The 
reason for this additional step was to remove samples where the latencies 
would have an adverse affect on the standard deviation (i.e. the distribution 
of samples was tightened). 
Once all the user profiles were calculated, another application (the data 
comparator) was used to generate tables of results for each of the methods. 
The data comparator (Figure 2) was based on the original analyser developed 
in the previous trial (Dowland et al., 2002). A small number of additional 
features were introduced to the comparator to cater for the inclusion of 
trigraphs and keyword profiles. 
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Figure 2. Data comparator (running) 
hi the previous trial, when a digraph was processed that did not exist in 
the reference profile, the alert level remained static (simply increasing the 
count of unmatched digraphs). This trial considered the role of unmatched 
samples as they are a potential indicator of impostor activity. I.e. i f a user 
types a specific sample infrequently (to the extent that there is insufficient 
data on which to base a profile), it is reasonable to assume that these 
occurrences are un-representative of that user's normal typing behaviour. 
By default, in this trial, an unmatched sample increased the alert level by 
one, whilst a matched accepted/rejected sample varied the alert level by two 
accordingly. This behaviour can be adjusted by selecting the checkbox in 
the comparator - once unchecked; the alert level was not affected by 
unmatched samples. 
Before starting the full profile comparisons a trial comparison was 
conducted based on a random selection of five users in order to determine 
the optimum settings for the deviation threshold. In the previous study the 
deviation settings were chosen from a range of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0 standard 
deviations with the best results obtained at 0.5. In order to determine an 
optimum setting, profile comparisons were made between 0.5 and 1.0 
standard deviations (values below 0.5 had already been assessed in earlier 
trials). For the randomly selected users the best results were obtained at 0.7 
with an increase in alert level above and below this threshold. As such, the 
later comparisons were performed with standard deviations settings of 0.6, 
0.7 and 0.8. The permitted deviation was determined by the slider control 
that selects the number of standard deviations from the mean. 
digraph mean ± (digraph standard deviation * permitted deviation) 
Once the profile comparison was started each users' reference profile was 
loaded and then compared against the raw keylogger data files for all 35 
users. This resulted in a table of 35 sets of statistics for each user. This 
process was repeated for trigraphs and keywords with three different profile 
deviation settings (0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 standard deviations from the mean). NB 
a setting of 0.5 standard deviations was introduced to the trigraph 
comparisons due to poor performance at 0.6 and 0.7 and unmatched alert 
increases were optionally applied to digraphs and trigraphs (hence doubling 
the number of comparisons for these metrics). With an average of nearly 
100,000 samples per data file, each data comparison took approximately two 
hours with a total of 17 comparisons conducted - six for digraph, eight for 
trigraph and three for keywords (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Profile comparison setting 
Metric Standard Deviations (S.D.) 
Digraphs 0.6,0.7,0.8S.D. 
Trigraphs 0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8 S.D. 
0.5 added due to poo 
performance at 0.6 and 0.7 
Keyword 0.6,0.7,0.8 S.D. 
Once the profile comparison was completed, the results were exported 
and a number of fianctions were used to derive 2-dimensional tables of data 
from the raw results fi-om the comparator fi-om which the FAR/FRR figures 
could be derived. 
Following the basic analysis described in this section, a fiuther 
modification was made to the comparator to determine how many keystrokes 
were needed before either the valid user was challenged or an impostor 
detected. The threshold for this challenge was based upon the best 
performance thresholds from the earlier trials and was initially set at an alert 
level of 70. The results from this trial using the digraph keylogger files at a 
threshold of 0.7 standard deviations is presented in Table 4. The results 
from this trial were somewhat variable, while some users had good results 
(e.g. user 7, 10 and 26), most user profiles had only moderately successftil 
results. If we consider user 2, while 29/34 (85%) impostors were challenged 
in less than 100 digraphs, user 16 (when acting as an impostor against user 
2's reference profile) was able to type over 40,000 digraphs before being 
challenged. 
The results in Table 4 can also be considered in terms of the average 
number of keystrokes required before a challenge is issued. The results 
show that an average of 6,390 digraphs were accepted before an impostor 
was challenged compared with an average of 68,755 digraphs before the 
valid user was challenged. While these results seem to provide the 
appropriate differentiation between impostor and valid user, giving an 
impostor the opportunity to type over 6,000 digraphs presents a major 
security risk. 
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For this trial the False Rejection Rate (FRR) was fixed at 0% (i.e. the 
valid user would not be rejected by the system). The False Acceptance 
Rates (FAR*s) were then calculated for each user at the deviation thresholds 
specified in Table 3, and are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Results from single-metric measures 
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When the results were calculated, the False Acceptance Rates per user 
were averaged across all users to provide an average FAR for each metric. 
The averaged results for the statistical approach are shown in Table 6. It 
should be noted that the keyword latencies did not use the unmatched alert 
increase due to the use of a word list/dictionary - i.e. niany words would not 
be matched in the users' profile. 
Tabic 6. Final statistical results (best results highlighted) 


























































5. D I S C U S S I O N 
While the results shown in Table 6 show some encouraging FAR levels 
there is still significant variation with the best results obtained at 0.7 
standard deviations for digraphs, 0.5 standard deviations for trigraphs (with 
increased alert levels for unmatched digraphs) and 0.6 for keywords. 
However, when the full results are considered (as shown in Table 5), even at 
the optimum settings, certain users show high FAR levels (e.g. user 23's 
profile returned FAR levels of 51.4%, 45.7% and 37.1% respectively for 
digraph, trigraph and keywords at the average optimum settings). It can also 
be clearly observed that the results for trigraphs and keywords are 
significantly worse when compared with those for digraphs - this is most 
likely to be related to the number of underlying samples used for these 
techniques (i.e. the number of sampled digraphs were significantly higher 
than that for trigraphs and keywords, with a corresponding increase of 
samples per digraph). It is probable that over a longer period of time, the 
profiles could be refmed for trigraphs and keywords to produce a more 
distinct user profile with a corresponding reduction in the FAR. 
These results also demonstrate that the techniques can be very effective 
for some users while very ineffective for others. For example, when 
considering digraph FAR's at 0.6 standard deviations (where 0% FAR was 
actually experienced for 19 out of the 35 users - 54.3%) the average FAR 
(5.2%) has been heavily influenced by a single user (user 23) whose 68.6% 
FAR dramatically increases the average. In a full implementation, the 
authors propose that the use of keystroke analysis should only fomn a part of 
a comprehensive user monitoring system. As such, a users' typing would 
only be monitored if the method was shown to be a discriminating 
authentication technique for that user. The removal of user 23 from the 
results in Table 5 significantly affects the average FAR's presented in Table 
6, reducing the best digraph results from 4.9% to 3.5% , trigraph results from 
9.1% to 8.0% and keywords from 15.2% to 14.5%. 
Further optimisation can be achieved by removing the worst 5 
participants (15%) from the trial results. This provides a significant 
improvement in the results of the technique with average FAR's as low as 
1.7% for digraphs, 4.4% for trigraphs and 12.8% for keywords (Table 7). 
While the keyword FAR in particular remains unacceplably high, a reference 
back to Table 5 reveals that there were still almost a third of users for whom 
0% FAR was observed at the 0.5 standard deviation threshold. This suggests 
a clear potential for using the technique in a subset of cases - which could 
also increase if additional keyword typing samples were obtained to support 
the profiling. 
Table 7. Optimised results 


























































The removal of a number of specific user accounts from the keystroke 
monitoring process is not an ideal solution to the problem of poor user 
authentication. Keystroke analysis is unlikely to be used as a sole-method of 
user authentication, instead, it is envisaged that the methods described in this 
paper would form a part of a larger authentication system and would be only 
one of a range of authentication metrics that each user could be monitored 
with. With a larger number of users (and hence a wider range of user typing 
abilities and corresponding authentication rates) there is likely to be a 
proportional increase in the number of users for whom keystroke analysis 
does not produce appropriate FAR/FRR rates - in these cases other, more 
appropriate, techniques would have to be used. Identifying the cause of poor 
user performance when using keystroke analysis is vital; on-going work 
within the authors' research group will conduct further analysis on the 
gathered data sets to try to determine the cause of the variation between 
users and identify common factors (e.g. users' typing abilities, differences 
between application usage etc.). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the results presented in this paper that there is 
considerable potential for continuous user authentication based on keystroke 
analysis. The long-term sampling of digraph keystrokes has served to 
reinforce the validity of the technique, while the introduction of trigraph and 
keyword monitoring has provided additional metrics that can be used as 
alternative (or complimentary) techniques. In particular, the use of keyword 
monitoring has considerable potential when used to monitor for specific, 
high-risk typed words (e.g. delete, format etc.). 
It is also clear that the simple statistical approach does not provide 
sufficient distinction for all users and a live implementation would have to 
consider which metric (if any) is most appropriate for each user. It is 
envisaged that keystroke analysis would become only one of a number of 
monitoring characteristics used by a more comprehensive system with other 
authentication and supervision techniques. 
Future work will also consider how the individual keystroke metrics can 
be combined together. For example, by combining the confidence measures 
of multiple metrics (e.g. monitoring digraphs and trigraphs), coupled with 
monitoring specific keywords (e.g. the typing patterns for high-risk words -
format, delete etc.), it may be possible to provide a higher level of 
confidence in the authentication of the user. The potential for this method 
will be considered in a later paper. 
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Abstract: There has been significant interest in the area of keystroke analysis to support 
the authentication of users, and previous research has identified three discrete 
methods of application; static, periodic dynamic and continuous dynamic 
analysis. This paper summarises the approaches and metrics arising from 
previous work, and then proceeds to introduce a new variation, based upon 
application-specific keystroke analysis. The discussion also considers the use 
of keystroke analysis as a progressive, escalating response measure in the 
context of a comprehensive user authentication and supervision system, 
presenting an example of how this could be realised in practice. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of iiser authentication in IT systems has long been recognised 
as a potential vulnerability, with the majority of current systems relying 
upon password methods. Such methods have been repeatedly proven to be 
open to compromise, and can also be considered problematic in the sense 
that they typically only serve to facilitate a one-off authentication judgement 
at the start of a session. A number of previous works [1, 2, 3] have 
consequently discussed the need for some form of monitoring to 
continuously (or periodically) authenticate the user in a non-intrusive 
mamier. Although such monitoring is technically feasible, there are 
significant issues to be considered in selecting appropriate attributes to 
assess. This is particularly important, as continuous monitoring must be 
transparent to the end user in order to minimise any perceived inconvenience 
(with the exception of appropriate challenges in the event of suspected 
impostor activity). 
A number of studies have considered the application of keystroke 
analysis to the problem of inadequate user authentication in modem IT 
system using static [4, 5, 6] and dynamic [7, 8] implementations. While 
these studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, 
none have considered the implementation and necessary supporting 
application framework to effectively use keystroke analysis as a viable 
authentication and supervision mechanism. 
This paper summarises the potential approaches to keystroke analysis, 
and presents details of a new method based on application-specific user 
profiling. It then proceeds to consider how keystroke analysis may be 
utilised as part of an intrusion response framework. 
2. K E Y S T R O K E ANALYSIS O V E R V I E W 
Previous studies have identified a selection of data acquisition techniques 
and typing metrics upon which keystroke analysis can be based. The 
following section summarises the basic methods and metrics that can be 
used. 
• Static at login - Static keystroke analysis authenticates a typing 
pattern based on a known keyword, phrase or some other pre-
determined text. The captured typing pattern is then compared 
against a profile previously recorded during system enrolment. Static 
keystroke analysis is generally considered to be an initial login 
enhancement as it can supplement the traditional usemame/password 
login prompt, by checking the digraph latencies of the usemame 
and/or password components (i.e. authenticating the user on the 
basis of both what they typed and how they typed it). 
• Periodic dynamic - Dynamic keystroke analysis authenticates a 
user on the basis of their typing during a logged in session. The 
captured session data is compared to an archived user profile to 
determine deviations. In a periodic configuration, the authentication 
judgement can be intermittent; either as part of a timed supervision, 
or, in response to a suspicious event or trigger. This method provides 
distinct advantages over the static approach. Firstly, it is not 
dependent on the entry of specific text, and is able to perform 
authentication on the basis of any input. Another factor is the 
availability of data; in static keystroke analysis, the range of 
digraphs and frequency of their occurrence is likely to be 
significantly limited compared with a dynamic approach. Even an 
inexperienced typist is likely to produce sufficient digraph pairs to 
allow an authentication judgement to be derived. This is an 
important factor as it is necessary to have a statistically significant 
volume of keystroke data in order to generate a user profile. 
Continuous dynamic - Continuous keystroke analysis extends the 
data capturing to the entire duration of the logged in session. The 
continuous nature of the user monitoring offers significantly more 
data upon which to base the authentication judgement. With this 
method it is possible that an impostor may be detected earlier in the 
session than under a periodically monitored implementation. On the 
downside, however, the additional processing required will add to 
the computational overhead of the supervision system. 
Keyword-specific - Keyword-specific keystroke analysis extends 
the continuous or periodic monitoring to consider the metrics related 
to specific keywords. This could be an extra measure incorporated 
into a monitoring system to detect potential misuse of sensitive 
commands. For example, under a DOSAVindows environment it 
may be appropriate to monitor the keystroke metrics of a user 
attempting to execute the FORMAT or D E L E T E commands. This 
could represent a significant enhancement, as a command with a 
high misuse consequence (e.g. D E L *.*) is unlikely to cause 
sufficient profile deviation when observed from a system-wide 
context, due to the limited selection of digraphs. By contrast, static 
analysis could be applied to specific keywords to obtain a higher 
confidence judgement. 
Application-specific - Application-specific keystroke analysis 
further extends the continuous or periodic monitoring. Using this 
technique, it may be possible to develop separate keystroke profiles 
for distinct applications. For example, a user may be profiled 
separately for their word processing application and their email 
client. The potential of this new technique is discussed in more 
detail in section 3. 
In addition to a range of implementation scenarios, there are also a 
variety of possible keystroke metrics that can be profiled as the basis for 
subsequent comparison: 
• Digraph latency - Digraph latency is the metric that has 
traditionally been used for previous studies, and typically measures 
the delay between the key-up and the subsequent key-down events, 
which are produced during normal typing (e.g. T-H). In most cases, 
some form of low and high pass filter is applied to remove 
extraneous data from the session data. 
• Trigraph latency - Trigraph latency extends the previous metric to 
consider the timing for three successive keystrokes (e.g. T-H-E). 
• Keyword latency - Keyword latencies consider the overall latency 
for a complete word or may consider the unique combinations of 
digraph/trigraphs in a word-specific context. 
• Mean error rate - The mean error rate can be used to provide an 
indication of the competence of the user during normal typing. 
Whilst this may not be user specific, it may be possible to classify 
users into a generic category, according to their typing ability, which 
can then be used as an additional authentication method. 
• iVIean typing rate - A final metric is that of the mean typing rate. As 
with the mean error rale, individuals can be classified according to 
their typing ability and hence evaluated based on their average 
typing speed. 
While the final two metrics indicated above are unlikely to provide a 
suitably fine-grained classification of users for direct authentication 
judgements, they may be used to provide a more generic set of user 
categories that can contribute to a combined measure. 
It should be noted that all of the above techniques and metrics can be 
implemented on a standard PC platform, without the need for special 
hardware. 
3. E X P E R I M E N T A L DYNAMIC K E Y S T R O K E 
ANALYSIS 
The idea of using keyboard characteristics for authentication is not 
unique, and there have been a number of previous published studies in the 
area. To date, however, virtually all published studies have focussed upon 
static or context-independent dynamic analysis, using the inter-keyslroke 
latency timing method. From the earliest studies in 1980 [9], the focus has 
been on the analysis of digraph latencies. Later studies [6, 8] further 
enhanced the work, identifying additional statistical analysis methods that 
provided more reliable results. 
In [7], the concept of dynamic keystroke analysis was fu^t proposed, 
with the introduction of a reference profile that could be used to monitor a 
live user session. Brown and Rogers [5] also explored the idea of dynamic 
analysis, presenting preliminary results. 
A summary of some of the main results fi-om studies to date is presented 
in Table 1 below, which illustrates the effectiveness observed (in terms of 
false acceptance and false rejection errors), as well as the type of keystroke 
analysis technique employed (digraph/trigraph etc.) and the analysis 
approach taken (statistical/neural network etc.). 
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Table I: Previous keystroke analysis studies 
A further variation in the data analysis can be introduced through the 
consideration of application specific keystroke profiles. If we accept fi-om 
previous work that individual users have a distinct typing pattern, it can be 
hypothesised that an individual's typing pattern may also vary depending 
upon the application in use. For example, a user participating in a chat 
session may type in a fairly relaxed style, while the same user may type in an 
significantly different way when producing a document. It should also be 
noted that certain categories of user might use the numeric keypad for large 
quantities of data entry. Under these circumstances the volume and diversity 
of the keystroke digraphs will vary tremendously when compared to the 
more usual alphanumeric typing encountered with most user profiles. 
Previous research has been carried out in this area [15], which has shown 
that analysis of numeric keystrokes can provide a viable authentication 
measure. This is an area receiving on-going attention through a separate 
research project at the authors' institution. 
In [16] the authors described a trial in which keystroke data, obtained 
within Microsoft Windows NT, was evaluated across all applications. While 
the results from this trial were encouraging, the quantity of data collected 
was insufficient to make a true, statistically valid, conclusion. Instead it was 
determined that further trials were necessary. Following the first trial, the 
authors conducted a second round of monitoring in which eight test subjects 
were profiled. Over a period of 3 months, a total of 760,000 digraph samples 
were captured and stored for analysis. In this case, however, the analysis was 
conducted with a view to determining viability of application-specific 
keystroke profiling. To this end, it was necessary to identify a series of 
applications for profiling, with the selection criteria being those for which 
sufficient keystroke data had been logged during the sampling period. A 
review of the keystroke data revealed that the applications satisfying this 
requirement were Microsoft MSN Messenger, hitemet Explorer, Word and 
PowerPoint. While the authors considered that a numerically intensive 
application such as Excel would have provided an interesting candidate, 
insufficient keystrokes were captured to enable the creation of a profile. 
Additionally, of the eight users sampled during the trial, only five produced 
sufficient data to analyse from all of the aforementioned applications. 
Although the resulting sample group was very small, it was sufficient to 





Figure 1; Acceptance Rate for application specific keystroke data 
compared against a system-wide context user protlle 
In Figure 1 above, a single user's application-specific keystroke data is 
compared against the reference profile from the same user. The reference 
profile was based on all keystroke data acquired from all applications. 
Although the figure does not show distinct differences in all cases, there is a 
clear distinction between all applications apart from Messenger and Word. 
This can be explained when the nature of these applications is considered. 
Messenger and Word are both significantly textual in their usage, and users 
will typically type within Messenger and/or Word for considerable periods 
of lime. In contrast, while Internet Explorer and PowerPoint sessions may 
both involve significant elements of keyboard activity, the typing is more 
likely to occur in sporadic bursts. As such, any dynamic that emerges is 
likely to be markedly different to that which would emerge in applications 
where more sustained typing is the norm. Considering the information 
portrayed above, the creation of application specific profiles would be likely 
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Figure 2: Acceptance Rote for two user profiles 
In Figure 2 above, a specific users' profile (users D and E when using 
Internet Explorer) is examined, showing there is a clear difference between 
other users' keystroke data (impostors) with appropriate peaks in acceptance 
rate for the valid users. 
While the results shown do not indicate a suitably discriminative metric 
upon which to base a satisfactory authentication judgement, they do show a 
level of correlation between a user's typing pattem in an application-specific 
context. These preliminary results show that further work is needed to 
investigate the use of application-specific keystroke analysis. 
4. AN E S C A L A T I N G RESPONSE FRAiMEWORK 
USING K E Y S T R O K E ANALYSIS 
The earlier discussion summarised the different potential 
implementations of keystroke analysis, and explained the operational 
differences between the approaches. It is possible to integrate these analysis 
approaches into an overall user authentication and supervision framework, 
with the varying techniques being invoked as responses to anomalies 
detected at earlier stages. A possible example of this is illustrated in Figure 
3, which shows how the five variations discussed earlier can be incorporated 
within a four-level response framework. It should be noted that this is by no 
means the only method by which the techniques could be combined, and 
specific implementations could vary depending upon rule sets for a 



















- dynamic • 
analysis 















Figure 3; Response framework using keystroke analysis 
A suitable architecture for achieving such an approach is offered by the 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) [17]. This proposes an architecture for 
real-time user authentication and misuse detection, based upon a monitoring 
Host that has the responsibility for supervising a number of Client systems 
(e.g. in the form of end user PCs or workstations). Key elements of the 
architecture, from the perspective discussed in this paper are the collector 
(which obtains the keystroke data from the individual client systems), the 
anomaly detector (which performs the actual keystroke analysis and profile 
comparison, maintaining a consequent alert status metric), and the responder 
(which is responsible for initiating the different keystroke analysis 
approaches in response to increases in the alert status and other contextual 
factors). Assuming such a monitoring context, the text below describes how 
the response process in Figure 3 would proceed. 
Initial authentication may occur using a standard usemame/password pair, 
but supplemented by the use of static keystroke analysis to assess how the 
information is entered. If the user fails to authenticate at this stage (e.g. after 
being permitted three attempts to enter the details), then the most appropriate 
response is to deny access (if the correct password is provided, but the 
keystroke analysis aspect fails, then an alternative option could be to allow 
the login to proceed, but to begin the session with a higher level of 
subsequent monitoring - e.g. continuous rather than periodic assessment). If 
this login authentication is successful, the user will proceed to a logged in 
session, during which dynamic keystroke analysis could be applied on a 
periodic basis (in order to minimise the associated processing overhead in 
the initial instance). Assuming no anomalies, this could simply continue 
throughout a logged in session. If a departure from the typing profile is 
noted during the monitoring period, however, there would be two options for 
response. If the keystroke data exhibits a significant incompatibility, then a 
high confidence of impostor action could be assumed and the responder 
could proceed directly to some form of explicit action (e.g. interrupting the 
user session by issuing a challenge or suspending their activity pending an 
administrator intervention). In cases where the profile incompatibility is not 
conclusive, the responder could initiate an increase in the monitoring 
resolution - firstly to invoke continuous dynamic analysis, and then beyond 
this to invoke either application or keyword-specific methods. The choice in 
the latter case would depend upon the context of the current user's activity. 
For example, if they were word-processing, then application-specific 
dynamic analysis would potentially give a more accurate assessment of 
identity. If, by contrast, they were operating at a command line level, then it 
could be considered more appropriate to invoke keyword-specific static 
analysis, looking for instances of particularly sensitive commands such as 
'format' or 'erase'. Profile incompatibility at this final stage would 
automatically result in more explicit response action. 
In cases where the responder agent has initiated a more detailed level 
(e.g. from periodic to continuous, or from continuous to application-
specific), then the monitoring would continue at this level for a period of 
time, in order to ensure that profile incompatibilities were no longer 
observed. A suitable trigger (e.g. the entry of a certain number of further 
keystrokes without significant profile departure) would be used to reduce the 
alert status of the monitoring system, and thereby allow the responder agent 
to re-invoke a lesser level of analysis (this is indicated by the dotted arrow 
lines in the figure). 
The combination of mechanisms in this manner allows a system to 
provide a standard, and hence acceptable, user login for the initial 
authentication, while also providing enhanced user supervision for the 
duration of the users' session. Such a system should, in theory, ensure 
transparent operation to legitimate users. It should also be noted that, in a 
practical context, keystroke analysis may not be the only technique involved, 
and other metrics relating to user activity and behaviour might also be 
considered by the anomaly detector, and thereby used to inform the 
responder agent. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered the significant variety of implementation 
methods and metrics that can be associated with keystroke analysis. The 
new concept of application-specific analysis has been introduced, along with 
initial experimental findings that support the feasibility of the approach. The 
preliminary results suggest that the technique is worthy of further 
investigation. 
The discussion has also considered the application of keystroke analysis 
as a response mechanism within an intrusion detection system. The 
combination of analysis techniques, placed within such an 
authentication/supervision framework has the potential to provide a 
significant improvement in system-wide security against impostor attacks, as 
well as ensuring transparency to legitimate end users. 
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Abstract: There has been significant research in to the provision of reliable initial-login 
user authentication, however there is still a need for continuous authentication 
during a user session. This paper presents a series of results from the 
preliminary statistical analysis of multi-application keystroke data. This has 
been contrasted with a Data Mining approach to the production of a unique 
user profile. This paper aims to determine which approach provides the best 
basis for further research. It is determined that the technique offers promise as 
a discriminator between individuals in an operational context, but further 
investigation with larger data sets is required with a combination of 
approaches being considered in order to improve the accuracy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been a number of previous studies that have considered the 
security weaknesses in modem IT system and, whilst various 
recommendations and technical solutions have been proposed, many still 
rely on enhancing the initia] login-stage mechanism (e.g. via biometric 
identification, smart cards etc.) [ C O P E 90, S H E R 92, M I L L 94]. Whilst this 
improves the initial authentication judgement, there is still a need for user 
authentication throughout a session. In most systems there is no further 
check on a users' identity beyond the initial usemame/password. Once a user 
gains legitimate access to IT resources, it is feasible for there to be no further 
challenge, with the only possibility for detection of a masquerader being the 
post-event detection of a major incident (i.e. an impostor can masquerade as 
the valid user without detection or challenge). 
T o counter this risk, it is suggested that some form of user monitoring is 
desirable to continuously (or periodically) authenticate the user in a 
transparent manner. Whilst such monitoring is technically feasible, there are 
significant issues to be considered in selecting appropriate attributes to 
assess. This is particularly important, as continuous monitoring must be 
transparent to the end user in order to minimise any perceived inconvenience 
(with the exception of appropriate challenges in the event of a significant 
profile deviation). 
This paper specifically considers the problems of continuous user 
authentication using keystroke digraph latencies. This area has not received 
much attention and as such, most of the background research is based upon 
static keystroke analysis [JOBU 89, B R O W 93, J O Y C 90) (i.e. where the 
users' typing was constrained). Keystroke analysis is, however, considered 
by end users as the most acceptable form of continuous authentication 
[FURN 00]. A G U I environment produces a new challenge, as there is no 
option to control the users' typing. This can cause problems, as it is difficult 
to determine in which application individual digraph pairs were entered. This 
paper will introduce a statistical approach for detecting deviation from a 
user's historical keystroke profile captured under a multi-tasking windowed 
environment. Following this initial analysis, a Data Mining (DM) approach 
will be considered in order to determine the potential for improving user 
classification. It should be noted that the aim of this paper is to determine 
which approach provides the best basis for further research and is not 
intended as a thorough analysis of keystroke latencies for user 
authentication. Finally, some thoughts on future work are introduced which 
will be developed further. 
2, E X P E R I M E N T O V E R V I E W 
Although there have been a series of papers describing the mechanisms 
for keystroke analysis, the authors have been unable to identify any research 
specifically focussed on continuous keystroke analysis in which the 
collection of users typing samples was not artificially constrained in some 
way through a custom interface (e.g. asking the user to type known strings). 
The experiment was designed to allow keystroke data to be collected 
under the Microsoft Windows N T environment. In order to collect the 
required data, it was necessary to implement a mechanism for acquiring 
keystroke notifications across all applications running within a users' active 
session. As the client systems were running Microsoft Windows N T v4.0, it 
was necessary to implement a system-wide hook function that would receive 
keyboard events through the Windows message chain. System-wide hooks 
allow a specified code block (hook-ftinction) to receive the appropriate 
Windows messages (e.g. W M _ I C E Y U P for the key-up event) irrespective of 
the target application (i.e. it is possible for a hook ftmction residing in a 
system D L L to receive keystroke notifications for all currently running 
applications). This effectively allowed application keystroke data to be 
duplicated and directed towards the data logger on the client workstation. 
Technical details of the implementation of the hook ftinction and its 
associated support files are beyond the scope of this paper and, as such, have 
been omitted. There are a number of resotirces available that provide ftirther 
information for interested readers [ D O W L 00. M I C R 00]. In order to 
determine accurate digraph latencies, it was also necessary to implement a 
high-accuracy timer (as the default timers available do not offer adequate 
accuracy for the millisecond latencies expected). 
To eliminate extreme short/long digraph latencies that may adversely 
affect the distribution of digraph times, any digraph pair whose latency fell 
outside a nominal range was excluded from the archived data. For the 
purposed of this experiment the range was restricted to times above 40ms 
and below 750ms. These thresholds are based on the original experiments 
carried out by the authors [ F U R N 95] and are designed to eliminate samples 
where two keys may have been accidentally struck together (thus, producing 
an infeasibly small latency) or, where the user may have made a pause in 
their typing and thus introduced an unnaturally large inter-keystroke latency. 
The output of this pre-processing was a data file containing the following 
structure: 
ftrst_char secondj:har digraph Jatency 
For this experiment a total of ten users were profiled. As the intention 
was to evaluate the analysis mechanisms without implementing a large-scale 
trial, tests were carried out using a small set of test subjects. The main 
limiting factor was the need to collect data over a prolonged period (weeks 
rather than hours). Despite the small scale of the trial, it still proved difficult 
to collect sufficient data in order to provide a valid comparison between 
users. Due to this limited set of data, analysis has focussed on the 4 main 
users who provided the largest profiled data sets in order to best illustrate the 
trends observed. 
3 . STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Following the pre-processing described in the previous section, the 
experimental data for each user was then processed off-line to calculate the 
mean and standard deviation values for each unique digraph pair. In the 
event that any digraph pair had a standard deviation greater than its mean 
value, the digraph samples were sorted and the top/bottom 10% were then 
removed with subsequent re-calculation of the mean and standard deviation 
values - this was only attempted where at least ten samples were available 
for the digraph pair. The reason for this additional step was to remove 
digraph samples where the latencies would have an adverse affect on the 
standard deviafion (i.e. the distribution of samples was tightened). 
Once a set of digraph pairs was produced (with corresponding 
mean/standard deviation digraph latency values), the user's profile was 
further constrained by filtering out digraph pairs where the sample count fell 
below a nominal threshold value. Our experiments fixed this value at fifty 
samples; however, the software used for analysis allows a variable threshold 
that will be investigated ftirther in the ftiture work described in a later 
section. A summary of the profiles generated by this method is shown in 
Table I. 






User A 466 122 151ms 
U s e r B 405 51 145nis 
User C 412 89 206ms 
User D 461 127 162ms 
Once a user profile was generated, the profile was evaluated by 
comparison with the users' raw keystroke data. This allowed the test profile 
to be evaluated using the users' own data (to test the False Rejection Rate -
F R R ) and against other users' keystroke data (to test the False Acceptance 
R a t e - F A R ) . 
As there is likely to be significant variation in a users' own session data, 
a compensatory factor was applied to the standard deviation that could be 
varied in a "live" environment according to the security needs of the 
organisation. This factor allowed the number of standard deviations fi-om the 
mean to be adjusted. For the purposes of this experiment, four weightings 
were considered, namely 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2. This produced an acceptable 
digraph range: 
digraph range ^ mean ± (standard deviation * weighting factor) 
When viewing the preliminary results (Figure / ) . if we consider the four 
users A, B, C and D and follow the vertical columns of data, we can see a 
clear peak for each users data when compared with their own profile. This is 
most noticeable for user C where a significant peak is observed (50% of all 
digraphs accepted) compared with 35% when user B's digraph data was 
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Figure I: User profile comparisons 
Although there was a clear correlation between user C's profile and data, 
if we consider user A, there was a high F A R for data from users D and B 
(impostors) when compared with user A's profile. We can also see that in 
user B's profile the impostor "user A" achieved the same acceptance rate 
(48%). It is clear from these results that an additional measure of 
acceptance/rejection is required. To further test the F A R / F R R of the test 
system, the analysis software monitored the number of consecutively 
rejected digraph pairs - representing the highest alert level of the system 
{Figure 2). 
User A 
Figure 2: Single user profile comparison 
When considering {Figure 2) we can identify two distinct trends. Firstly, 
the top line plots the digraph acceptance rate for all user data sets against 
user C's profile. Here we can see a clear peak correlating to user C's own 
data and corresponding reductions in the acceptance rates for the other users' 
data. Secondly, the lower line indicates the highest alert level detected by the 
analysis software. This is simply a record of the highest count of 
consecutively rejected digraph times (excluding non-profiled digraph pairs). 
Again, we can sec a correlation between user C"s own data when compared 
with their profile and corresponding increases in the alert level as impostor 
data sets are compared with the target profile. 
4. DATA MINING ANALYSIS 
The methodology described in the previous sections, using traditional 
statistical approaches, requires a significant level of manual intervention in 
the data analysis stages. Further, it is time consuming when considering the 
amount of data generated from a single session or multiple sessions and the 
number of users on a system. From this we can determine there is a need to 
automate some of the data analysis pre-processing stages. These stages offer 
the opportunity to investigate Data Mining (DM) methodology and 
algorithms, a previously untried approach in this field, in order to eliminate 
the manual approaches adopted and also to compare the F A R / F R R 
percentage accuracy with the statistical approach. Data Mining can be 
described as a collection of techniques and methodologies used to explore 
vast amounts of data in order to find potentially useful, ultimately 
understandable patterns [ F A Y Y 96] and to discover relationships. The 
methodology used to analyse the raw keystroke data is derived from the tour 
main activities of DM; selection, pre-processing, data mining and 
interpretation [ F A Y Y 96]. DM is an iterative and interactive process, 
involving numerous steps with many decisions being made by the user. 
DitTerent algorithms are optimised based on the predetined D M task. This 
involves deciding whether the goals of the DM process are classification, 
association, or sequential [MICH 94]. 
For the purpose of this work, the data sets were split into a ratio of 9:1 
hence into two parts; a training set and a testing set, which is a commonly 
used technique known as train and test. The Intelligent Data Analysis (IDA) 
Data Mining Tool [SING 99] is used to analyse the sample data sets which 
incorporates algorithms from the fields of Statistical, Machine Learning and 
Neural Networks. Six algorithms, k-NN, C O G , C4.5, CN2, O C l and R B F 
were chosen for this investigative work. The algorithm or classifier is 
subjected initially with the training set and then the classification accuracy is 
tested using the unseen data set or testing set. The results give an indication 
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Figure 3: Varying sample sizes with fixed number of classes and attributes 
The percentage classification accuracy obtained is encouraging as 
depicted in {Figure 3), which shows that when the sample size is increased, 
the classification accuracy obtained increases proportionally, except for the 
C O G a statistical based algorithm and R B F a Neural Network based 
algorithm. This is important when considering the size of data being 
analysed and hence eliminates the ad-hoc approaches adopted using 
traditional statistical methods. 
The initial results suggest that Machine Learning ( O C l and C4.5) and 
Statistical (k-NN) based algorithms are suitable for these types of data sets. 
Despite the results, more work needs to be carried out in order to correlate 
the results to a specific or group of algorithm(s), in order to obtain a higher 
percentage of classification accuracy. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the results presented in this paper that there is some 
potential for continuous user authentication based on keystroke analysis. 
However, it is also clear that a simple statistical approach does not provide 
sufficient distinction between users. The D M approach is limited due to the 
nature of the data gathered and will also require further research. It is 
proposed that ftirther work will investigate the useftilness of trigraph 
keystroke combinations (timings for three consecutive keystrokes) and the 
possible use of word-graph timings (timings for frequently occurring words). 
Further analysis will be carried out on much larger data sets in order to give 
a higher statistical reliability and will also incorporate high-level 
characteristics (average typing speed and typing error rates) which will 
provide additional information to the system-characteristic based D M 
approach being developed in parallel with this research [SING 01]. Other 
approaches that will be investigated include, consideration of various 
standard deviation weightings, varying the minimum number of samples for 
profiled digraphs and varying the inclusion threshold for each sampled 
digraph. A fiirther possibility for research may be an investigation into a 
correlation between digraph latencies and the applications in which they 
were generated (i.e. application specific keystroke profiles). 
This paper has presented a series of results from the preliminary 
statistical analysis of multi-application keystroke data. This has been 
contrasted with a D M approach to the production of a unique user profile. 
Whilst the results fi-om this stage of the research are not as encouraging as 
we had hoped for. they have shown a potential for the use of continuous user 
authentication. The next phase will concentrate on a combination of 
techniques to improve the digraph acceptance rate seen in these results. 
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Authentication and supervision: A survey of user attitudes 
S.M. Fumell, P.S. Dowland, H.M. lUingworth and P.L. Reynolds 
Abstract 
User authentication is a vital element in ensuring the secure operation of IT systems. 
In the vast majority of cases, this role is fulfdied by the password, but evidence 
suggests that this approach is easily compromised. Whilst many alternatives exist, 
particularly in the form of biometric methods, questions remain over the likely user 
acceptance. This paper presents the results of a survey that examines user attitudes 
towards a range of authentication and supervision techniques. It is concluded that 
whilst there is still an element of reluctance amongst users to depart from the familiar 
password based mechanisms, many are convinced of the need for improved 
authentication controls. The acceptability to users of various new techniques is 
variable, but many seem willing to consider a range of alternative methods. 
Keywords 
Authentication, Biometrics, User supervision, Survey. 
Introduction 
User authentication is widely accepted to represent an essential first line of defence in 
the security of Infomiation Technology (IT) systems. All but the most trivial systems, 
therefore, require some form of authentication in order to verify that a claimed user 
identity is indeed correct. There are three main approaches to user authentication: 
something the user knows (e.g. password or PIN), something the user has (e.g. a card 
or other token) and something the user is (e.g. a biometric characteristic) [1]. By far 
the most commonly used means of authentication in FF systems is the password. 
Passwords are conceptually simple for both system designers and end users, and can 
provide effective protection if they are used correctly. However, the protection 
provided is often compromised by users themselves. Typical problems include 
forgetting passwords, writing them down, sharing them with other people and 
selecting easily guessed words. 
If the password approach is to be replaced or supplemented, then alternative means of 
authentication are clearly required. However, when considering such alternatives, a 
number of factors can be cited that may complicate their adoption: 
- effectiveness (i.e. the ability to detect impostors, whilst allowing legitimate 
access); 
- cost (i.e. financial overtieads of deployment); 
- user acceptance (i.e. the friendliness and transparency of the measure). 
Of these, the issue of user acceptance is possibly the most difficult to assess, as it 
represents a highly subjective measure. This paper presents the results from a survey 
that set out to assess public attitudes to various forms of user authentication and, 
thereby, determine whether acceptable alternatives to the password could be 
identified. The discussion begins by summarising the potential problems with 
existing password approaches and then proceeds to consider the alternatives that are 
offered by various classes of biometric method. Details of the survey itself are then 
presented, leading into an analysis of the results obtained. 
The problems with passwords 
The password approach has a number of shortcomings, which can undermine the 
effectiveness of the approach [2]. Indeed, passwords can often be considered a mere 
hindrance to a determined hacker and can easily be bypassed by relatively 
inexperienced individuals using tools freely available on the Internet. 
Several studies have been carried out over the last 20 years looking at the ease with 
which passwords can be determined. In 1979, 86% of the 3829 passwords gathered, 
could be guessed by a PC in less than one week [3]. This was later repeated by Klein 
in 1990 [4] and SpafTord in 1992 [5]. Whilst the results fiDm these subsequent 
experiments showed that password selection had improved (only 21% could be 
guessed in a week), so have the tools that can be used to guess them. In 1998, LOpht 
Heavy Industries released LOphtCrack [6], a utility which allows Windows NT Server 
Message Block (SMB) password packets to be captured dtiring network 
authentication sessions. This utility not only allows the encrypted passwords to be 
captured directly off the network, it can ^so perform a dictionaiy and bmte force 
attack against the encrypted passwords. Similar utilities are also available for other 
operating systems - most notably C R A C K which runs under a number of flavours of 
UNIX [7]. 
There are a number of measures that can be taken to improve password security. For 
example: 
• Non-Dictionary words. Forcing users to select non-dictionary passwords 
prevents the use of dictionary based attacks. Such attacks can identify a 
password in less than 20 minutes even on dictionaries with up to one million 
words. The only way to identify non-dictionary passwords is using a brute-
force approach (testing every combination of characters for every length of 
password). 
• Passwords with mixed case/symbols. Including both upper/lower case and 
symbols (!£$% etc.) in passwords requires any attack to use a brute force 
method and increases the number of character permutations that must be tried. 
• Password ageing. Should an intruder obtain a valid usemame/password 
combination, most systems wall allow them to continue to access the system 
until the intrusion is noticed. If a password ageing policy is in place users can 
be forced to change their passwords regularly, thus forcing the intruder to 
identify the new password. 
Although these sugestions will help to make a password-based system more resiliant 
to an intruder they are by no means secure. A detemiined intruder can utilise 
password cracking utilities to detemiine even the most random password in a matter 
of weeks. With the advent of more powerful processors, intruders can crack 
passwonis in a more realistic time - a matter of days for some PCs. In addition, it can 
be argued that restrictions such as those above may compromise the simplicity (and, 
hence, user friendliness) of the password method - one of the previously cited 
advantages. To counter these problems with password based systems, it is necessary 
to consider alternative approaches to user authentication. 
An overview of biometric authentication approaches 
Whereas the password approach relies upon something the user knows, biometric 
authentication is based upon something the user is. This has the advantage that it is 
less straightforward for the user to be impersonated or to compromise protection 
themselves (e.g. they cannot share, write down or forget a biometric characteristic). 
Methods of biometric authentication fall into two distinct categories, namely 
physiological and behavioural characteristics [8], 
• Physiological biometrics represent those traits that describe who we are based 
on physical attributes, for example fingerprints, hand geometry, retinal and iris 
scanning. These characteristics usually require additional equipment to be 
connected externally to the computer to provide the necessary data capture. 
• Behavioural biometrics encompass attributes such as typing style, voice 
pattern and signature recognition. Most behavioural characteristics can be 
acquired without the need for external equipment (e.g. keyboard & mouse), 
although some do reqtaire specialised haixlware solutions (e.g. signature 
recognition). 
Most biometric devices offer a compromise between high security/low user 
acceptance and low security/high user acceptance. This trade-off can be measured as 
the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the devices. It 
has so far proved impossible to achieve a system where the FAR and FRR are 
simultaneously reduced to zero, as they share a mutually exclusive relationship [9]. 
Most systems select an appropriate level at which inconvenience to the user, through 
denial of access (false rejections), is acceptable, without allovinng too many intruders 
unauthorised access (false acceptances). All systems have an Equal Error Rate, the 
point at which the FAR and FRR rates are equal. Whilst this rate represents die 
theoretical '^ best-fif* for security measures, it is rarely ideal in a secure environment 
where a preference for either high FAR or FRR exists. 
In recent years, biometric techiuques have progressed from the research environment 
to consumer products. Indeed, Microsoft Windows now incorporates a biometric 
application programming interface to enable easy integration and utilisation of such 
approaches within the operating system [10]. Some biometrics are, however, more 
mature and well-known than others. The table below presents a list of biometric 
techniques and accompanying descriptions (these descriptions are worded as 
presented to the respondents in the survey that is described in the next section). 
Method Description 
Keystroke analysis Research has shown that users have different typing styles 
and that they can be identified by measuring the times 
between keystrokes [ I I ] . 
Face recognition A snapshot of the user, taken by a camera positioned on the 
monitor, is compared with a previously stored Taceprint*. 
Mouse dynamics Similar to keystroke analysis, users can be identified by the 
way in which they use the mouse. 
Voice verification A user's voice, when speaking a word or phrase into the 
computer's microphone, is compared with a previously 
stored 'voiceprinf. 
Signature analysis A user signs their name using a special pen and pad, the 
signature is digitised and compared with a previously stored 
version. 
Iris scanning A snapshot of the user's iris, taken by a camera, is compared 
with a previously stored iinage. 
Hand geometry This technique measures the physical dimensions of the hand 
using a small camera and compares these with previously 
stored values. 
Fingerprint analysis An automated version of the fingerprint identification 
system simihr to that traditionally used in criminology. 
Table 1 : Biometric methods, as presented to survey respondents 
Many organisations are aheady testing such alternative fonns of user authentication. 
For example, trials of iris recognition systems have been conducted in the banking 
sector for use in automated teller machines [12]. 
A subset of the above biometrics (e.g. keystroke analysis, mouse dynamics) can be 
considered to represent aspects of the wider issue of behaviour monitoring. This 
recognises that everyone has characteristic ways of doing things and that, over time, it 
may be possible to establish individual profiles of behaviour. FT systems offer a 
number of factors that may be monitored in order to establish such a profUe. 
Examples include: 
typical access time and location; 
operating system command usage; 
typical application and resource utilisation; 
methods of user interaction. 
Techniques such as these have been incorporated into a variety of intnision detection 
and monitoring systems, which can provide real-time supervision of user activity in 
order to detect potential impostor activity and other forms o f misuse [13], Although 
such an approach represents an increase in the level of security, there is also the 
potential to alienate legitimate users, who may be concerned about their activities 
being monitored to this level. 
A significant body of work exists in relation to biometrics and behavioural monitoring 
systems and, as previously mentioned, many commercial products are now available 
as alternatives to simple passwords. It is, therefore, relevant to consider what the 
views of the potential users themselves are towards the technologies. This issue is 
explored in the sections that follow. 
A Survey of attitudes towards authentication technologies 
In order to determine the acceptability of user authentication and supervision 
techniques, a survey was conducted to assess the attitudes and awareness of the 
general public. The survey aimed to assess the following issues: 
• public attitudes towards different forms of user authentication; 
• the attitudes towards the concept of continuous monitoring. 
The survey questionnaire consisted o f 53 main questions, the majority o f which were 
multiple choice, with the remainder requiring short written responses. Many o f the 
questions contained multiple sections, resulting in a maximum of 130 possible 
answers per respondent. The survey was split into a number of categories, each 
focussing on a specific area of interest to the authors. Questions 1-7 gathered general 
details, to determine the gender, age, education, and level of computer use; these 
provided demographic information on the survey response base. Questions 8-14 
considered the use of computers within the respondent's work environment, whilst 
questions 15-19 considered the use of computers at home. These helped to provide 
information on the spread of IT into the home and work contexts, as well as the likely 
IT awareness of the respondents. Questions 20-34 were intended to determine 
individual opinions and knowledge in the area of computer crime and abuse. The final 
section (encompassing questions 35-53) looked at the respondent's views on user 
authentication and supervision. This paper targets the issues of user authentication and 
supervision, whilst the findings relating to computer crime have been documented in a 
previous publication [14]. 
The survey was distributed to a wide range of individuals and organisations with the 
intention of gaining a diverge variety of opinions. The questionnaire was made 
available in two forms, a printed copy and an online version published on the authors' 
WWW site. Approximately 300 printed surveys were distributed with 148 completed 
responses being received, representing a response rate of 49%. A fiirther 27 surveys 
were submitted via the web site resulting in a total o f 175 responses. It should be 
noted that, whilst questionnaires were sent to companies, the focus required 
respondents to reply Irom an individual rather than organisational perspective. As 
such, these responses were still representative of a public rather than business 
viewpoint on the issues. 
Analysis of results 
General 
The vast majority (80%) of the survey respondents were male. In temis of age, 74% of 
the respondents were below 35, indicating that the vast majority of the responses were 
likely to be from people who had *grown up' with IT to some extent. The overall 
breakdown of respondents by age group is given in table 2. 
Age range Respondents 
16 to 24 42% 
25 to 34 32% 
35 to 49 18% 
50 to 64 7% 
65 and over 0% 
Table 2 : Survey respondents by age 
In terms of employment background, a high number of responses were received from 
the technology fields (with 103 out of the 175 responses claiming to be from the 
computing, communications or engineering domains). Academically over 70% of the 
respondents claimed to hold post-16 qualifications, with 44% having a degree level 
education. This represents a high level of academic achievement among the 
respondents and reflects the fact diat the distribution of a large proportion of surveys 
occurred via academic channels. 
The respondents had considerable familiarity with FT, with over 98% having used a 
computer for over one year, 88% using a computer at work and 84% using one at 
home. The respondents were also asked about the availability o f Intemet access. 129 
respondents (88%) claimed to have access at work, while 69 respondents (48%) 
claimed to have access at home. 
The inforaiation above indicates that the respondents were generally IT literate and 
had considerable experience using computers in both home and work environments. 
As later sections of the survey looked at views on user authentication and supervision 
in relation to such systems, it was felt that the respondents were suitably qualified to 
comment on these issues. 
Password based authentication 
Given that they represent the most common (and, hence, familiar) form of 
authentication, the survey began by assessing respondent attitudes towards passwords. 
The results indicated that over 9 1 % of respondents relied on passwords for access 
control to their computeni, a figure that is generally compatible with the 1998 KPMG 
security survey, which showed 97% of organisations using them [15]. 
Due to the dominance of passwords, most users have multiple passwords for different 
systems and applications. When asked how many different systems or applications 
they use which require passwords, 26% of respondents claimed to have five or more, 
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Figure I : Number of different systems/applications used requiring passwords 
The requirement to remember such a large number of passwords can cause a major 
problem for users. It is, therefore, no surprise that users often select dictionary words 
or personal names as the basis for their passwords, as these a:e easier to remember. 
Having said this, only 15% of respondents felt that their passwords could be easily 
guessed. The phrasing of the question in this case gave examples of information that, 
i f used as a basis for selection, could render the password more easily guessed (i.e. "is 
it part of your address, name, partner's name?"). Although the majority of users 
considered themselves to be safe on this basis, the question did not provide an 
exhaustive list of what might constitute obvious choices. As such, many respondents 
may still have been using insecure passwords, such as dictionary words (which the 
aforementioned LOphtCrack tool can determine in less than a minute). 
Not only do users often choose insecure passwords, they also frequently select the 
same password for multiple accounts, with 40% of respondents re-using the same 
password. As such, should an intruder gain access to one protected account, it is quite 
likely that he/she will be able to n^ use that same password for other machines and 
applications. A fijrther issue is that of the password's lifetime. Once a password is 
illegitimately acquired then, without time limits, restricted logins or account 
monitoring, it is possible that the inuuder would remain unnoticed until he/she 
committed an act that caused some form of disruption. The respondents were asked 
how frequently they changed their passwords and i f they were forced to change their 
passwords by the system or the system administrators. As indicated in table 3, an 
alarming 34% of respondents claimed to never change their passwords. Furthermore, 
the responses to the subsequent question revealed that 51% were not forced to change 
their password by the system. The former represents bad practice on the part of the 
users, whereas the latter reflects poor system administration. From an administration 
point of view, it is more encouraging to observe that 70% of users claimed to use 
systems in which a minimum password length is enforced. Having a miiumum length 
of seven or more characters helps to ensure that passwords are more resilient to brute 
force attacks. 





Less frequently 20% 
Never 34% 
Table 3 : Frequency of password changes 
Responses to subsequent questions revealed that, in many cases, the respondents 
themselves were compromising password protection, with 15% admitting to writing 
them down and 29% willingly sharing them with colleagues, hi addition to this, 31 
(21%) o f the 151 respondents who used computers at work claimed to have used 
another person's password without their consent or knowledge. 
These results serve to underline some of the known problems with passwords and 
provide the justification for the subsequent questions, which asked users about other 
forms of authentication. 
Alternative authentication and supervision methods 
One of the main objectives of the survey was to evaluate user's opinions regarding 
different authentication methods. In order to achieve this, the respondents were asked 
to rate the acceptability of a variety o f initial login and continuous supervision 
techniques on a 5-point sliding scale ftom 'totally acceptable' to 'totally 
unacceptable'. A total of nine methods were cited, ranging ftx)m passwords to a 
variety of physiological and behavioural biometric methods. Each of the methods was 
briefly described on the questionnaire sheet to ensure that the respondents understood 
the context (using the text previously shown in table 1). Table 4 summarises the 
ranked results, which are also illustrated graphically in figure 2. The responses have 
been normalised to reflect the variable response rate to each question, as there was a 
higher response rate to questions on initial login authentication (probably reflecting a 
lack of understanding of the concept of continuous supervision amongst some 
respondents). The positive responses ('totally acceptable' and 'acceptable') were 
summed and then the total number of negative responses ('unacceptable' and 'totally 
unacceptable') were subtracted, thus producing a rank of user preference. 
Method Initial login authentication Continuous supervision 
Password 95.7% -10.2% 
Keystroke analysis 29.8% 25.5% 
Face recognition 49.1% 3.2% 
Mouse dynamics 21.3% 21.8% 
Voice verification 53.4% -0.6% 
Signature analysis 40.1% -35.9% 
Iris scanning 47.2% -16.8% 
1 land geometry 44.4% -19.9% 
Fingerprint analysis 48.8% -16.0% 


















Figure 2 : User preference of authentication methods 
As expected, the most popular forni of initial login authentication was the password, 
with 90% of respondents rating it as 'totally acceptable' (scoring more than twice as 
many votes in this category than most other methods). However, this did not mean 
the outright rejection of alternative methods and many also achieved respectable 
scores. The authors were, however, surprised to see a general acceptance of mouse 
dynamics for initial login authentication. This was felt to be somewhat erroneous, as it 
is unlikely that moving the mouse for logging-on would provide sufficient data for a 
unique identification. It is expected that using a combination of methods, such as 
password and keystroke analysis, would provide a much more reliable method of 
initial login authentication. 
It is clear that there is a high level of user acceptance for all the initial login 
authentication techniques suggested. Methods such as face recognition, voice 
verification, signature analysis, iris scanning, hand geometry and fingerprint analysis 
were all considered favourably. It is interesting to note that all of these techniques 
(with the exception of signature analysis) have had significant media coverage. 
especially through film and television. It is possible that familiarity with these 
techniques influenced the respondents' choices. The acceptance o f signature analysis 
cannot be readily explained by the familiarity with the technology through the media, 
however the concept of a signature as a means of identity verification is well 
established in our society. 
After passwords, the most acceptable forms of login authentication were considered to 
be voice verification and fingerprint recognition, scoring raw overall acceptability 
ratings of 68% and 67% respectively. The htter r ^ l t is somewhat surprising, in that 
conventional wisdom suggests that the association of fingerprints with criminal 
identification may represent a potential barrier to user acceptance. However, it is 
clear ft^m these results that the majority of respondents are comfortable with the 
concept. It can, however, be noted diat, in the normalised results (as presented in 
table 2), face recognition scored higher than fingerprints once negative responses had 
been taken into account 
One of the significant questions posed in the survey was whether respondents would 
be comfortable with the concept of continuous supervision. This would provide a 
means for authentication to become an ongoing process within a logged in session, 
rather than being merely a one-time judgement at the beginning. This, in tum, would 
guard against situations such as an impostor replacing a legitimate user at the tenninal 
or an impostor who may have been able to fool the initial login authentication system. 
In general, the respondents were positive towards the idea of monitoring, with 43% 
considering it acceptable, though 29% were unsure. However, the respondents 
considered only three techniques acceptable; namely keystroke analysis, mouse 
dynamics and face recognition (the latter being with a very low preference). Whilst 
the overall ranked results reflected sensible views, some of the individual responses in 
the underlying data did provide a few surprises. In particular, 34 respondents rated the 
use of signature analysis for continuous monitoring to be 'acceptable*. This is most 
likely to be a misunderstanding, as few computer users would be prepared to stop 
woric and sign their name intermittently (a view borne out by the fact that 90 rated this 
as 'unacceptable'). 
Respondents were also asked to consider how long they would be prepared to spend 
creating a behaviour profile that the monitoring system would use to authenticate 
them. The responses are shown in table 5. It is clear that the majority of users would 
not be tolerant of explicit profiling activity for any long periods. Equally, the time 
diat most of them would consider acceptable is 15 minutes or less - which would be 
unlikely to be adequate for some measures (e.g. whilst face and fingerprint 
recognition systems would allow adequate registration within this time, accurate 
measures relating to typing and more general system usage would require longer 
periods). As such, elements of profiling would need to occur as a transparent 
background task in order to ensure user acceptance. 
User-profile set-up time Respondents 
No time 11% 
Up to 5 mins 36% 
Up to 15 mins 24% 
Up to 30 mins 13% 
Up to Ihr 12% 
> Ihr 5% 
Table 5 : Acceptable duration of proHiing activity 
Once a profile has been created, there is still the possibility that a monitoring system 
may falsely reject a legitimate user, believing them to be an impostor. The 
questionnaire made the respondents aware o f this and asked them how ftequently they 
would be willing to tolerate such errors. The results are presented in table 6 and 
clearly illustrate that any deployed system would need to have a very low error rate in 
order to avoid alienating the user population. 





Table 6 : Perceived tolerable frequency of false rejection by monitoring system 
It is recognised that the concept of continuous supervision also introduces ethical 
considerations. Indeed, 40% stated that they would consider monitoring as an invasion 
of their privacy, with a fiirther 18% being unsure. It is clear that i f continuous 
supervision of users is to be implemented, then certain safeguards should be 
considered In particular, users should be aware of the intended uses of the 
information collected. 45% of respondents felt that they could not trust their 
organisation to use the supervision data for security-related purposes only and were 
concemed that it could be utilised for an ulterior motive, such as monitoring work 
productivity. 85% stated that users should be aware of any monitoring being used. 
The simplest way to ensure these requirements are met is to involve the users in the 
planning and implementation of these systems and provide clear policies on the uses 
for the gathered informatioa 
Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate which fields/sectors would benefit 
most from supervision of users by computer, rating the benefit from 'great benefit' to 













Figure 3 : Benefit from monitoring by sector 
As expected, the majority of respondents considered the areas of government, 
defence, health and banking to benefit most from user supervision (these being the 
areas with the most obviously sensitive systems and data to protect). However, the 
respondents felt that all areas could benefit from improved supervision, showing that 
there is still considerable concem over the perceived computer security across all 
sectors. 
Discussion 
The results clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of password-based authentication, as 
well as the fact that, in spite of these, it remains the dominant form of user 
authentication. However, the fact that the respondents have shown a willingness to 
use altemative authentication techniques can be considered to be encouraging. It 
should be noted, however, that in the majority of cases, it is unlikely that the 
respondents had actually used the techniques that they were being asked to comment 
upon. As such, it is possible that their views may change i f presented with the 
practical experience. 
Given that a strong preference was expressed for passwords, consideration should be 
given to Retaining them as the means of login authentication, whilst identifying means 
to compensate for their weaknesses. Suitable strategies in this respect could include: 
Utilising password login in conjunction with transparent keystroke analysis of 
the information entered. In this way, the user would be authenticated not only 
by what they type, but also how they type it. This should not have any 
significant influence on user acceptance, as the primaiy authentication 
mechanism will still appear to be the password. 
- Retaining password-only authentication at login, but supplementing it with 
continuous supervision during the user session. The survey results suggest 
that techniques such as keystroke analysis and mouse dynamics would be 
acceptable to users in this regard. 
The respondents preference for passwords is in agreement with the previously 
published results from the Australian TRUST project, which (fix)m a survey o f 76 
participants) found users' principal preference to be for passwords, followed by 
physiological biometrics and, finally, behavioural measures [16]. The latter fmding 
is, however, in contrast to the results from this study in that (for continuous 
monitoring) the behavioural techniques of keystroke and mouse dynamics were 
chosen in preference to the physiological technique of face recognition. Indeed, in the 
TRUST study, keystroke analysis and pointing device based verification scored the 
lowest of the seven biometrics assessed. 
Although many considered the concept of continuous supervision to be acceptable for 
security purposes, the respondents showed concern over the potential wider use of 
such data. As such, it is important for organisations to establish agreed working 
practices to employees before proceeding with such methods (this may assist in 
reassuring those such as the 29% of respondents who were undecided over the 
acceptability of the monitoring concept). I f such practices are not naturally adopted by 
organisations, it is possible (maybe even preferable in some cases) to legislate on 
acceptable supervision practices. This could be implemented in a similar way to that 
which restricts the rights of an employer to intercept and/or read an employee's email 
correspondence. 
Overall, a significant factor in the acceptance of alternatives to the password wil l be 
that of education. I f people can be shown that newer authentication techniques are 
safe, reliable and secure, then their acceptance is likely to be improved. 
Conclusions 
The survey has shown that, aldiough demonstrably weak, the password remains the 
most popular form of authentication in the minds o f users. However, a number o f 
other methods emerged as possible contenders and it is possible that practical 
experience of using diem, combined with improved awareness of the vuherabilities of 
passwords, would increase their perceived acceptability as alternatives. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn fiDm the survey results is that the use of 
continuous supervision is, in general, acceptable. However the viability of such a 
scheme would be dictated by the methods chosen and subject to suitable assurances 
being given to the monitored population regarding the planned uses of the collected 
data. 
The findings fiiom the survey will be used to inform on-going work in relation to an 
architecture for real-time user supervision and monitoring [17]. This system will be 
based upon composite authentication techniques, rather than attempting to apply 
particular techniques in isolation. 
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A conceptual intrusion monitoring architecture and thoughts 
on practical implementation 
P.S.Dowland and S.M.Fumell 




The paper presents a conceptual description of the 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) architecture, which 
is designed to facilitate detection of system penetration 
and other anomalous activity in a networked 
environment. The architecture is based upon eight 
functional elements, distributed between a monitoring 
host and a scries of monitored client systems. The 
discussion also considers how the approach could be 
integrated within the Windows NT environment. 
1 Introduction 
The concept of real-time intrusion monitoring has been 
of interest in the IT security domain for a number of 
years, with the original idea having been proposed by 
Denning (1987). Such an approach is valuable as a 
means of combating a number of classes of system abuse, 
including penetration by unauthorised persons and 
misuse of privileges by registered users. In addition, 
abuse may be perpetrated by malicious software, such as 
viruses and Trojan Horse programs. Although a number 
of IDS have been developed (Mukherjcc et al. 1994), 
these have generally targeted large systems or specific 
domains (e.g. military). Commercial implementations 
are generally restricted in their monitoring functionality. 
However, the increasing interconnection of corporate 
systems, coupled with reported increases in computer 
abuse incidents (CSI 1999), suggests that the use of more 
advanced intrusion monitoring functionality would be 
advantageous. This paper presents the conceptual 
architecture of the Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS), 
which aims to detect anomalous activity in a networked 
enviroTunent, followed by consideration of how to realise 
the approach in practice under Windows NT. 
2 Intrusion Monitoring System overview 
The IMS architecture was originally proposed by Fumell 
(1995) and is based upon the concept of a centralised 
Host handling the monitoring of one or more Clients on 
local workstations. The Clients collect the required data 
relating to system activity and respond to any suspected 
intrusions detected by the Host. Monitoring is based 
upon the comparison of current activity against two 
categories of stored information, namely user behaviour 
profiles and generic intrusion rules. These approaches 
are common to other intrusion monitoring architectures, 
such as the Intrusion Detection Expert System described 
by Lunt (1990). User profiles could conceivably hold a 
range of identification, authentication and behavioural 
information relating to registered users. Examples of 
potential characteristics would include system access 
times and locations; typical levels of system resource 
utilisation; application and file usage; methods of user 
interaction; and biometrics (i.e. physiological and 
behavioural characteristics). Biomciric monitoring is 
considered to be particularly appropriate to prevent 
impostor penetration and a number of options exist that 
could be employed in this context, including keystroke 
analysis, face recognition and voice recognition (Cope 
1990). Other well-known biometrics, such as fingerprint 
recognition, are less strongly favoured in the IMS 
context, as less opportunity exists to integrate them in a 
manner that is transparent (and, hence, non-intrusive) to 
the legitimate user. 
Some classes of intrusion or misuse can be trapped 
without identifying departures from historical patterns of 
user behaviour. The occurrence of some events will be 
suspicious in themselves and, therefore, the system 
requires a means to monitor for these as well. Examples 
of generic indicators would include consecutive access 
violations, out of hours access, account overuse / 
simultaneous access, use of inactive accounts and 
extensive use of help systems. While none of these alone 
would provide sufficient indication to state that an 
intrusion was in progress, the combination of two or 
more could be more persuasive. In the IMS context, 
these attack signatures would be represented via 
Intrusion Rules that, i f satisfied, would increase the alert 
status of the system. 
3 The IMS Architecture 
Anomaly Detector. The Anomaly Detector analyses 
activity for suspected intrusions, comparing it against the 
behaviour profile of the current user's (claimed) identity, 
as well as against the generic intrusion rules. The 
detector is comprised of further sub-modules, each 
handling specific monitoring tasks (e.g. keystroke 
analysis, tracking of resource usage etc.). The detector 
maintains an alert status table^ with entries existing 
throughout the life of each user-initiated session or 
process to indicate the level of detected anomalies and 
thereby the confidence of a potential intrusion. This 
information would be examined and updated each time 
activity data relating to the relevant user / process is 
analysed. The alert status level would increase in 
response to departures from the user-specific behaviour 
profile or the satisfaction of generic intrusion indicators. 
The level would be reduced after successful challenges 
or after a sufficient period of nonmal activity to allow the 
system to discount the previous anomaly. The alert 
status level can be linked with the types of activity that a 
subject is permitted to perform. In this way, a phased 
reduction of permitted behaviour would occur as the 
level increases. Sensitive activities / information could, 
therefore, be denied i f doubt exists over the legitimacy of 
the current user, whilst still allowing more mundane 
activities to continue. The approach would demand that 
a maximum alert status threshold be associated with each 
of the activities or objects that IMS is to control. 
Profile Refiner. User behaviour may legitimately alter 
over time. The Profile Refiner aims to provide an 
automatic means to account for such changes, using 
neural networks to analyse and recognise behavioural 
characteristics that might not be apparent to a human 
observer. In this way, the effectiveness of the system has 
the potential to improve over time. It might also be 
possible to determine which of the profiled 
characteristics provide the best discriminators for each 
user and thereby establish various levels of behavioural 
indicator (with the primary level representing the most 
reliable verifiers). This hierarchy could also be extended 
to allow for the fact that some characteristics may 
represent negative indicators (i.e. those that, despite 
refinement, are found to cause a high level of false 
rejection). 
It would be undesirable for the Profile Refiner to utilise 
data that is later found to be anomalous. Refinement 
should, therefore, only take place after the termination of 
non-anomalous user sessions. User-specific profile 
records would also incorporate a series of fiags to 
indicate whether the individual behaviour characteristics 
are ready to be used in supervision or still being 
developed. This will allow a gradual training period to 
be defined for new user profiles without the IMS 
continually generating intrusion alerts (the fiags would 
also allow a specific ^refinement only' period to be 
established for existing profiles that have proved to be 
inadequate for the legitimate user). The purpose of 
associating flags with each profile characteristic is so that 
some degree of monitoring could still continue whilst 
other aspects are being (ro)traincd. 
Recorder. The Recorder handles the short-term storage 
of user-related activity data during a session and focuses 
specifically upon the collection of data relating to the 
profiled characteristics of a given user (e.g. collection of 
keystroke data in relation to the typing profile). Upon 
termination, the information will be used as input to the 
Profile Refiner, provided that the session was not 
considered anomalous. In the event of a proven 
anomaly, the Recorder can discard the session data. 
Archlver. The Archiver collects data relating to all 
system activity and stores it in a long-term archive, 
providing a more permanent record of activities and 
suspected anomalies. The storage occurs regardless of 
whether sessions / processes are regarded as anomalous 
and details of all security relevant events arc archived. 
Such events include login failures, intrusion alerts, 
authentication challenges and suspended sessions. 
However, in order to conserve storage space, it may be 
desirable to only record details of certain types of event. 
The Archiver is therefore configurable to suit the 
preferences of the organisation involved (note that the 
same would not be true for the Recorder as this would 
always need to collect information on any activities for 
which profile refinement may later occur). The long-
term retention period of archived details would be 
organisation-dependent 
Collector. The Collector is responsible for obtaining 
information on all relevant client-side activity. The 
module must operate in such a way as to encompass, but 
be independent of, all system applications. It is 
envisaged that this could be best achieved by 
implementation at the operating system (OS) level, such 
that key events also lead to IMS notification. For 
example, a significant proportion of data collection could 
be based around the interception and redirection of 
selected OS service requests (such as file input / output, 
application execution, keyboard input). In some cases, 
data could be obtained directly from audit trail records -
as in previous systems, such as Wisdom cS: Sense 
(Leipins and Vaccaro 1989.). However, with certain 
aspects (e.g. keystroke analysis) the required information 
will not be held by audit trails and implementation may, 
therefore, require a significant number of OS links. 
Whilst ihis would serve to make this aspect of IMS very 
system specific, it would be more efficient than 
attempting to modify individual applications to provide 
relevant infonnation to IMS. 
Responder. This module resides in the Client and 
responds to anomalies detected by the Host, The 
operation centres around the continuous monitoring of 
the alert status transmitted by the Host, with increases In 
the level triggering appropriate actions. The nature of 
response at different levels would vary and a detailed 
discussion of the possible options is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, appropriate responses might 
include: issuing of an explicit challenge for further 
authentication; recording of details in an intrusion log for 
later investigation; notification of the system manager; 
phased reduction of permitted behaviour; locking of the 
intruder's terminal; and termination of the anomalous 
session / process. 
Communicator. The Communicator provides the 
network communications interface between the Host and 
the local Clienl(s). The principal functions include 
transmitting user and process information to the Host and 
then subsequently keeping the Client(s) informed of the 
current alert status. I f implemented in a heterogeneous 
environment, the Client side would be responsible for 
resolving any operating system differences that exist 
within the monitoring domain, so that information could 
be presented to the Host in a consistent, standardised 
format. The actual communication could then be 
handled via a standard sockets approach, with protection 
provided by a technology such as Secure Sockets Layer 
(Frier etal. 1996). 
Controller. This module allows the operation of the 
IMS system to be configured. On the Host side, this 
applies to the Anomaly Detector (e.g. behaviour 
characteristics to utilise, generic rules in operation), the 
Projile Refiner (e.g. frequency of refinement, acceptable 
thresholds for challenges) and the Archiver (e.g. level of 
detail required, specific events to record or exclude from 
logging). On the Client side, configuration relates to the 
Collector (e.g. the level of data collection, which could 
be automatically linked to the characteristics being 
monitored by the Anomaly Detector) and the Responder 
(e.g. the level of response required at each alert status 
level). These settings would be controlled and recorded 
through the Host system. Local Client(s) would then be 
configured at the time of session iiutiation. Other 
features would also be provided under the auspices of the 
Controller^ including user profile management and 
update of the generic rulebase. 
4 IMS Implementation 
Work is currently being conducted to develop an 
implementation for Windows NT. This requires 
replacement of the Graphical Identification aNd 
Authentication (GINA) Dynamic Link Library (DLL) -
the interface through which a user can provide his/her 
identification, typically in the form of a usemame and 
password. However, it can be replaced with any desired 
authentication method (e.g. commercial products are 
available using fingerprint and faceprint methods). In 
addition to the GINA replacement, the IMS would also 
require software to provide the required continuous 
monitoring, together with a remote security server. The 
security server would be used to store, maintain and 
update the user profiles. This server would process all 
authentication requests together with local system audits 
and updates to profiles. This role is slightly different to 
that of a network server, which usually only authenticates 
requests for access at the beginning of a session. Instead, 
the security server would be responsible for ongoing 
authentication throughout a session. A user login would 
be performed locally (or remotely via a domain 
controller) and once the user^ s credentials arc confirmed 
the monitoring program would be loaded to provide 
continuous user authentication. To prevent tampering, 
the IMS system would store user profiles remotely on the 
security server. These would be encrypted and 
downloaded at login (although for higher security the 
profiles could be maintained on the server with 
authentication requests being handled by the server). To 
ensure monitoring hardware has not been tampered with, 
a local machine audit can also be initiated together with 
checks for dependent entries in configuration files or 
registry keys. 
To reduce network traffic, it is envisaged that the user 
authentication would be performed on the local computer 
with only warnings or profile updates being fed back to 
the security server. Under certain scenarios it may be 
necessary to lock local computers i f contact is lost with 
the security server to ensure an intruder had not removed 
a computer. However, it should be noted that this creates 
a weak point and appropriate measures will be needed to 
prevent a single server stopping the entire network. This 
could take the form of a backup server, in a similar 
fashion to a secondary DNS server. Alternatively, the 
range of facilities available to the user can be restricted 
until they can be re-authenticated. 
Once a user has been authenticated by the replacement 
GINA DLL. the IMS client would be activated. The IMS 
client would then check the IMS security server (host) 
for the users monitoring characteristics and rules, to 
allow it to select the most appropriate monitoring 
programs. At this point, the selected characteristics 
would be loaded and initialised. To ensure ease of 
implementation and future modification, each distinct 
monitor program would be implemented as a system 
DLL. Taking the keystroke analysis example, the 
monitor program would install a system-wide hook to 
intercept all keystrokes received by the keyboard buffer 
and pass these to an analysis algorithm within the DLL. 
To ease the processing burden, the DLL would pass 
periodic samples of keystroke activity (either lime or 
quantity based) to be analysed. The results of this 
analysis would then be passed on to the IMS client 
program to be either compared to the local copy of the 
user's profile or to be returned to the IMS Host for 
remote verification and subsequent action. In the event 
that the IMS detects a potential intruder, a call can be 
made to the GINA DLL to provide a request for further 
user authentication, (e.g. question and answer challenge 
or biometric identification request). As the GINA DLL 
provides the login interface for NT, it is impossible to 
perform a local user login without authenticating via the 
GINA DLL. This can be used to enforce a variety of 
security rules. For example, the system may refuse login 
without the presence of the IMS host, the system may 
only accept a user once a secondary authentication has 
been made or the system may disallow local logins i f 
monitoring hardware (e.g. a camera) has been removed. 
Under Windows NT, the Anomaly Detector, Profile 
Refiner, Recorder and Archiver would be implemented 
on the IMS Security server (Host) as a software suite. To 
facilitate future upgrades, each component would be 
contained within a separate DLL, with a front-end 
provided through a single executable. Depending on the 
size of the system being monitored, it may be necessary 
to distribute the tasks over multiple hosts to cope with 
the level of data analysis and profile updating. It may 
also be beneficial to implement these programs as 
services under NT - ensuring they are loaded at host 
boot-up. The Collector would be implemented as a 
mediator on the Client, collecting information via hooks 
that intercept system messages (e.g. keystrokes, mouse 
movements etc.) and forwarding this information on to 
the Communicator. This would again be held in a DLL, 
which would be called by the replacement GINA. The 
Responder would be implemented within the GINA DLL 
and provide a replacement login interface for NT. This 
would also interface to the Communicator and Collector 
for data acquisition and client-host communication. The 
Communicator provides the interface between the client 
and server IMS software. It would be implemented as a 
shared DLL (used by both client and host). The 
Communicator would use standard TCP/IP 
communication, with all data being encrypted using a 
standard algorithm. The Controller provides a 
management interface to the IMS server software and 
would be implemented on the host as a single executable 
linking to the Anomaly Detector, Profile Refiner, 
Recorder and Archiver DLL's. Further details of the 
practical implementation approach can be found in 
Dowland and Fumell (2000). 
5 Conclusions 
Intrusion detection systems have the potential to provide 
an important contribution to system security, protecting 
against abuse by both external persons and organisational 
insiders. The IMS architecture represents an example 
approach and the paper has sought to describe the main 
functional elements. A system such as IMS is considered 
to represent a useful addition to Windows NT. which 
increasingly has a role in enterprise-level IT and, hence, 
an increasing requirement for strong protection. The 
paper has provided an indication of how IMS would be 
realised in the NT environment. The detailed mapping 
of the IMS approach to the NT architecture is currently 
in progress. 
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Abstract 
The need for enhanced user authentication has been evident for some time; but has not been addressed at 
the operating system level to any degree. Whilst all mainstream operating systems offer some level of 
user identification and authentication, this is generally based on the usemame/password combination. 
Although a number of extensions to operating system security have been proposed (with some reaching 
implementation) none, as yet, have been integrated into the core operating system kernel. Although there 
are examples that extend the operating system security model with additional measures (e.g. plug-in 
fingerprint scanners), these merely extend the operating system security rather than replace it with a more 
secure version. 
This paper will consider the need to improve operating system security focussing upon the enhancement 
of user identification and authentication. In particular, the security weaknesses of the Microsoft Windows 
NT environment wil l be considered, leading to a discussion of supervision techniques that may be 
integrated within the NT security model. Finally, the conceptual integration of an Intrusion Monitoring 
System (IMS) architecture is considered. 
Keywords 
User authentication, user supervision, security, intrusion monitoring, Windows NT. 
Introduction 
The most commonly used form of operating system user authentication is the 
usemame/password pair. In most systems, the allocation o f passwords (and sometimes 
usemames) is entirely at the discretion o f the users and, as such, is the cause o f many 
security loopholes. The weaknesses o f passwords as the primary form o f user 
authentication have been documented in previous works (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989; 
Cherry et al, 1992) and w i l l not be covered in detail here. However, typical weaknesses 
include passwords being easily guessed, shared among users, the use o f dictionary 
words (which are more vulnerable to attack) and being written down near PCs. Even 
when passwords are more selectively chosen, they are still vulnerable to brute force 
attack, especially with the fast processors and distributed password cracking software 
now freely available (Savill, 1999). 
It is clear that the 'out o f the box' configuration for an operating system is inadequate 
for most systems. For example, most U N I X installations leave many security 'back-
doors' into the system wide open by default (e.g. default password settings that 
administrators should change, but often do not), which provide an easy target for 
hackers (Stoll, 1989). Similarly, a standard installation o f Microsoft Windows N T 
requires many steps before it can be considered secure (Microsoft, 1999a). Relying on 
passwords in their common form is inadequate and, therefore, some form o f advanced 
user identification is desirable. Ideally, this should also be combined with some form of 
user monitoring; thus ensuring that a user's session cannot be hijacked. Hijacking 
occurs where a users' active session is taken over by another user (intruder). This can 
occur on a number of levels; firstly an intruder can simply resume a session by waiting 
for the user to leave their desk and then taking advantage of an unprotected computer. 
Alternatively, an intruder may connect a device (computer) to the target computers' 
network connection and masquerades as the target computer. Whilst hijacked sessions 
are most likely to occur in a corporate networked environment, there are still risks to 
SME's and individuals - this is especially true with the trend towards e-commerce and 
the increased confidence in purchasing on-line (NOP, 1999). An intruder may be able to 
capture a credit-card purchase and then either modify or replay that same exchange of 
data to their advantage. Enhancing user authentication is, therefore, of value to both the 
commercial and private sectors. 
Another problem, which is often overlooked during the selection of appropriate security 
systems, is that of internal misuse of computer systems. Most systems rely on the 
usemame/password pair to identify and authenticate a user. Once this authentication has 
been given, the user is often free to access the system without further checks or 
monitoring. Whilst most systems offer the ability to selectively exclude users and/or 
groups from specific shared resources, this is not usually the default setting. For 
example, under Windows NT, shares are, by default, accessible to all users and an 
administrator must specifically set access rights to ensure a shared resource is protected 
from internal misuse. A similar issue relates to private use of computing resources. 
Although this is not usually considered to be a security risk, it can represent a loss to a 
business either through physical resource usage or loss of computer processing time. 
Often the biggest loss to a company is that of lost employee time; not just through the 
time lost by the employee concerned but also in the time taken to investigate the 
problem and prevent further misuse (Audit Commission, 1998). 
Operating system security weaknesses 
With operating systems such as Microsoft's Windows NT4 comprising several million 
lines of code, it is, perhaps, no surprise that security weaknesses should occur. 
However, it is often surprising to see the scope and frequency with which such 
fundamental flaws are found. Using Microsoft Windows NT4 as an example, the 
Microsoft Product Security Notification Service issues several warnings each week, 
each identifying a potential security problem with the operating system or its sub-
components (Microsoft, 1999b). Of course, Microsoft Windows NT is not the only 
operating system to suffer with such security problems - the many flavours of Unix also 
generate hundreds of security patches each year (see 
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/computer-security/most-common-qs/index.html). However, 
the wider distribution of Windows means that the consequences of security 
vulnerabilities are potentially more wide reaching. A fijrther drawback with a "popular" 
operating system is that as its popularity increases, it becomes a greater target to hackers 
partly due to the increased usage (and, therefore, potential targets) but also because of 
the greater availability of information relating to security weaknesses. This has been 
particulariy prevalent with the appearance of "script-kiddies" (young inexperienced 
hackers), who frequenUy use the many resources (called "filez") which are available 
from hacking sites on the Internet. A noticeable side effect of this is the use of 
alternative operating systems where security is of prime concern. For example, the US 
Army has switched to a MacOS-based web server platform, following a hacking 
incident when the server was running Windows NT (Donoghue, 1999). This is not to 
say that MacOS is any more secure than Windows NT, just less widely targeted. 
Despite the frequency of these vulnerabilities, the only standard form of security 
provided by these operating systems for authentication purposes is the password. 
Enhancing Windows NT security 
Windows NT security can be considered on two levels, local machine and domain or 
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Figure 1 Local/remote user authentication 
When a local user presses the "Control-Alt-Del" combination to initiate a login they are 
prompted to enter their usemame/password pair. The NT hash algorithm is then applied 
to the password and is passed on to the Local Security Authority (LSA) which calls the 
MSVI O authentication package. This hash is finally compared with the hash stored in 
the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database by the authentication package. 
Once a users' password is authenticated, an access token is issued that is valid for that 
users' session. 
When a user wishes to be authenticated across a network (to log-in to a domain 
controller or for access to a remote machine), the password hash must be transferred 
across the network. When the user is prompted for their usemame/password they are 
also required to enter a valid domain. When the authentication package identifies that 
the account is not held locally, a call is made to the NetLogon service which sets-up a 
secure Remote Procedure Call (RPC) session to the domain controller to authenticate 
the login. The domain controller then issues a 16-bit challenge (the nonce). This 
challenge is then encrypted together with the password hash and is returned to the 
domain controller for authentication. Finally, the domain controller returns an access 
token which is valid for that users' session. 
One of the main problems of the above technique is that once the challenge (nonce) has 
been intercepted and with knowledge of the encryption algorithm it is possible to 
determine the password hash. Given a known hash, it is feasible (with today's 
technology) to guess (using a dictionary and/or brute-force attack) the original 
password. 
To achieve a more comprehensive approach under Windows NT would require a 
replacement GINA Graphical Identification aNd Authentication DLL (core user login 
system library e.g. usemame/password prompt). The GINA DLL provides an interface 
through which a user can provide his/her identification. This typically takes the form of 
the traditional usemame/password, but can be replaced with any form of identification 
(e.g. fingerprint scanner, iris scanner etc.). 
There are a number of "add-on" software/hardware packages that can be used to 
enhance Windows NT security. One of the most common packages currently available 
is the fingerprint scanner. This is a small device that connects to the PC and provides a 
cost-effective way of authenticating a login attempt. These devices typically provide an 
additional security module that integrates into the NT security model. Similar devices 
are also available to capture handprint geometry, facial patterns and there are devices 
appearing that are capable of iris scanning. A l t h o u ^ these packages allow the 
enhancement of NT security by removing the need for the user to remember a password, 
they are not completely integrated into the operating system and only provide a 
replacement for the usemame/password prompt. There is also a significant cost 
overhead to be considered (for example, a fingeqjrint based authentication system 
would require the purchase of sufficient scanners for all the PC's in an organisation). 
Many of these soluHons also depend on addifional hardware that is dedicated to the task 
of providing enhanced authentication and, therefore, provides no additional benefit to 
the organisation concemed (i.e. no purpose other than security). 
Even i f these techniques were integrated into the NT security model, there are still gaps 
which leave significant security weaknesses. For example, even with a fingerprint 
scanner, once the user has logged-in using their finger, there is no guarantee that the 
same user will sit down and continue with the session. Similarly, i f a user leaves their 
workstation, there is no means of checking i f the user who continues the session is the 
same that started it. (Although all versions of Windows allow the configuration of a 
Screensaver with password protection, this is not set by default. It should also be noted 
that the computer is unprotected fi-om the time the user leaves their desk to the point at 
which the Screensaver is activated, unless they explicitly lock the terminal). Due to 
these risks, some form of ongoing user supervision is required to ensure that the current 
user is the same as the user who activated the session. The remainder of this paper 
considers the adoption of an Intmsion Monitoring System (IMS) and the technical 
aspects involved in integrating into the Windows NT security model. 
Description of an IMS 
Following previous research work, a proposed IMS architecture is shown in figure 2. 
The specific fianctionality of this architecture has been described in a previous paper and 
will not be described in detail here (Fumell et al, 1997). At the basic level, the approach 
involves an IMS host monitoring activity occurring on a series of client systems. The 
client/server relationship of the IMS architecture shown fits neatly into the Windows 
NT security model architecture and the proposed IMS integration is described later in 
this paper. Further research work is necessary to ftilly integrate the IMS architecture 
into the Windows NT security model and will be the subject of a later paper. 
The Anomaly Detector analyses the data gathered by the IMS client for signs of 
suspected intrusion. This data can be compared against both the user's behaviour profile 
and the generic intrusion rules (i.e. attack signatures). 
The Profile Refiner allows the automatic modification of a user's profile in response to 
a valid session profile. This recognises the fact that a user's behaviour pattern may 
change over time (e.g. in a scenario where typing style has been profiled, their typing 
skill may improve) and allows a user's profile to evolve. Due to the nature of the data 
and the difficulty in recognising gradual behavioural pattern changes, it is likely that 
this would be implemented using some form of neural network (Fumell, 1994). 
The Recorder stores a temporary record of system and user activity during a session 
(session profile) which can be used by the Profile Refiner to update the user profile, 
providing the session was not considered anomalous. 
User 













User i - H 
pons^ 





























Normal data flow 
Rows (f intrusion suspected 
Figure 2 Proposed IMS Architecture 
The Archiver provides an audit log, storing all security relevant events. This could also 
be extended to monitor all events i f an organisation requires a more detailed log of user 
activity (e.g. to monitor user performance). 
The Collector provides an interface between the IMS client and the applications 
running on the client computer. The collector is responsible for gathering information 
relevant to the user and his/her system activities. Under Windows NT the collector 
would be implemented as a mediator, collecting information gathered by low-level 
system functions that intercept system messages (e.g. keystrokes, mouse movements 
etc.) and forwarding this information on to the communicator. 
The Responder provides user interface between the IMS software suite and the end-
user. Its main task is that of monitoring the signals send from the server to the client and 
taking appropriate action where necessary. Possible actions include; issuing a user 
authentication challenge, suspending a session, limiting a user's actions or cancelling a 
process. 
The Communicator provides the interface between the client and server IMS software. 
The communicator is responsible for ensuring a consistent, reliable and secure exchange 
of data between the client and server. Where an IMS system is implemented in a 
heterogeneous environment, the communicator is also responsible for data translation to 
provide consistent data formatting between different client platforms. 
The Controller provides a management interface to the IMS server software allowing 
an administrator to configure the IMS system-operating parameters. The controller also 
allows an administrator to configure client-monitoring characteristics on a global, 
group, machine or individual user basis. 
An Intrusion Monitoring System incorporates identification and authentication of users, 
monitoring of users for unusual behaviour or characteristics, together with the ability to 
modify the profile of a user to reflect changing patterns of use/behaviour. An IMS can 
rely on many physiological characteristics of the user (e.g fingerprint, voice etc.) and 
can also monitor behavioural traits such as keystroke patterns, mouse dynamics and 
application/resource usage. However, it should be noted that the majority of 
commercially available IMS systems rely on traditional methods of user authentication 
A strong potential candidate for a monitoring characteristic is that of keystroke analysis. 
This is a particularly attractive characteristic, as it requires no additional hardware (cost) 
or proprietary drivers (development time). By monitoring a user's typing profile it is 
possible to determine, with some accuracy, the identity of the current user. The use of a 
users' typing pattern as an authentication characteristic has been described in a number 
of papers (Fumell et al, 1996; Brown and Rogers, 1993) and has shown to be a strong 
distinguishing factor in certain contexts with overall False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
figures as low as 4.2% being observed. 
Although keystroke analysis is a good characteristic upon which to base user 
authentication, there are limitations. One of the major drawbacks of this characteristic is 
the very fact that users have a broad range of typing patterns. An inexperienced typist 
will use a keyboard in a slow deliberate manner, having a slow typing rate and most 
probably a high error rate. A trained touch-typist will type quickly with a low error rate. 
However, most inexperienced typists will type equally slowly and most touch-typists 
will type equally quickly. It is quite possible that the inter-keystroke time will be such 
that two typists may be indistinguishable in normal working environments. 
Keystroke analysis may also be inappropriate depending on the environment in which it 
is used. For example, i f a user is typing in numeric data for a prolonged period, it may 
be impossible to achieve a statistically valid sample of keystroke data upon which to 
base the authentication judgement. Similarly, i f a user were drawing with a mouse, there 
would be no keystrokes to analyse. 
From this, we can see that a composite approach is needed, where several appropriate 
authentication and monitoring techniques are applied. For example, a user may be 
initially authenticated by their fingerprint, after which their typing profile and 
application usage can be monitored. Similarly, i f that user then starts to draw using the 
mouse, data can be recorded to determine i f the dynamic movement of the mouse is 
consistent with the users' profile. This technique can also be applied where users 
hotdesk. I f a user moves to a desk with an additional security-relevant device (e.g. a 
camera for faceprint recognition), the additional measures can be detected during an 
audit and then utilised for that user depending upon the settings in their profile. 
Integrating an IMS into the Windows NT security model 
I f we consider the concept of an IMS, the usemame/password pair could be used to 
identify the user with a partial degree of certainty, whilst the continuously evaluated 
characteristics would allow the user to be monitored throughout the session. Using the 
previous example o f keystroke analysis, a users' typing pattern can be monitored 
throughout the active session and compared with a historical profile. Deviation fi-om 
this profile can be flagged and a threshold set beyond which fijrther authentication of 
the user would be required (Fumell, 1995). This trust level can also determine the 
fi-equency of monitoring and, where fijrther authentication is considered necessary, the 
degree of certainty needed (and, hence, the form of authentication to request). 
To achieve an Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) under Windows NT would require a 
replacement GINA DLL and an additional piece of software to provide the required 
continuous monitoring together with a remote security server, A security server (or 
some form of centralised system) would be used to store, maintain and update the user 
profiles. This server would (in an ideal system) process all authentication requests 
together with local system audits and updates to profiles. This role is slightly different 
to that of a network server, which, usually, only authenticates requests for access at the 
beginning of a session. Instead, the security server would be responsible for ongoing 
authentication of a user throughout a session. 
A user login would be performed locally (or remotely via a domain controller) and once 
the user's credentials are confirmed the monitoring program would be loaded to provide 
continuous user authentication (Figure 3). To prevent tampering, the IMS system would 
store user profiles remotely on a security server. The profiles would be encrypted and 
downloaded at login to the local computer (although for higher security the profiles 
could be maintained on the server, with authentication requests being handled by the 
server). To also offer security for the hardware (to ensure monitoring hardware had not 
been removed) a local machine audit can also be initiated, together with checks for 
dependent entries in configuration files or registry keys. An IMS system would also 
allow updafing of the user profiles, to take into consideration changing user behaviour 


































Figure 3 Prototype I M S - N T Integration 
To reduce network traffic, it is envisaged that the user authentication would be 
performed on the local computer with only warnings or profile updates being fed back 
to the security server. Under certain scenarios it may be necessary to lock local 
computers i f contact is lost with the security server to ensure an intruder had not 
removed a computer. However, it should be noted that this creates a weak point and 
appropriate measures will be needed to prevent a single server stopping the entire 
network, this could take the form of a backup server (in a similar fashion to a secondary 
DNS server in an Internet context). Alternatively, the range of facilities available to the 
user can be restricted until the user can be re-authenticated. Another possible weak-
point is the profile update process. It is important that the profile update is only 
performed once a user authentication confidence level is exceeded and it is established 
that the computer concerned has not been tampered with. In the event that a users' 
authentication threshold has been uncertain and/or the computer may have been 
tampered with, any proposed changes to the user profile should be discarded. 
One of the most important factors in the implementation of continuous user monitoring 
is ensuring the transparency of the monitoring process. A system that requires users to 
continuously re-authenticate themselves will not be successful. Therefore, an IMS 
should allow background monitoring of an authenticated user, only interrupting the user 
in the event that fiirther authentication is necessary (e.g. in the form of a challenge-
response question). 
Clearly an IMS system can provide enhanced user authentication. However, there is no 
single system configuration that will meet all the needs of all the users. Instead 
configuration of the security server and client monitoring software is dependent on the 
level of security required by the organisation and amount of inconvenience that is 
tolerable to the users (the classic False Acceptance Rate versus False Rejection Rate 
dichotomy) (Cope, 1990). 
Conclusions 
As the need for enhanced user authentication grows, operating systems wil l be extended 
to provide the necessary services. Windows NT already allows the use of a replacement 
GINA DLL, which allows OEM security vendors to supplement the Windows NT 
usemame/password login with additional/replacement authentication techniques. 
Altemative login techniques (e.g. fingerprint identification) allow the system confidence 
in user validity to be increased, but further security is needed to ensure the continued 
confidence in the user once past the initial login process. A process of continuous user 
authentication and monitoring, as described in the paper, is therefore desirable. 
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Abstract 
The detection and prevention of 
authorised activities, by both ex-
jtemal parties and internal person-
nel, is an important issue within IT 
systems. Traditional methods of 
user authentication and access 
control do not provide compre-
hensive protection and offer op-
portunities for compromise by 
various classes of abuser. A po-
tential solution is provided in the 
jfomi of intrusion detection sys-
jtems, which are able to provide 
proactive monitoring of system 
I activity and apply automatic re-
sponses in the event of suspected 
problems. This paper presents the 
principles of intrusion monitoring 
and then proceeds to describe the 
conceptual architecture of the 
Intrusion Monitoring System 
(IMS), an approach that is the 
focus of current research end 
development by the authors. The 
main functional elements of the 
IMS architecture are described, 
followed by thoughts regarding the 
practical implementation and the 
associated advantages (and po-
tential disadvantages) that this 
would deliver. It is concluded that 
whilst an IMS-type approach 
would not represent a total repla-
cement for conventional controls, 
it would represent an effective 
means to complement the protec-
tion already provided. 
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Computer Security 
8 / 2 (2000) 65-74 
© MCB University Press 
[ISSN 0968-52271 
I Introduction 
In typical IT systems, protection against 
unauthorised user activities is usually 
provided via login authentication and access 
controls. The majority of authentication 
schemes are based upon traditional password 
methods. The weaknesses of passwords are 
well-known (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989), 
but their simplicity (from both user and 
developer perspectives) serves to ensure 
their continued use. A significant issue with 
passwords is that they typically provide a 
one-off authentication judgement at the 
beginning of a user session. From that point, 
protection against unauthorised user activity 
is reliant upon access controls applied to 
specific data and resources. Whilst these can 
be utilised in an effective manner, they are 
themselves reliant upon appropriate system 
administration to grant suitable access rights 
and privileges to users. However, depending 
upon the level of control imposed, this 
scenario still offers the potential for 
unauthorised activity. The normal means of 
monitoring and identifying this is via audit 
trails, which maintain a record of nominated 
security-relevant activities within the system 
and can be inspected at a later time in order 
to identify anomalies. The problem with this 
approach is that any detection of 
unauthorised activity will be retrospective, 
when significant damage may already have 
been done. In addition, previous research 
findings suggest that while many 
organisations may maintain audit trail 
information, only a small percentage (10 per 
cent) of them actively follow up the 
information collected (Gliss, 1990). As such, 
breaches of security may potentially remain 
unnoUced for some time. What is, therefore, 
required is an automated, proactive means of 
detecting and responding to unauthorised 
The oirreni esue and full text archive of this journal is avaitabte at 
http://www.emerald-library.com 
access/activity. Such a solution is provided 
by intrusion detection systems. 
The concept of intrusion detection can be 
traced to original work by Denning (1987), 
who proposed a model for an intrusion 
detection system (IDS). This work led to a 
number of practical IDS implementations 
from various organisations, in particular the 
IDES system from SRI (Lunt. 1990). Indeed, 
intrusion monitoring is still an area of active 
researchflL indicating that the overall issue 
has yet to be resolved. 
This paper presents an approach to guard 
against these classes of intrusion and misuse, 
in the form of the Intrusion Monitoring 
System (IMS) architecture. The discussion 
begins by presenting the principles that 
underlie the intrusion monitoring process, 
followed by a conceptual description of the 
IMS architecture. The paper then proceeds to 
examine a number of issues relating to 
practical implementation aspects. 
I Principles of intrusion monitoring 
This section presents a number of general 
principles that underlie the concept of 
intrusion monitoring and detection, which 
will enable the architectural approach 
proposed by IMS to be more fully understood 
and appreciated. 
Categorising system Intrusions and misuse 
At the highest level, intrusions or misuse 
will be the result of actions by users or 
processes, which will operate on one or more 
targets (which may include data (files), 
system devices and other users or processes). 
The purpose of introducing supervision will 
be two-fold: 
1 to ensure that systems are only accessed 
by authorised users; 
2 to ensure that systems are only used for 
authorised purposes. 
User actions can be categorised as being 
either legitimate or illegitimate. However, it 
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is useful if a more detailed breakdown than 
this can be derived for the different potential 
classes of illegitimate activity. For example, 
all of the following scenarios represent types 
of illegitimate activity that should be 
monitored: 
• an illegitimate action that is stiU within 
the normal authorisation of a valid user 
(i.e. abuse of privileges); 
• an action by a valid user which is outside 
the normal limits of authorisation; and 
• any action by an unauthorised user. 
In addition, it is necessary to recognise 
differences in the types of potential system 
abuser. These have already been 
comprehensively categorised by Anderson 
(1980), and are described in Table I . 
These groupings are considered 
appropriate for describing the.different types 
of user-related abuse within an intrusion 
monitoring framework and wUl, therefore, be 
adopted for the remainder of the discussion. 
Whilst it is also possible to develop a deeper 
profile of potential intruders, by considering 
factors such as the common motivations 
behind abuse (e.g. money, ideology, egotism 
etc.), these are not explored here as 
knowledge of them would not contribute to 
the process of detection. 
It should be noted that Anderson's 
categorisations do not take into account any 
of the categories of abuse that may result 
from software activity (e.g. viruses, Trojan 
Horses etc.). This is understandable given 
that the analysis was made in 1980 before 
such incidents had become commonplace. 
However, there has been a significant 
increase in such attacks over the last decade 
and evidence suggests that viruses are now 
the major cause of security breaches in both 
networked and standalone PC systems 
(National Computing Centre, 1998). It is now 
extremely unlikely that the problem will ever 
disappear and, therefore, countering such 
activity should also be within the scope of a 
comprehensive monitor. As a consequence, a 
further category of intrusion, caUed 
Table I 
Ca tegor ies of s y s t e m abuser 




Outsiders auempting to gain unauthorised access to the system 
Authorised users of the system who access data, resources 
or programs to which they are not entitled. SutKategorised into: 
MasQueraders Users who operate under the identity of 
another user 
Clandestine users Users who evade access controls and 
auditing 
Users who are authorised to use the system and resources 
accessed, but misuse their privileges 
malicious process (or malware), can be added 
to Anderson's list. These may introduce 
various undesirable consequences, including 
the alteration or destruction of data, creation 
of false data, degradation of system 
performance, crashing of systems or other 
eflects that might render data or systems 
inaccessible (Brunnstein et al. 1990). 
Monitoring and detecting intrusions 
The supervision of activities (and resulting 
anomaly detection) can be based upon user 
behaviour profiles and generic intrusion 
indicators. These approaches are common to 
other intrusion monitoring architectiures, 
such as the IDES system mentioned earlier. 
User profiles could conceivably hold a 
range of identification, authentication and 
behavioural information relating to 
registered users. Examples of potential 
profiled characteristics W9uld include: 
• system access times and locations; 
• typical levels of system resource 
utilisation; 
• application and file usage; 
• methods of user interaction (e.g. GUI 
versus command line), and 
• biometric information (encompassing 
both physiological and behavioural 
characteristics). 
The use of biometric monitoring is 
considered to be particularly appropriate to 
prevent impostor penetration and 
masquerade attacks. A number of options 
exist that could be employed in this context, 
including keystroke analysis (i.e. monitoring 
of the current user's typing style), face 
recognition and voice recognition (Miller, 
1994). 
It is also recognised that some classes of 
intrusion or misuse can be trapped without 
identifying departures from historical 
patterns of user behaviour. As such, generic 
intrusion rules (also known as attack 
signatures) may be utilised to identify the 
occurrence of events that are suspicious in 
themselves (i.e. irrespective of the user 
involved). Examples of such generic 
indicators would include the following: 
• consecutive access violations; 
• out of hours access; 
• account overuse/simultaneous access; 
• use of inactive accounts; 
• copying of password file; 
• extensive use of help systems; and 
• modification of an executable file. 
WhUe none of these alone would provide 
sufTicient indication to state that an 
intrusion was in progress, the combination of 
two or more could be considered more 
persuasive. In the IMS context, the 
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occurrence of any such events would 
increase the alert status of the system 
(which, as discussed later, could result in a 
range of potential responses as different 
threshold values were reached). 
A full IMS would operate by comparing 
current system activity against information 
held in a knowledge base. The knowledge 
base would effectively maintain two models 
of activity for reference by IMS: 
1 normal activity (i.e. the user behavioural 
profiles); and 
2 intrusive activity (i.e. the generic rules). 
These models will determine what types of 
activities and events the system will look for 
and, as such, an event will be judged to be 
indicative of a suspected intrusion if: 
• it is compatible with intrusive activity OR 
• it is incompatible with normal activity. 
Having considered these principles, the 
proposed architecture for a practical 
monitoring system can now be presented. 
I Intrusion monitoring system 
architecture 
At a high level, the IMS architecture is based 
upon the concept of a centralised host 
handling the monitoring and supervision of 
one or more networked clients running on 
local workstations. The purpose of the clients 
is to collect the required data relating to user 
and process activity and respond to any 
suspected intrusions detected by the host. 
All behaviour profiles, generic rules and 
such like are maintained securely at the host, 
which also handles all of the analysis and the 
main bulk of other processing associated 
with the supervision. By contrast, the client 
involves no local data storage and acts almost 
exclusively as an agent of the host. 
At a lower level, the host and client 
systems will be comprised of a number of 
modules, each handling a different aspect of 
the overall intrusion monitoring task, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The modules shown 
are intended to represent the conceptual 
elements of the system, but could also equate 
to the coded functional elements in a full 
implementation. The key aspects of this 
design are defined in the sections that follow. 
Anomaly detector 
The anomaly detector analyses user and 
process activity for signs of suspected 
intrusion, comparing it against the 
behaviour profiles (class and user-specific) 
that apply to the current user's (claimed) 
identity as well as against the generic 
intrusion rules. In practice, this module will 
be comprised of a number of further sub-
modules, each handling a specific aspect of 
anomaly detection and behaviour monitoring 
(e.g. keystroke analysis). 
The detector maintains an alert status 
table, with entries existing throughout the 
life of each user-initiated session or process 
to indicate the level of detected anomalies 
and thereby the confidence of a potential 
intrusion. Each entry contains the basic 
information shown in Table D, which is 
examined and updated each time activity 
data relating to the relevant user/process 
analysed. 
It is envisaged that, at its most basic, the 
"alert status level" could be a simple 
aggregate value based on the number of 
behavioural anomalies detected and 
intrusion rules satisfied (with the monitored 
characteristics and rules having been 
weighted to indicate their significance). The 
entry relating to "idle time" will be used to 
allow the phased reduction of the alert status 
level after certain periods of inactivity. 
Recording a tally of previous challenges 
would then be used as a safeguard to 
determine whether the level of IMS response 
should be escalated in response to an 
anomaly even if the alert status is currently 
low (i.e. as a result of the phased reduction). 
As Table n illustrates, the alert status table 
might also be used to store other information, 
such as the time of session/process initiation 
or the number of access violations incurred. 
These would be used for the purposes of on-
going comparison against behaviour profiles 
(for example, session start time could be used 
to derive the current session length) and 
would also be required to be maintained 
throughout the life of the session. It should be 
noted that some of the table entries are most 
applicable in the context of monitoring user 
sessions and will be redundant in the case of 
process supervision. 
The alert status level would increase in 
response to both departures from a user's 
historical behaviour profile and the 
satisfaction of generic intrusion indicators. 
Under normal circumstances, the detector 
would commence supervision of a session 
with an alert status of zero (i.e. no suspicion 
of an intrusion). However, factors such as 
failed login attempts, system configuration 
anomalies and the like could cause it to begin 
with a non-zero status so that it is essentially 
more sensitive to further anomalies in the 
initial instance. The alert status would be 
reduced after successful challenges or after a 
sufficient period of normal activity to allow 
the system to discount the previous anomaly. 
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It is desirable for IIMS to utilise user-related 
activity data in two ways - to analyse for 
anomaly detection and as the basis for 
updating behaviour profiles. This second 
point recognises the possibility that user 
behaviour may legitimately alter over time 
(e.g. as a result of access to new applications, 
improvements in typing ability etc.). The 
purpose of the profile refiner would, 
therefore, be to provide an automatic means 
for user-specific profiles to be updated to 
accoimt for such changes. 
It would be most appropriate for the profile 
refiner to be based upon a neural network 
approach (Bishop, 1995), given that the 
inherent ability to analyse and recognise 
patterns could allow behavioural 
characteristics to be identified that might not 
be apparent to a human observer. In this 
way, the effectiveness of the system would 
have the potential to improve over time, in 
that it could gradually learn more patterns of 
legitimate activity for each user (building 
upon the foundation provided by the generic 
rules and the initial profiles). It might also be 
possible to determine which of the profiled 
characteristics provide the best 
discriminators for each user and thereby 
establish (for example) primary, secondary 
and tertiary level behaviour indicators (with 
the primary level representing the most 
reliable identity verifiers). This hierarchy 
could also be extended to allow for the fact 
that some characteristics may represent 
negative indicators (i.e. those that, despite 
refinement, are foiand to cause a high level of 
false alarms). 
It would be undesirable for the profile 
refiner to utilise data that is later found to be 
anomalous. Refinement should, therefore, 
only take place after the termination of user 
sessions (provided, of course, that no 
intrusions were proven during this time). 
However, it is also considered sensible to 
allow refinement to proceed if any challenges 
that were generated were correctly answered 
by the user (the reason being that the 
generation of the alert may be indicative that 
legitimate behaviour has departed from the 
profile and that refinement is, therefore, 
necessary). However, in order to help guard 
against the recognised problem that 
misfeasors will answer challenges correctly, 
refinement should be performed on the 
proviso that the number of alerts raised is 
small relative to the length of the session (i.e. 
two alerts in a three hour session would be 
acceptable, whereas the same number in a 
ten minute session would be very 
suspicious). Additionally, any activity 
occurring during periods where supervision 
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of the relevant aspect is suspended cannot 
reliably be used for profile refinement. 
User-specific profile records would also 
incorporate a series of flags to indicate 
whether the individual behaviour 
characteristics are ready to be used in 
supervision or stiU being developed. This 
wiU allow a gradual training period to be 
defined for new user profiles without the IMS 
continually generating intrusion alerts (the 
flags would also allow a specific refinement 
only period to be established for existing 
profiles that have proved to be inadequate for 
the legitimate user). The purpose of 
associating flags with each profUe 
characteristic is so that some degree of 
monitoring could still continue whilst other 
aspects are being (re)trained. The flags could 
also be used to allow the total disablement of 
some aspects of monitoring if, for example, 
some characteristics are found to be 
inappropriate to certain users. 
Data relating to process activity would not 
be used for refinement as the generic 
rulebase would remain static (unless specific 
information on new intrusion methods is 
introduced by the system administrator). 
Recorder 
The recorder handles the short-term storage 
of user-related activity data during the period 
of a user session and focuses specifically 
upon the collection of data relating to the 
profiled characteristics of a given user (e.g. 
collection of keystroke data in relation to the 
typing profUe). Upon termination, the 
information wfll be used as input to the 
profile refiner, provided that the session was 
not considered anomalous. In the event of a 
proven anomaly, the recorder can discard its 
stored information for the session. 
Archiver 
The archiver coUects data relating to aU 
system activity and stores it in a long-term 
archive (in the same manner as a traditional 
audit trail), providing a more permanent 
record of activities and suspected anomalies. 
The storage will occur regardless of whether 
sessions/processes are regarded as 
anomalous and details of aU security relevant 
events will be archived. Such events will 
include login faflures, intrusion alerts, 
authentication challenges, suspended 
sessions and the like. The basic format of the 
archive records would be as shown in Table 
111. 
However, in order to conserve storage space, 
it may be desirable in some scenarios to only 
record details of certain types of event. The 
archiver would, therefore, be configurable to 
suit the preferences of the establishment 
involved (note that the same would not 
necessarily be true for the recorder as this 
would always need to collect information on 
any activities for which profile refinement 
may later occur). The long-term retention 
period of archived detaUs would be 
determined by the security policy of the 
organisation involved. 
Collector 
The collector represents the interface 
between the IMS and the existing 
information system/applications, with the 
responsibUity for obtaining information on 
all relevant user and system activity. The 
module would be required to operate in such 
a way as to encompass, but be independent of, 
aU system applications. It is envisaged that 
this could be best achieved by 
implementation at the operating system (OS) 
level, such that key events also lead to IMS 
notification. For example, a significant 
proportion of data coUection coiUd be based 
around the interception and redirection of 
selected OS interrupts and service requests 
(such as ffle input/output, application 
execution, keyboard input). These would be 
monitored with two objectives: 
1 to coUect data on those events which 
pertain to monitored behaviour 
characteristics; and 
2 to identify those events which may affect 
the security of the system (for comparison 
against generic intrusion indicators). 
In some cases, the required data could be 
obtained direcUy from existing audit trafl 
records on the underlying system. However, 
with certain aspects (e.g. keystroke analysis) 
the required information will not be 
maintained in audit trails and 
implementation may, therefore, require a 
significant number of operating system links. 
WhUst this would serve to make this aspect of 
IMS very system specific, it would be 
considerably more efficient than attempfing 
to modify each individual application to 
specifically provide relevant information to 
IMS. The system specific coding of the 
collector would only need to be done once, 
whereas modifications would be required to 
all current and future applications (which 
would be likely to be a non-trivial 
Table III 
IMS archive record structure 
Date Time User/process ID Logged event Privileges Resources utilised 
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undertaking and potentially impossible in 
the case of commercial packages where the 
source code may be unobtainable). 
As with the configuration of the archiver, 
the resolution of data collection would be 
determined at the host by the system 
administrator. 
Responder 
This module resides in the IMS client and 
handles the task of responding to anomalies 
detected by the host. The operation of the 
responder would centre around the 
continuous monitoring of the alert status 
transmitted by the host, with increases in the 
level triggering appropriate actions. The 
nature of the response might include the 
issue of a user authentication challenge, 
suspension of a session or cancellation of a 
process. The issue of appropriate response is 
discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
In some implementation scenarios, the 
responder might also be responsible for 
handling the initial user identification and 
authentication process that is required to 
gain access to the system in the first instance. 
Communicator 
The communicator provides the network 
commimications interface between the host 
and the client(s) operating on the local 
systems. As such, the fimctionality of this 
module is duplicated on both sides of the 
link. The principal fiuictions would include 
transmitting user and process information to 
the host and then subsequently keeping the 
client(s) informed of the current alert status. 
If implemented in a heterogeneous 
environment, the client side of the module 
would be responsible for resolving any 
operating system differences that exist 
within the monitoring domain so that 
information could be presented to the host in 
a consistent, standardised format. 
Controller 
This module is provided for use by the 
system administrator to allow the operation 
of the IMS system to be configured. On the 
host side, such a configuration would apply 
to the following modules: 
• anomaly detector, e.g. behavioiu-
characteristics to consider/prioritise, 
generic rules in operation; 
• profile refiner, e.g. frequency of 
refinement, acceptable thresholds for 
challenges within a session; and 
• archiuer, e.g. level of detail required, 
specific events to record or exclude from 
logging. 
For the client side, the operation of the 
following modules would be controlled: 
• collector, e.g. the level of data collection 
(linked to the characteristics being 
monitored by the anomaly detector), and 
• responder, e.g. the level of response 
required at each alert status level. 
These settings would obviously be controlled 
and recorded through the host system. The 
configuration of the local client(s) would then 
be established at the time of session 
initiation. 
In addition to the above, several other 
features would also be provided imder the 
auspices of the controller module. These 
would include facilities such as user profile 
management, update of the generic rulebase 
and the like. 
User profiles 
IMS profiles could conceivably hold a range 
of identification, authentication and 
behavioural information relating to 
legifimate users. The profiles would use a 
niunber of methods to represent measures of 
user behaviour: 
• frequency tables (e.g. for file access); 
• means and standard deviations (e.g. for 
keystroke/typing profiles); 
• ranges (e.g. valid access times); 
• lists (e.g. for valid access locations); and 
• a combination of methods (e.g. a list of 
valid access locations which also indicate 
the relative frequency of use). 
The profile data obviously require secure 
storage to prevent unauthorised browsing or 
tampering by potential impostors. If users 
were able to modify profile information it 
would be possible for them to adjust the 
records of other users to match their own 
(and, therefore, allow them to access the 
account in place of the legitimate owner). 
Whilst disclosure of the profile statistics may 
not initially appear to pose such a threat, it 
could still be a problem in the case of a 
determined impostor. For excunple, if the 
characteristics of the "target" user were 
known, the impostor would have a concrete 
statement of what he/she would be required 
to mimic. An alternative opUon would, of 
course, be to subsequently enlist the help of 
an accomplice with a comparable profile. At 
the very least, this dictates a requirement for 
encrypted storage, as used with the password 
files in the majority of commercial operating 
systems (Morris and Thompson, 1978). 
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1 Issues related to intrusion 
monitoring 
This section presents further discussion of a 
number of the issues that were mentioned 
during the description of the IMS modules. 
The issues in question are the restriction of 
user activities, suspension of supervision 
and types of response to suspected intrusion. 
Restriction of user activities 
It is considered feasible for the alert status 
level to be inter-linked with the types of 
activity that a subject is allowed to perform, 
such that a phased reduction of permitted 
behaviour would occur as the level increases. 
In this way, highly sensitive activities and/ 
or information could be denied if there is any 
doubt over the current user's legitimacy, 
whilst still allowing more mundane activities 
to continue. The approach would demand 
that a maximum alert status threshold be 
associated with each of the activities or 
objects that the IMS is to control. If the 
current status level was then to exceed this, 
the activity or object would become 
unavailable. For example, consider the 
thresholds in Table IV associated with two 
objects (wordprocessor and database) and the 
activities create and delete file. If the current 
alert status level were five then the user 
would not be permitted to access the database 
or to perform any file deletion. However, the 
creation of a file using the wordprocessor 
application would still be possible. 
Such a threshold table would be 
maintained within IMS, but the values would 
initially need to be assigned (and, if 
necessary, subsequently updated) by the 
system administrator. It must be said that the 
potential for error would make this approach 
inappropriate in many scenarios (for 
example, the denial of data access in 
sensitive applications could be most 
unwelcome). In any case, it would be 
advisable for the system administrator to be 
notified whenever behaviour restrictions 
were being imposed so that the situation 
could be investigated (in case legitimate 
users were being unintentionally impeded). 
Table IV 
Atert s t a t u s threshold table 
Activity/object Alert status threshold 
Wordprocessor 8 
Database 2 
Create file 8 
Delete file 3 
Suspension of supervision 
In some cases it is envisaged that continuous 
behaviour monitoring at all times 
throughout a user session may not be strictly 
necessary or even advantageous. This is 
especially true in the case of the mechanisms 
aimed solely at the detection of penetrators 
(e.g. keystroke analysis). The rationale here 
is that, after a reasonable amount of 
uninterrupted behaviour analysis (i.e. with 
no challenges and no significant periods of 
user inactivity), the monitoring system 
should have been able to accurately 
determine the legitimacy of the current user 
(e.g. previous research has indicated that, 
using keystroke analysis, a reliable 
authentication judgement should be 
obtainable within 400 keystrokes in a real-
time monitoring context (Fumell, 1995)). If an 
impostor is not suspected at this point then it 
is extremely unlikely that further 
monitoring will detect one (indeed, 
monitoring for longer than is necessary 
would simply allow more opportunity for 
false rejections to occur and place an 
addifional load on the system). In view of 
this, it is considered that monitoring activity 
during the following periods is likely to be 
most crucial in terms of impostor detection 
(with supervision being temporarily 
suspended at other times): 
• during the period immediately after the 
start of the session (when the authenticity 
of the user has yet to be conclusively 
proven); 
• during the time after any significant 
period of inactivity (during which an 
impostor could potentially have replaced 
the legitimate user). 
Important considerations here would 
obviously be the period of monitoring 
necessary before suspension of supervision 
and also what length of time would constitute 
the significant period of inactivity necessary 
for it to be resumed. Suggested periods would 
depend upon the monitored characteristics 
(e.g. monitoring of keystroke dynamics could 
yield an authenticafion judgement more 
quickly than monitoring of application 
usage), but a general rule could be to monitor 
up to five minutes of non-anomalous activity 
before suspension in order to allow a 
sufficient appraisal of the user to be made. 
Approximately two to three minutes of 
inactivity would then be seen as a suitable 
trigger for monitoring to resume, as this 
length of time could have allowed sufficient 
opportunity for impostor intervention. In a 
practical implementation, both of these 
aspects would be configurable so that the 
optimum levels could be established. 
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It should be noted that this approach would 
not be adequate for the detection of misfeasor 
activity, as this could very well proceed after 
authentication has been established. 
Therefore, i f suspension of monitoring was 
still to be incorporated, it would be sensible 
to periodically reintroduce supervision at 
random intervals as an additional safeguard 
(this would also help to guard against a 
situation where an impostor/penetrator 
might be able to replace the authorised user 
without there being a significant period of 
inactivity). 
This idea is primarily suggested as a 
means of minimising the likelihood of false 
rejections in the practical context. However, 
a further advantage in the context of 
practical implementation would be that it 
would reduce the significant processing 
overhead that would be associated with 
continuous monitoring in an environment 
with a large number of client machines. 
Response to suspected Intrusions 
The existence and operation of IMS should 
ideally remain transparent to the user unless 
an anomaly is suspected. As previously 
stated, a suspected intrusion wi l l cause IMS 
to automatically perform some further action 
(the nature of which wi l l vary depending 
upon the type of intrusion involved). Options 
here include: 
• issuing of an explicit request (or 
challenge) for further authentication; 
• recording of details in an intrusion log for 
later inspection/investigation; 
• immediate notification of the system 
manager (i.e. an intrusion alarm); 
• phased reduction of permitted behaviour; 
• locking of the intruder's terminal; 
• termination (or suspension) of the 
anomalous session/process. 
The degree of automatic response is an 
important consideration and, as indicated 
above, must be matched to the severity of the 
suspected intrusion. For example, i f there is 
high confidence that an activity represents 
an intrusion or i f a particularly serious 
breach is suspected, then the maximum 
coimtermeasure response should result. 
However, in lesser scenarios more limited 
responses wi l l be appropriate (e.g. simply 
writing details to the intrusion log). 
There is an obvious danger that any option 
which allows the user to continue working 
whilst the anomaly is investigated would also 
allow more time for an intruder to cause 
damage. At the other extreme it would be 
undesirable for the system to terminate a 
session or process without a very high degree 
of certainty that an intrusion was in 
progress. Therefore, the first two options 
above are considered to be the most 
appropriate as initial forms of response. 
In practice, there are several possibilities 
for the type of challenge that the system 
could issue in the event of a suspected 
intrusion. The original system password 
would obviously be inadequate, given that it 
may have already been compromised in 
order for an intruder to have gained access in 
the first place. It is desirable that the 
challenge be such that i t allows any 
legitimate user to resume work quickly with 
minimal interruption (i.e. it should be easy 
for them to overcome, whilst still trapping 
impostors). A suggestion is that a (short) 
series of question and answer type challenges 
be posed to the user (Haga and Zviran, 1991), 
who would then need to answer them 
correctly in order to proceed further. These 
could be based upon cognitive and/or 
associative information, with valid responses 
having been obtained and stored in 
conjunction with the original user profiling. 
I f several (e.g. five to ten) such questions 
were to be obtained from users during 
profiling then the challenge could be based 
upon a random selection from the set (further 
reducing the chance of impostors being able 
to compromise the system). 
There are, however, a number of scenarios 
in which this approach would be ineffective. 
Firstly, it must be remembered that any form 
of authentication-based challenge would be 
an inadequate countermeasiu*e against 
misfeasors. They would obviously be able to 
respond correctly to such challenges (having 
originally supplied the information 
themselves) and then continue with 
unauthorised activity. There is a solution 
here in the realisaUon that continuing 
anomalies would lead to a succession of 
intrusion alerts; an event that would be 
suspicious in iUelf. At this pomt, the IMS 
response could then change to a method that 
would effectively combat misfeasors as well 
(e.g. a session lock or a trigger for system 
manager investigation). Nevertheless, this 
would st i l l enable misfeasors to continue for 
longer than other classes of intruder (albeit 
with intermediate challenge(s)) before the 
system locks them out. 
A second problem/exception relates to 
suspected malicious processes - these cannot 
be issued with a challenge to which they may 
respond and verify their legitimacy. This in 
turn places more importance on the 
correctness of the resulting IMS response 
(e.g. the dangers of suspending/deleting a 
legitimate, and possibly essential, process or 
failing to take positive action against a 
genuinely destructive one). 
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Finally, some classes of anomaly (for 
example, login failures based on 
unrecognised user identities) cannot be tied 
to a specific user and, as such, the issue of a 
challenge based upon profile information is 
again inappropriate. However, it is 
conceivable that some form of generic 
challenge could be issued (the answer to 
which would be known by legitimate system 
users), wi th invalid responses causing the 
IMS to proceed to its next level of 
countermeasure (e.g. system manager 
notification, terminal lockout). 
I IMS implementation issues 
The IMS concept is considered most 
appropriate to implementation in a 
networked environment, for the following 
reasons: 
• Standalone systems wi l l most often be 
dedicated to a single user. As such, more 
traditional authentication and access 
controls (e.g. passwords) w i l l probably be 
sufTicient to ensure security i f they are 
correctly implemented. 
• Implementation of a fu l l IMS would be 
likely to degrade the performance of a 
standalone system. 
• Networked systems provide more 
potential for collecting monitoring 
information. Many statistics (e.g. access 
location, resource usage) would not be 
appropriate to a standalone environment. 
In this scenario, the host would be 
centralised with multiple IMS clients being 
used to monitor activity on the individual 
workstations. The purpose of the clients 
would be to collect any activity data that is 
generated locally (e.g. keystroke timings) and 
to enforce IMS restrictions in suspected 
intrusion scenarios (e.g. issue a challenge, 
lock access to the system etc.). In such a 
scenario it would be necessary to maintain 
the security of the IMS clients on the 
individual machines to ensure that their 
operation cannot be compromised (e.g. by a 
malicious user trying to avoid detection). 
The realisation of the IMS approach is 
considered to have a number of advantages, 
as listed below. 
• Improved security. This is advantageous in 
any information system, and is achieved 
here due to the continuous nature of 
supervision. User authentication is no 
longer restricted to the discrete 
judgement(s) possible with passwords* 
and misuse wi l l be identifiable much 
earlier than with traditional auditing. In 
addition, the fact that much of the 
supervision is based upon behavioural 
characteristics makes i t more diff icul t for 
users themselves to undermine security 
(e.g. by allowing colleagues unauthorised 
access to their accounts) as they cannot 
easily transfer these abilities to other 
users. 
• Cost. Advantages here result f rom the fact 
that it is possible to implement the 
concept entirely in software at the user 
end, whereas many frequently suggested 
authentication enhancement schemes 
(e.g. smart cards, other biometric 
methods) are reliant upon specialised 
equipment at each user workstation. This 
makes the technique particularly suited to 
financially constrained environments. 
• Convenience. This comes from the fact that 
the supervision can be performed 
transparently, in a non-intrusive manner. 
In addition, the fact that the IMS would 
demand nothing special from the users 
(e.g. they are not required to remember 
additional password-type information or 
possess any physical token) means that its 
operation should not undermine the 
existing staff culture, which is recognised 
as an important issue in the introduction 
of security (Warren et al, 1995). 
There are also a number of inherent 
disadvantages in the concept of IMS (and, 
indeed, any other type of comprehensive 
monitoring and supervision system). The 
principal concerns are highlighted below. 
• The operation of IMS clients and/or data 
collection wi l l consume system resources 
and may degrade overall performance. 
The collection of detailed audit t rai l data 
typically degrades machine performance 
by between 5 and 20 per cent (Wolfe, 1992; 
Mukherjee et al. 1994). An IMS performing 
fu l l behavioural monitoring and testing of 
generic intrusion rules would be 
envisaged to introduce a similar burden. 
• Transmission of data from clients to the 
host wi l l result in a loss of network 
bandwidth and a loss of timeliness of data. 
• Maintenance of the IMS itself would entail 
a more significant management/ 
administration burden in the affected 
systems. For example, correcting 
problems with behaviour profiles would 
be a more complex operation than 
cancelling a forgotten password. At the 
same time, however, other duties (such as 
inspection of audit trails) would be 
reduced, so the new demands would at 
least be somewhat offset. 
• The overall concept of continuous 
supervision raises a question of user 
acceptance. It is conceivable that there 
may be mistrust and resentment of the 
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system on the grounds of it being seen as a 
means of monitoring legitimate work and 
staff performance as opposed to just 
guarding against intruders. It would, 
therefore, be important to ensure that the 
system is perceived as a caring mother 
rather than a big brother. 
In general terms, the likely advantages when 
compared to other means of protection are 
considered sufficient to outweigh these 
points. In view of this, the authors are 
currently developing an implementation of 
the IMS approach for the Windows NT 
environment (Dowland and Fumell, 2000). 
Conclusions 
The paper has described the concept of 
intrusion monitoring and a potential 
approach by which i t may be realised in 
modem networked systems. The IMS concept 
is not intended as a total replacement for 
conventional authentication and access 
control methods (although in some cases it 
wi l l offer an opportunity for more dated 
approaches to be replaced). In the m^or i ty of 
systems, supervision could be incorporated 
alongside other methods to complement the 
security already provided. In addition, it w i l l 
have little or no effect upon the need for 
physical security and personnel-related 
measures wi thin an organisation. There are 
also some important aspects of logical 
security that are not addressed (e.g. 
protection of data communications) which 
further highlight the potential need for a 
wider IT security framework. 
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